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Abstract/Lay Summary  
 
The war effort of the United Kingdom and the subsequent restrictions and laws enforced 
by the Government during the Second World War time period had a significant impact on 
the British piano industry. The skilled work force, factories, and raw materials previously 
used to produce pianos became integral to the war effort, while production of non-
necessities and luxury items, such as pianos, was limited and eventually ceased. In order to 
limit production and divert material and labour to the war effort, debilitating restrictions, 
company consolidation, and prohibitive taxation came into effect. This forced many piano 
manufacturers to seek out war production contracts, while those who were not able to 
secure these contracts had to relinquish their factories and employees, rely on revenue from 
repair work, or completely close down during the war years.    
This thesis is the first extensive study of the impact of the Second World War on the British 
piano industry. Through an examination of the laws and regulations passed by the British 
Government during and immediately following the war years, a better understanding of the 
war’s effect on the entire industry will be established and a timeline of the various 
restrictions placed on piano manufacturing will be presented.  This timeline highlights (1) 
the Government’s desire to stop piano manufacturing in order to divert labour and materials 
to the war effort, (2) the effect of Government restrictions on the piano industry, (3) the 
industry’s struggle to convert to war work, and (4) the impact of the war in the post-war 
years.    
Archival documents from both the piano industry and the Board of Trade elucidate the 
difficult situation faced by the industry and the effort of the Government both to stop 
piano production and to help the industry restart in the post-war era.  The goal of the 
paper is to show the lasting effects of the war on the British piano industry and to argue 
that the British Government’s treatment of the piano industry during the war era hastened 
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The study period of this thesis predates the introduction of decimal currency in Britain in 
1971. Monetary figures quoted from primary sources and other historic documents use the 
old system of currency; pounds (£); shillings (s), and pence (d). In this system there were 
20 shillings to the pound; 21 shillings to the guinea; 12 pence to a shilling or 240 pence to 
the pound.  
Measurements are primarily given in the imperial system as this study predates the switch 
to metric in Britain in 1995. Measurements include feet (ft or ') and inches (in or ") for 
length, gallons for volume, and pounds (lbs) and ounces for weight.  
During the study time of this thesis the United Kingdom controlled to varying degrees 30% 
of the world’s land mass through its numerous crown colonies, protectorates, and the Indian 
Empire. In addition, the United Kingdom maintained political ties to four dominions: 
Australia, Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, which were called the 
“Commonwealth” after 1926.  This thesis uses the term “empire” when referring to the 
United Kingdom and all associated countries and territories. Commonwealth is used when 
referring to dominion countries. Although historical documents and primary source 
material used for this study sometimes use the terms “empirical states,” and “empirical 
preference countries,” this thesis uses the term Commonwealth because the countries 
referred to in the archival documents were dominion countries and therefore members of 
the Commonwealth. 
Although modern conventions often use the term pianoforte to distinguish an early piano 
(meaning one without an iron plate) from a modern instrument; this thesis uses the term 
piano throughout.   
For the purpose of this study, the term “piano industry” refers to the manufacturers of 
pianos and piano parts. The term does not include piano merchants, dealers, repairers, or 
tuners, although references to these facets of the music trades are occasionally included, 
particularly in the investigation of the effects of the Purchase Tax.   
References to the National Archives in this thesis refer to the archives at Kew. Documents 
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The Second World War had a significant impact on the manufacture of pianos in Great 
Britain.  Government regulations imposed for the war effort limited production, 
restricted materials integral to piano manufacture, banned piano sales to the domestic 
and then export market, forced companies to consolidate, and ultimately halted the 
production of pianos. In order for companies to remain solvent during the war years, 
firms sought contracts to produce war-related items, made pianos for the military, or 
relied on repair work and second hand piano sales. Many factories and some 
companies were completely closed.  In the post-war era the continued limitations 
placed on the British piano industry by the Government stymied the reconstruction 
efforts, further damaging the already faltering industry. Without a doubt, the Second 
World War had a lasting effect on the British piano industry. 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, the British piano industry was a mere 
shadow of its former self. After dominating the piano market during the nineteenth 
century, the British industry had been haemorrhaging business throughout the 
twentieth century, and by the time of this study period only 40 companies remained. 
This fall from grace was largely due to the companies slow acceptance of modern 
manufacturing techniques and new piano technologies, as well as their inability to 
compete with German and American imports. That said, the industry was not dead; in 
fact, in the 1930s sales were beginning to rise and the general mood was optimistic. 
Unfortunately, the upswing in business and rise in manufacturing was about to come 
to an end.  
The Second World War would stop the fledgling renaissance of the British piano 
industry. Its effects would last much longer than the period of fighting and it would 
affect the industry for the rest of the twentieth century. However, little has been 
published about how the war changed the industry and this thesis is the first in-depth 
study of the impact of the Second World War on the British piano industry. 
The musical instrument industry of Britain during the mid-twentieth century included 
more than manufacturers of pianos. Organs, woodwind and brass instruments, guitars, 
banjos, bowed strings, harps, percussion, harmonicas, and concertinas were all 
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produced in the United Kingdom.1 During the period of this study, band instrument 
manufacturers (woodwind, brass, and percussion instruments) consisted 
predominantly of larger companies such as Boosey & Hawkes and the Premier Drum 
Company.2 Like piano manufacturers, these instrument makers had a significant 
workforce and sizeable factories. Plucked string instruments, harmonicas, and 
concertinas were massed produced by companies such as John E. Dallas & Sons, and 
Rose, Morris and Company. Alternatively, bowed stringed instruments and harp 
manufacturers tended to be smaller in scale.  
The decision to focus on the piano industry was mainly due to the availability of 
archival sources3 and because it was decided that examining the entire musical 
instrument industry would be too large of a task for this study. As pianos are made of 
a variety of materials, the piano could serve as an example of how government 
restrictions and policies affected piano making and this information could then be 
transferred to studies of other types of instrument manufacturing at the time.  
Historically the British piano industry was located almost entirely in London. A small 
number of companies were established in other cities and towns throughout the history 
of British piano making, but during the period of this study only two manufacturers 
were located outside of London. Because of this, this dissertation focusses mainly on 
the London piano industry, but makes mention of companies established in other parts 
of the United Kingdom when appropriate. 
The study of piano manufacturing during the Second World War complements a 
growing collection of organological scholarship which uses the interdisciplinary 
nature of musical instrument research in expanding our understanding of instruments 
and their place in society. Today, organology as a discipline uses musical instruments 
as specimens which can tell a researcher not only about how the instrument may have 
                                                 
1 Musical instrument manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and importers were listed in the 1938 The 
Music Trade Directory. Unfortunately, this publication does not differentiate as to whether a company 
was a manufacturer or retailer, but it gives a good indication of the number of businesses involved in 
the music trades prior to the beginning of the Second World War. The Music Trade Directory 1938 
(London: Musical Opinion, 1938).  
2 Arnold Myers, “Brasswind Manufacturing at Boosey & Hawkes, 1930-1959,” Historic Brass Society 
Journal 15, (2003): 55. 
3 The National Archives hold documentation directly relating to the manufacture of pianos during the 
study period and two company archives were readily available. 
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sounded, but also about the people who played it, who made it, who designed it, and 
what its role was in society. The field has grown from its traditional in-depth technical 
study of the acoustic properties of musical instruments and focus on classification, to 
a broader, cultural study of musical instruments. Organological scholarship overlaps 
with that of musicology,4 the social sciences, history, and many other disciplines. This 
allows organology to explore a wide range of topics, but with musical instruments 
always at the core of the discussion.  
This dissertation follows in the footsteps of organologists who study industrialised 
musical instrument manufacturing. This includes the work of Marie Kent who studies 
the lives of the workman of the piano industry in nineteenth-century London;5 of Jenny 
Nex who researches the socio-economic aspects of musical instrument making, as well 
as the social and cultural context of musical instruments;6 of Jocelyn Howell who 
studies the Boosey & Hawkes Company;7 and of Margaret Banks who researches the 
American band instrument industry and how its migration from the east coast to the 
Midwest changed the musical landscape of the United States.8 All of these authors 
explore wider, socio-economic issues and developments through the study of wide-
scale instrument manufacturing. The authors often rely heavily on business records 
and archival documents rather than on the examination of musical instruments in order 
to expand our knowledge of instrument making and related issues.  
As this dissertation looks at how the laws and restrictions passed by the Government 
of the United Kingdom affected musical instrument making, this study is just as much 
a study of economics and political science as it is about musical instrument 
                                                 
4 There is disagreement as to whether organology is a sub-discipline of musicology or its own 
discipline. The author was trained as a organologist and was taught that the field is its own discipline. 
As such, the author approaches this study as an example of organological research. That said, much of 
today’s organology research could just as easily fit within the field of musicology and vice versa. The 
cross-over nature of the two fields allow scholars in both disciplines to explore music and musical 
instruments in complementary ways.    
5 See Marie E. Kent, “The Piano-Industry Workforce in Mid-Victorian England: a Study of the 1881 
Census.” Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle 46:1 (2015): 95-158 and “Exposing the 
London piano industry workforce, c.1765-1914” (PhD dissertation: London Metropolitan University, 
2013). 
6 See Jenny Nex, “The Business of Musical-Instrument Making in Early Industrial London” (PhD 
dissertation: Goldsmiths College, The University of London, 2013).  
7 See Jocelyn, Howell, “Wind instrument design and manufacture at Boosey & Hawkes and its 
associated companies: a corporate history” (PhD dissertation: City, University of London, 2016). 




manufacturing. As such, this dissertation is continuing the developing scholarship of 
musical instrument research which explores wider cultural topics through the lens of 
musical instrument making. 
A plethora of material examines the development of the piano industry from its early 
days in the eighteenth century through its heyday in the nineteenth century. This 
includes in-depth organological explorations of the technical development of the piano 
and changes in its design and construction techniques; the establishment of the piano 
industry; as well as overviews of leading makers, inventors, composers, and 
performers.9 But, the majority of the organological scholarship on the British piano 
industry stops at the turn of the twentieth century and within this limited source 
material, even less is written about the impact of the Second World War.  
The cultural and social influence of the piano, as well as how its development shaped 
music and performance practice is also thoroughly explored. This is especially true in 
musicological research into the influence of the piano, piano music, and pianism in 
eighteenth and nineteenth century music and culture.10  As the instrument developed 
and rose to prominence, the piano became the centre of domestic and professional 
music making and as Nicholas Temperley states “it is not easy to recapture the 
excitement and romance that the instrument embodied when it first became widely 
                                                 
9 See Marth Clinkscales, Makers of the Piano Vol. 1: 1700-1820 (Oxford University Press, 1993) and 
Makers of the Piano Vol. 2: 1820-1860 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); Henry Warwick Cole, “The 
Early Piano Reconsidered.” Early Music 14:4 (November 1986); Alfred Dolge, Pianos and Their 
Makers (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1972); Cyril Ehrlich, The Piano: A History (London: J. 
M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1976); and Richard Maunder’s articles “The Earliest English Square Piano?” 
The Galpin Society Journal 42 (August 1989): 77-84 and “J. C. Bach and the Early Piano in London.” 
Journal of the Royal Musical Association 115:2 (1991): 201-210.   
10 Examples of works which document the cultural impact of the piano on eighteenth and nineteenth 
century musical life include: Ruth A Solie’s chapter ‘“Girling’ at the Parlor Piano” from her book 
Music in Other Words: Victorian Conversations (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) - an 
interesting discussion of how the piano became the focus of young women’s education and 
entertainment in Victorian times; Dorothy de Val, “Gradus ad Parnassum: The Pianoforte in London, 
1770-1820 (PhD dissertation: University of London Kings College, 1991), which documents the 
symbiotic development of the British piano and the piano music publishing industry; and Iain 
Woodfield’s chapter “The Woman Amateur” in his book Music of the Raj: A Social and Economic 
History of Music in Late Eighteenth-Century Anglo-Indian Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), which discusses the importance of the piano to British women living in India in the eighteenth 
century and documents the difficulty of obtaining and maintaining the instrument in the country. The 
collection of essays in The Piano in Nineteenth-Century British Culture, edited by Therese Ellsworth 
and Susan Wollenberg (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007) explore a wide range of piano-
related topics such as the origin of the piano recital, the reception of early piano music, the piano 
market in Ireland, and the lives of British composers of piano music.  
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used after about 1770,”11 but with the amount of scholarship focused on the instrument 
in the eighteen and nineteenth century, it seems that researchers are still finding plenty 
to write about.  
By the beginning of the twentieth century the piano’s place in cultural life was 
thoroughly established and the instrument and its influence were no longer the focus 
of extensive examination. For example, the importance of music during wartime, 
particularly for morale and propaganda purposes, is an interesting topic for 
musicological and historical research. Examples of recent research which explores 
music during wartime Britain include Jane Angell’s dissertation “Art music in British 
public discourse during the First World War,”12 Kate Guthrie’s “Music and Cultural 
Values in 1940s Britain,”13 and David Allen Sheridan’s “‘Give Us More Music’: 
Women, Musical Culture, and Work in Wartime Britain, 1939-1946.”14 But, in each 
of these three theses, the piano is mentioned mainly in passing, with the focus on music 
and its role, rather than on the instruments which would have been played. Angell 
devotes the most time to discussing the role of the piano during wartime when she 
describes the comforting presence of a piano to people living through the war.15 She 
does describe the anti-German sentiment that was rife throughout the London piano 
industry and how the industry saw the war as a time when they could re-establish the 
reputation of British-made pianos with the British public, but this information had been 
previously published by Cyril Ehrlich.16 Sheridan discusses the piano as a performance 
instrument in wartime concerts organised by Myra Hess at the National Gallery,17 and 
Guthrie mentions the piano in referring to composers or as an instrument played in a 
film.18 The three dissertations are important for exploring the perception and 
                                                 
11 Temperley writes this in the forward to The Piano in Nineteenth-Century British Culture edited by 
Therese Ellsworth and Susan Wollenberg (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), xv.  
12 Jane Angell, “Art music in British public discourse during the First World War” (PhD dissertation: 
Royal Holloway University of London, 2014). 
13 Kath Guthrie, “Music and Cultural Values in 1940s Britain” (PhD dissertation: King’s College 
London, 2014). 
14 David Allen Sheridan, “‘Give Us More Music’: Women, Musical Culture, and Work in Wartime 
Britain, 1939-1946” (PhD dissertation: University of Southern California, 2007). 
15 Angell, 89. 
16 In her discussion of the London piano trade during the First World War, Angell references Ehrlich’s 
The Piano: A History as the source for all of the information. Ibid, 93. 
17 Sheridan, 70. 
18 Guthrie mentions the piano seven times in her dissertation but the piano is never the focus of the 
discussion. For example, John Ireland and his piano composition Sarnia is referenced on page 40; the 
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importance of art music and popular music during times of crisis in the twentieth 
century, but they do not give any insights to the position of the piano or the piano 
industry during the time.   
The reason for the lack of organological scholarship on twentieth-century British piano 
production may be the result of the diminishing prominence of the British piano during 
this time period. By the beginning of the twentieth century London was no longer the 
centre of piano making, as this had moved to Germany and the United States of 
America. Generally, histories of the piano give an overview of the development of the 
instrument by examining the centres of instrument making, often highlighting 
predominant makers within their regions and corresponding time periods, but once that 
region is no longer leading in production or innovative in their design, the scholarship 
dwindles.19 Perhaps researchers are less inclined to research a failing or lacklustre 
industry? Or, perhaps the lessening of primary source materials caused by the failure 
of an industry has deterred researchers from investigating this time period. Whatever 
the reason, there seems to be little organological scholarship on twentieth-century 
piano making overall.   
Key studies of the British piano industry in the twentieth century include Cyril 
Ehrlich’s The Piano: A History, David Wainwright’s The Piano Makers and 
Broadwood by Appointment, and Alistair Laurence in his books Five London Piano 
Makers and More London Piano Makers.20   
Ehrlich, in The Piano: A History, and Wainwright, in The Piano Makers, give broad 
overviews of the history of the piano industry. As the books were published in the 
1970s, they include information about piano manufacturing in the twentieth century 
                                                 
playing of Rachmaninov’s Piano Concerto No.2 at a Proms concert in 1941 is referenced on page 57; 
and Vera Lynn’s piano-playing co-star in the film We’ll Meet Again is mentioned on page 76 and 77.  
19 This format is used in Alfred Dolge, Pianos and Their Makers, (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1972); Cyril Ehrlich, The Piano: A History (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1976); Stuart 
Isacoff, A Natural History of the Piano: The Instrument, the Music, the Musicians: From Mozart to 
Modern Jazz and Everything in Between, (New York: Vintage Books, 2012); and David Wainwright, 
The Piano Makers (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1975). 
20 See Cyril Ehrlich, The Piano: A History (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1976); David 
Wainwright, The Piano Makers, (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1975); David Wainwright, 
Broadwood by Appointment, (London: The Book Service Ltd., 1982); Alistair Laurence, Five London 
Piano Makers: Brinsmead, Challen, Collard, Danemann, Welmar, (London: Keywood Press, 2010); 
and Alistair Laurence, More London Piano Makers: Eavestaff, Rogers, Squire, Knight, Chappell, 
Hopkinson, (London: Keywood Press, 2015.)      
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and the Second World War, but neither author devotes much research to this period.  
Whereas Wainwright wrote extensively on the effects of the First World War on the 
British industry, the Second World War is discussed in much less detail, with only two 
pages dedicated to the subject.21 In his short overview of the war, Wainwright 
mentions the Concentration of Industry Scheme, but fails to mention any other 
restriction placed on the industry. He does mention piano production for the military, 
and some war production contracts, but Wainwright does not include notes and his 
book lists only 31 sources in his bibliography, so it is difficult to validate his 
information. Additionally, through the research conducted in this thesis, it was 
discovered that the dates given by Wainwright for the return to piano manufacturing 
in the post-war years are incorrect.22 This thesis looks to rectify this misinformation. 
Wainwright follows a similar treatment of the war in his Broadwood by Appointment. 
In this study three pages of text give the summary of the company during the war 
period.23 As Wainwright used the John Broadwood and Sons Archive at the Surrey 
History Centre as a source for his research, he had much more information available 
to him for this period of time, but he chose not to include it in the book.24  
Ehrlich’s book is considered a seminal source on the history of the piano industry. The 
book is an important reference for both the international growth and decline of the 
industry, but in his book the author writes just one paragraph on the war in the 
concluding chapter. He states: 
The Second World War was less disruptive to piano making than the first 
because there was less to disrupt. Some factories were destroyed in air raids, 
including Blüthner’s, and some firms were forced out of business by shortage 
of men and materials. But many small or weak makers had been eliminated 
during the Depression, and further concentration through market forces or 
government decree merely continued an existing trend. In Britain, the most 
important difference was that the industry no longer depended upon foreign 
components, which again eased adjustment to wartime conditions. Production 
was diminished, of course, and standards tended to decline, which disturbed 
musicians but had little effect on a general public for whom pianos no longer 
                                                 
21 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 160-161. 
22 Wainwright states that piano manufacturing for the domestic market was restarted in 1951. 
Resumption of Home Trade for the piano industry was started in July 1949 when manufacturers were 
able to produce a limited number of instruments for the domestic market. (See Appendix 2 for a 
timeline of Government restrictions on the piano industry.   
23 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 308-310. 
24 Wainwright lists the archives in his references.  
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occupied a central place in expenditure and aspiration. Occasional incidents, 
such as the purchase of a second hand instruments in which the action’s tapes 
had been replaced with elastic bands, were illustrative of a sellers’ marker, but 
people were not sufficiently eager to buy for a ‘munition workers’ scandal to 
develop comparable to that of 1915-19.25  
Certainly, there were fewer piano makers in Britain than during the previous war, but 
those makers still have an important story to tell. During 1939-1953, the British piano 
industry faced enormous difficulties: from material shortages, Government 
restrictions, forced consolidation, to labour shortages, it is impressive that any of these 
companies were able to remained solvent during and after the war. How the piano 
industry met the difficulties is worthy of investigation.  
Alastair Laurence has spent considerable effort documenting the history of individual 
piano companies, and much of his work focuses on the twentieth century. In his books 
he includes the histories of eleven London-based piano making firms: Brinsmead, 
Challen, Chappell, Collard, Danemann & Company, Eavestaff, Alfred Knight, Rogers 
and Hopkinson, Squire, and Welmar.  Laurence included information regarding the 
piano companies’ production during the Second World War, but the information 
presented is often vague and because he does not take into account all of the restrictions 
placed on the piano industry during the time. Ultimately his timeline of piano 
production during the war years is inaccurate.26 Either way, the books were invaluable 
resources for this dissertation. 
Whereas there is a lack of information on the piano industry during the Second World 
War, there have been numerous published studies regarding the restrictions and 
regulations used by the British Government in order to control manufacturing during 
the war years. The British Government published the official history of the war through 
a series of publications which documented the war. Useful books from this series 
included British War Production by Michael Moïssey Postan, The Control of Raw 
Materials by J. Hurstfield, and Contracts and Finance by William Ashworth.27 These 
                                                 
25 Ehrlich, 194. 
26 In particular Laurence may not have taken into account the strict restrictions placed on the piano 
industry by the Board of Trade and the influence the Ministry of Labour and National Service had in 
shutting down piano production in 1943. Laurence states that makers were producing pianos in 1944 
and 1945 but this is in conflict with the regulations placed on the industry by the Board of Trade.  
27 These three books are part of the British Official History of the war. The book series began in 1949 
and had its last publication in 2004. See Michael Moïssey Postan, British War Production, (London: 
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publications look at the process of mobilisation from a broad perspective, giving 
overviews of the structure of the Government and the reasoning for the Government’s 
motives for closing down domestic production of what was deemed “luxury” items.  
More critical analysis of the organisation of mobilisation can be found outside official 
Government publications. Examples of this writing includes the work of G.D.N. 
Worswick and A. Briggs, in their articles about the controls placed on raw materials 
in articles in the Oxford Economic Papers, as well as Maurice Hankey’s Government 
Control in War, Ronald Weeks’ Organisation & Equipment for War, and Mary 
Murphy’s article “Wartime Concentration of British Industry” from the The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics.28 These publications focused more on the effects of the 
mobilisation effort on the British economy.  
The mobilisation of the British economy is an interesting topic for researchers but most 
of the publications provide a macro-approach to their studies. Individual industries, 
particularly industries not related to the military, are not examined. The piano industry 
receives no mention in any of these publications but they were useful sources for 
creating the timeline of restrictions placed on the piano industry during this study’s 
period.   
As secondary sources give little data on the impact of the Second World War on British 
piano production, much of the research undertaken for this thesis has been done 
through studying archival documents and the piano industries’ trade publications in 
order to create a timeline of the impact of the war on the industry. The sources 
consulted include archives of the British Government, individual company archives, 
and the Music Trades Review.  
                                                 
Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1952); J. Hurstfield, The Control of Raw Materials, (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953); and William Ashworth, Contracts and Finance, (London: Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953). 
28 See Ian Bowen and G. D. N. Worswick, “The Controls and War Finance,” Oxford Economic Papers 
(September 1940): 77-104 and G. D. N. Worswick, “British Raw Materials Control,” Oxford 
Economic Papers (April 1942): 1-44; A. Briggs, “The Framework of Wool Control” Oxford 
Economic Papers (November 1947):18-45; Maurice Hankey, Government Control in War (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1945); Weeks, Organisation & Equipment for War (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950); and Mary E. Murphy, “Wartime Concentration of British Industry,” The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 57:1 (November 1942): 129-141. 
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The papers of the Board of Trade preserved at the National Archives, Kew, provide a 
first-hand look at the governmental planning of the war economy. The archive showed 
how the Government needed to shut down the piano industry in order to re-direct vital 
resources but knew that by doing so it would damage the industry. The papers include 
internal correspondence between civil servants working at the Board of Trade, 
Ministry of Labour and National Service, and Ministry of Supply, as well as letters 
from members of the piano industry. Reports provided by the piano industry include 
production statistics before the piano manufacturing was stopped in 1943. The papers 
are kept in two files: “Piano Industry General Policy” (BT 64/1783) contains 
production information and correspondence relating to the closing of the industry up 
until 1943; “Piano Industry Reconstruction” (BT 64/1786) contains papers relating to 
the reconstruction of the industry beginning in 1942. Additional Government 
documents consulted at the National Archives were that of the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production and Royal Air Force papers. These papers contained information which 
related the design of the Mosquito bomber to the skills that the piano industry needed 
in its manufacture. The two most useful files were: “Mosquito” (AIR 20/2884) and 
“Research and Development – Unarmed bomber” (AVIA 46/116).  
Two company archives were consulted in researching this thesis in order to give a 
more in-depth look at the impact of the war on individual companies. They were the 
John Broadwood and Sons Archive preserved at the Surrey History Centre, Woking, 
and the Kemble Archive, Hackney Archives, Hackney. Both archives contained 
information relating to the production of pianos and other war-related items during the 
Second World War. The Broadwood archive is extensive and contains the Minutes of 
the Meetings of the Board of Directors, which included reports on the status of the 
company, rate of production, consolidation of the company, damage to the factory, as 
well as information on the difficulty of obtaining war production contracts. In addition, 
the Broadwood archive included the sales books of the company and the year-end 
reports for the period of the thesis.  The materials preserved in the Kemble archive 
were less complete and they do not thoroughly document the history of the company. 
Rather, the archive is a hodgepodge of items that were donated to the Hackney 
Archives by Michael Kemble, director of Kemble, when the factory closed. 
Nevertheless, the archive contained some information on war-time production, 
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wholesale and retail price lists, photographs, newspaper clippings, deeds to properties, 
and legal agreements between Kemble Company and other piano manufacturers. In 
addition to research undertaken at the Kemble archive, the author conducted a personal 
interview with Denzil Jacobs, a former director of Kemble, who was an employee of 
the company during the study period.  
The trade publication primarily consulted for this thesis was the Music Trades Review, 
which included valuable information on the status of the industry before, during, and 
after the Second World War. The publication included reports on production, damage 
to piano factories, company consolidation, and factory and company closures. The 
Music Trades Review also was a source for Government regulations as it printed 
Government documents detailing the Excess Profit Tax, Purchase Tax, Limitation of 
Supplies Orders, and Control Orders for piano manufacturers. It must be said that the 
publication was prejudiced towards the situation of the industry and could be 
inflammatory in its rhetoric, but its reprinting of Government documents and reporting 
on individual manufacturers was invaluable.  
The chapters are presented, as far as possible, in a chronological order. This is done to 
create a timeline of the impact of the war on the British piano industry, particularly in 
regard to piano production. Chapter 1: History of the British Piano Industry gives a 
broad overview of the development of the British piano industry up until the beginning 
of the Second World War and allows the readers to familiarise themselves with the 
history of British piano manufacturing. This chapter reviews the rise of the industry in 
the late eighteenth century, its dominance in the nineteenth century, and its subsequent 
downfall in the twentieth century. Attention is given to the geography of the British 
piano industry, its centralisation in London, and how this location was helpful to the 
industry’s development. The status of the industry in the early part of the twentieth 
century and the impact of the First World War and the following Depression in the 
inter-war years lays the foundations for the subsequent chapters which will explore the 
Second World War and its impact.  
The next chapter, Chapter 2: Mobilisation for War, presents a study of the organisation 
of the mobilisation of the British Government in the inter-war years and in the first 
few years of the war. This chapter explores the development of the British war machine 
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and the various ministries which would have an impact on the piano industry. It 
includes a discussion of Britain’s initial reluctance to mobilise and then the steps that 
were taken in order to change the economy from one focused on civilian production to 
that of war production. This includes the methods the Government used in order to 
control production, materials, and labour. The chapter follows the development of the 
war economy until the country was considered fully mobilised.  
The exploration of raw materials used in piano manufacture and the steps the British 
Government took to control them is explored in Chapter 3: The Restricted Materials 
Used in Piano Construction. The chapter explains why one of the main reasons the 
Government needed to close the piano industry was the need of the materials used in 
piano production for the war effort. One method used to halt piano production was the 
restriction of raw material, ultimately helping to make piano manufacturing 
impossible. This chapter analyses the various materials used in the construction of a 
piano, how those materials were needed for the war effort, and the organisation which 
was responsible for its regulation. The use of timber, iron and steel, and wool is 
examined in three ways: the use of the materials in piano construction; the needs of 
that material in the war effort; and the control of the material by the Government.   
Chapter 4: The Impact of Government Restrictions on Piano Production presents a 
timeline of the closure of the piano industry by examining the restrictions and taxes 
implemented by the British Government in the mobilisation effort. This includes the 
Excess Profits Tax, Purchase Tax, Limitation of Supplies Order, and the Concentration 
of Industry Scheme. These restrictions prohibited both production and purchasing of 
pianos and forced the industry to consolidate in order to free labour and factory space. 
The impact of these restrictions and how the industry responded is explored. In 
addition, changes in the piano industry’s labour force and types of war production 
contracts granted to the industry is presented.   
The process of restarting the piano industry was one that took many years and Chapter 
5: The Lean Years and Reconstruction explores how the Board of Trade organised the 
reconstruction of the industry and the obstacles that stood in the way. The chapter 
shows that although the Board of Trade wanted to help the industry restart after the 
war, the economic situation of Great Britain continued to prohibit piano manufacturing 
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long after the war had ended. How the piano industry survived in the immediate post-
war era is explored, as well as how the Government’s push towards exporting 
instruments impacted the industry. 
Investigations into individual piano manufacturers’ production during the war shows 
how the conflict differently impacted firms. Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are two case 
studies which show this in detail. The first, a case study of John Broadwood and Sons, 
presents a company that had a very difficult time throughout the war period. Unable 
to obtain war contracts, the company was forced to close its factory, release its labour, 
and consolidate with its competitor. The chapter gives an in-depth look at the impact 
of the war on the company, highlighting the difficulty of the piano company and the 
steps the firm took to stay in business during the war years. The chapter serves as an 
example of the negative effect the Second World War had on a piano firm. In contrast 
the second case study of Kemble and Company highlights how this firm flourished 
during the war years. The company specialised in small, economical instruments, and 
the affordability of the company’s pianos coupled with their large factory and labour 
force allowed for Kemble to receive extensive war production contracts throughout 
the war period. These contracts helped Kemble in the immediate post-war years as the 
firm maintained its workforce and factory space, thus it was more quickly able to 
convert its factory back to piano production.   
Finally, the overall effects of the war on the British piano industry is discussed in 
Chapter 8: Conclusion. The chapter explores how the cessation of piano production in 
Britain during and after the war years had an impact on the industry and how the piano 
industry was never fully able to recover. The post-war years were difficult for the 
industry as competition came not only from imported foreign-made pianos but also 
from alternative forms of entertainment. The question of whether or not the British 
piano industry would have been better placed to face these new forms of competition 
if the industry had more quickly recovered from the war is explored, as is the eventual 








Chapter 1: History of the British Piano Industry 
 
From its founding in the eighteenth century to the closure of the last piano factory in 
2009, the British piano industry has had a turbulent history. The British piano industry 
can trace its history back to the Seven Years Wars, the industry massively expanded 
during the industrial revolution as it adopted modern manufacturing techniques, and 
lost its position as the largest producer of pianos in the world to growing globalisation 
in the late nineteenth century. The industry faced its most challenging time during the 
twentieth century, when world wars and the Depression would diminish its standing.  
In order to understand how the piano industry adapted and reacted during the Second 
World War, it is important to review the history of the industry, laying out its position 
at the start of the war, and exploring how the industry had responded to challenging 
times in its past. Rather than give a detailed explanation of the technical developments 
of the piano, the response of the British piano industry to times of both prosperity and 
crisis will be examined.   
Development of the British Piano Industry  
The invention of the piano by Bartolomeo Cristofori in around 1700 did not 
immediately shake the musical world. On the contrary, this new instrument would have 
a long gestation period before actually affecting a musician’s or composer’s choice of 
keyboard instruments. In England, it would be more than half a century after the 
piano’s invention before the instrument began to be regularly made and played on 
British soil. But, after the piano set down its roots, the instrument would become the 
predominant keyboard instrument and London would become the world centre of 
piano manufacturing.  
Although it would take until the second-half of the eighteenth century for the piano to 
become a more common sight on the British musical scene, a few instruments were 
brought to England in the first half of the eighteenth century. This includes what is 
believed to be the first piano to be brought to London in 1711 by the author Samuel 
Crisp, who purchased the piano in Rome. Although the instrument “caused a 
considerable sensation among musicians” no maker had any success in duplicating the 
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instrument.29 Sadly the “sensational” instrument was just that and it would not be until 
1760 that the British piano industry can claim its true beginnings.  
In general, the founding of the British piano industry can be traced back to the Seven 
Years War. As Prussia, Austria, France, and Russia battled each other on the European 
continent, England seemed a safe haven to European makers wanting to leave war-
torn regions. The United Kingdom, although aligned with Prussia and Russia and 
battling France in North America, saw no fighting on its own soil and was more 
financially stable than continental Europe. In addition, English craftsmen were not 
regulated by a complicated and rigid guild system like in Europe30 and London was a 
bourgeoning musical centre.31 These factors combined in enticing instrument makers 
to leave the continent and emigrate to London. 
Among the makers that left Europe were Americus Backers, Johanne Zumpe and 
Johannes Pohlmann, all of whom were apprentices of Gottfried Silbermann in 
Freiberg. The apprenticeship with Silbermann was instrumental in the development of 
the British piano industry because Silbermann had Cristofori’s designs translated into 
German in 1725 and had begun making pianos based on the designs. His instruments 
were known by Johann Sebastian Bach and King Frederick of Prussia.32 When 
Backers, Zumpe, and Pohlmann arrived in London in 1760 they came with the 
knowledge of how to build a piano. 
For a time Zumpe worked for Burkat Shudi, owner of one of the two most established 
harpsichord workshops in London – the other being Jacob Kirckman. Eventually 
Zumpe, like Backers and Pohlmann, established his own workshop.33 Zumpe located 
his workshop in Hanover Square, only 500 meters from Shudi.34 It is believed that 
                                                 
29 It is said that Crisp bought the piano from an English monk named Father Wood, who based the 
piano on Cristofori’s design. Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 24. 
30 Ehrlich, 19.  
31 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 27. 
32 Additional makers from Silbermann’s workshop also immigrated to London during the Seven Years 
War. This group of makers has been referred to as ‘The Twelve Apostles’ and the nickname has been 
used in a number of books and articles, but it is erroneous. Ibid, 26. 
33 Shudi was Swiss and Kirckman from Strasbourg. They had both apprenticed with Hermann Tabel in 
London. Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 29. 
34 J. T. Oliver, “Piano Manufacture,” Geography (November 1975), 277. 
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Zumpe built his first square piano in 1766 as there are no earlier known instruments.35 
Zumpe’s instruments were small, plain, with little decoration, and have a simple 
action. This simple construction made the new square piano much cheaper and easier 
to manufacture than the harpsichord and they quickly became very popular, especially 
for the well-to-do middle class36 where the instrument filled a gap in the market.37 
Soon the demand was more than Zumpe could satisfy and Johannes Pohlmann began 
to manufacture square pianos as well.38 Zumpe’s success with the square piano and his 
innovative factory-system of construction has earned him the title of “father of the 
commercial piano.”39 As the piano became more common, printed music for the 
instrument began to be produced, and the earliest known English publication of music 
whose title-page mentions the piano is Johann Christian Bach’s Op. 5 sonatas, 
published in 1766.40 
                                                 
35 Mauder argues that the 1766 Zumpe piano in the collection of Emmanuel College, Cambridge is the 
earliest known extant Zumpe piano. Mauder, “The Earliest English Square Piano?,” 83.  
36 Although Dolge uses the term “middle class” to describe the purchasers of Zumpe’s pianos, this 
term does not fully describe or delineate between the complicated and dynamic social class system 
that was continuously shifting during the eighteenth century. According to the author Daniel Defoe, 
there were seven divisions of English society during this time. These included the great, the rich, the 
middle sort, the working trades, the country people, the poor, and the miserable. Of these seven 
classes it difficult to divide the groups into “upper, middle and lower classes” as the socio-economic 
situation of individuals was fluid, and a person’s status depended not only on their wealth or 
occupation, but also on their location, religion, and influence. If we are to describe who could have 
purchased Zumpe’s pianos it would be more appropriate to say they would have been purchased by 
people in Defoe’s “middle sort” and even perhaps in the “working trades” who had occupations such 
as merchant, tradesmen, manufacturer, tenant-farmer, and artisan. A growing number of members of 
these social divisions had enough wealth to purchase property, send their male children to school and 
university, and to purchase a musical instrument to be used in domestic life. Roy Porter, English 
Society in the Eighteenth Century, (London: Pelican Books, 1982), 53-54. 
37 A Zumpe square piano sold for £50. The price of the instrument was less than Dolge, 172. 
38 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 29. 
39 Dolge, 172. 













As Zumpe and Pohlmann developed and produced the English square piano, Americus 
Backers, working with John Broadwood and Robert Stodart, began building a “grand” 
piano.41 Backers’ earliest known grand piano is from 1772, an instrument formerly on 
loan to Musical Instrument Museums Edinburgh (MIMEd). Although this instrument 
is dated 1772, it is believed that Backers was making grand pianos as early as 1770 or 
1771, but no extant example survives.42 Backer’s piano has a version of the Cristofori 
action but with the addition of a check on the descending hammer.43 It was first 
described in a patent in 1777 and became known as the “English Grand Action.”44  
                                                 
41 The term “grand piano” is slightly anachronistic in referring to Backer’s instrument. The term was 
first used by Robert Stodart when he built his first concert piano which he called a “grand pianoforte” 
in 1777. Dolge, 59.  
42 The piano formerly in the MIMEd collection is number 21, implying that 20 previous instruments 
had been made. In addition, Backers advertised exhibiting pianos in his London showroom in 
February and March of 1771, again implying he had instruments already made and ready to be 
displayed. Maunder, “J. C. Bach and the Early Piano in London,” 206. 
43 The check, also known as the back check, is a small leather-covered wooden block which catches 
the tail of the piano hammer as it rebounds from hitting the string and prevents it from bouncing back 
up. 
44 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 31-32. 
Figure 1. Square piano by Johannes Zumpe, London, 1767. MIMEd 4339. Image courtesy of 







With Zumpe and Pohlman established in square piano production and Backers laying 
the foundations for the grand piano, the English piano industry was set into motion. 
The growth of the sector would be expansive and the piano itself would see rapid 
advancement in technology and commercialisation.45 Additional innovators would 
join in the development of the piano. These include familiar names such as John 
Broadwood, who began working for Burkat Shudi and eventually took over the firm;46 
Sebastian Erard, who fled the French Revolution and set up business in London in 
1792;47 and Muzio Clementi who went into the piano manufacturing business in 
1795.48 
                                                 
45 Ehrlich, 14. 
46 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 30. 
47 Ibid, 35. 
48  Clementi and partners Banger, Hyde, Collard and Davies took over Longman and Broderip when 
that firm went bankrupt in 1795. Within a year all the partners but Collard dropped out and the 
company became Clementi and Collard. Clementi was never a maker; he was the salesman while 
Collard was the piano maker. Ibid, 43. 
Figure 2. Grand piano by Americus Backers, London, 1772, No. 21. Formerly in 
the care of MIMEd. Photo courtesy of Musical Instrument Museums Edinburgh, 
The University of Edinburgh. 
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Encouraging the development of the piano industry were performances and 
composers. After the debut of the piano in a performance of The Beggar’s Opera in 
Covent Garden in 1767 and a recital by Johann Christian Bach on the piano in 1768, 
the piano became more accepted as a solo instrument and composers began writing 
idiomatic pieces for the instrument.49 Clementi is said to have written the first piece of 
music composed specifically for the piano in 1773 and he was soon followed by other 
composers such as Mozart and Beethoven.50 Instrument makers met the demand for 
pianos by transitioning from making harpsichords to making pianos. For example, 
John Broadwood transformed Shudi’s harpsichord workshop, which produced fewer 
than 20 harpsichords a year, to a piano factory, which produce an average of 400 pianos 
a year by 1802.51 The popularity of the piano rose so quickly that by the turn of the 
nineteenth century the piano had become the preferred keyboard instrument and the 
harpsichord was no longer in vogue.  
London was ideally situation to be the home of the British piano industry. Early makers 
set up their businesses in Soho in the West End, where furniture makers such as 
Thomas Sheridan and Thomas Chippendale were based, and there was an established 
shipping network and accessible wood supply.52 The city itself was benefitting from 
the industrial revolution and piano factories, as they came to be, used a factory set-up 
in their manufacture. Although some machinery was used in piano construction 
(steam-driven machines, circular saws, and planing machines were available) much of 
the work was done by hand but with considerable division of labour.53 The breadth of 
the English empire also aided the industry in its development. Supplies such as exotic 
woods like ebony, mahogany, and rosewoods, as well as ivory, were easily obtained. 
In addition, instruments were sold not only throughout the country but also overseas 
thanks to extensive British shipping networks and the reach of the Empire.54  
                                                 
49 Isacoff, 52. 
50 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 37. 
51 Ibid, 31. 
52 Oliver, 274. 
53 Erhlich, 34.  
54 Isacoff, 52. 
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It is believed that by 1830 there were around 50 piano makers in London.55 Depending 
upon the source, by 1851 London had either 151 or over 200 firms producing 25,000 
pianos a year56 and over the next four decades this number would continue to grow. 
The expansion of the British piano industry was due largely to the growth of what 
today we would call the “middle class:” a population in the United Kingdom which 
had more extraneous income and higher social ambitions.57 An important aspect of 
this socio-economic group was a musical education, especially for daughters. A girl’s 
ability to play the piano was a way for parents to improve their child’s marital 
prospects and as a result, well educated (and therefore desirable) ladies were expected 
to be musical.58 
 
Expansion and Innovation: Nineteenth-Century Piano Trade in 
London  
At the turn of the nineteenth century the piano industry in London was just starting to 
hit its stride. In addition to square and grand pianos, makers were developing new 
designs, such as cabinet and upright pianos. The instruments, like the square piano, 
were mainly marketed to the middle class. But, with these new designs came 
advancement in piano technology, such as the adoption of diagonally running strings, 
coiled wire on the bass strings,59 and new action models.60 Grand piano design was 
                                                 
55 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 82. 
56 Dolge lists 151 piano firms making 25,000 pianos a year, Dolge, 172–173, while Erhlich puts that 
number at over 200 piano manufacturers, Erhlich, 34. 
57 It is estimated that the percentage of the population who could be considered middle class (those 
with an annual income of £200 to £300 per annum) grew from 15% in the late eighteenth century to 
25% by the mid-nineteenth century. Leonore Davidoff and Caltherine Hall, Family Fortunes: Men 
and women of the English middle class 1780-1850 (London: Routledge, 1987); 23-24.  
58 The role of gender and the piano is explored in “’Girling’ at the Parlor Piano” in Ruth A. Solie’s 
Music in Other Words: Victorian Conversations. This interesting essay explores why the piano 
became so strongly associated with female domesticity and education in Victorian times and discusses 
the cultural perceptions and prospects of a musically educated girl. Ruth A Solie, Music in Other 
Words (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); 85-117. 
59 John Isaac Hawkins, an English piano maker working in Philadelphia, developed an upright piano 
in 1800. It was patented in England by the inventor’s father Isaac Hawkins. According to Wainwright 
the instrument may have been the first use of coiled wire for the bass strings. Wainwright, The Piano 
Makers, 58. 
60 In 1802 Thomas Loud of London patented an upright piano with strings running diagonally. Robert 
Wornum patented his “piccolo” upright action in 1826. This action became the prototype of all upright 
actions. It was later adopted by Pleyel of Paris and became known as the “Pleyel” action. Dolge, 54. 
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also rapidly advancing. From its commencement in the 1770s in England the 
instrument advanced from what was essentially a piano action placed within the body 
of a harpsichord, to a fully developed instrument with its own dimensions and design. 
These innovations went hand-in-hand with the establishment of the English piano 
trade.  
Examples of English innovations in piano design included the addition of a foot pedal 
to control the damper mechanism by John Broadwood in 1783.61 William Allen and 
James Thom, employees of William Stodart, developed a system of tubular metal 
bracing tubes in 1820.62 This system would lead to the development of the iron plate, 
although the first full iron frame would be patented by Alpheus Babcock, an American, 
in 1825.63 American and German makers quickly adopted this new technology, but 
British makers were slow to add the full iron plate to their instruments, instead 
preferring partial metal bracing even in the second half of the nineteenth century.64 
This lethargy in embracing new designs would eventually come to hurt the industry 
when British makers would have to compete with foreign imports.  
The piano action also developed throughout the nineteenth century. As the instrument 
was able to withstand more tension because of the addition of metal supports, piano 
strings were changed from thin, soft iron wire to strong, tempered steel wire. The 
adoption of steel piano wire necessitated a change in piano hammer design with the 
small, delicate leather-covered hammers of Cristofori’s design replaced with larger 
hammers made of dense felt. This felt was first patented by P. F. Fischer of London in 
1835.65 The moving parts of the action were modified to meet the changes of the piano 
and innovations such as Pierre Erard’s “repetition or double escapement action” 
allowed player to repeat notes more rapidly.66   
                                                 
61 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 33. 
62 Victoria and Albert Museum online catalogue, “Grand Piano,” W.5-1952, accessed 21/10/2015. 
http://collections.vam.ac.uk/item/O58874/grand-piano-stodart-william/  
63 Babcock patented the iron frame for the square piano. Jonas Chickering, another American, 
followed with the grand piano iron frame of 1843. The addition of metal supports to the all-wooden 
frame greatly increased the amount of tension a piano could withstand, increasing from 9,000 pounds 
of pressure to 13,000. Modern grand pianos, with their full iron plates can withstand between 30,000 
and 40,000 pounds of pressure. Dolge, 69. 
64 Ibid 71.  
65 Ibid, 98. 
66 Pierre Erard was nephew of Sebastian Erard. Ibid, 61. 
23 
 
By the middle of the nineteenth century London had become the centre of the piano 
world. It is estimated that by 1871 the number of pianos in the British Isles was around 
400,000.67 With such a large number of piano manufacturers centred in London and 
producing a substantial output of instruments, a considerable number of manufacturers 
of auxiliary parts developed. These companies included iron foundries that 
manufactured iron plates, makers of hammer felt,68 hammers, strings,69 piano keys, 
wrench pins, key leads, castors, and candle-sconces. In addition, there were workshops 
that worked on the finishing of pianos and specialised in gilding, marquetry, French 
polishing, silk work, and cabinet work.70 Although many of the parts of a piano could 
be sourced from English manufacturers, certain parts, such as wrest pins and tuning 
pins, were not available domestically. These items were traditionally made by a small 
number of manufacturers in Westphalia, Germany, and the makers had a monopoly on 
their manufacture.71 This reliance on foreign imports for certain parts (wrest pins, 
tuning pins, and later piano actions) would hurt the piano industry in times of crisis, 
such as during the First and Second World Wars.  
In addition to locally supplied and imported specialised piano parts, piano 
manufacturers relied on a complex international supply network for raw materials. The 
raw materials needed for the manufacture of pianos came from all corners of the globe. 
For example, ebony and ivory were sourced from Asia and Africa, while various kinds 
of woods, whether it was spruce for the sound board or mahogany and rosewood for 
veneer, could be sourced from Europe, North and South America, or the West Indies. 
This is also true for the wool that was used for felt and the iron ore and copper used 
for manufacture of strings, pins, and plates. In order to manufacture a piano, a large 
supply industry needed to be in place. This supply network was vulnerable to 
fluctuation in the market, import and export duties, and trade embargoes.  
                                                 
67 Isacoff, 52. 
68 Whitehead Brothers of Manchester were the first manufacturers to specialise in making piano 
hammer felt in the 1840s. Other English manufacturers included Naish and Wilton, England, started in 
1859, and Dolge in 1871. Dolge, 121. 
69 String makers included Webster & Horsefall of Birmingham, Rollason & Son, Smith & Houghton. 
Ibid, 123. 
70 “Piano Manufacture in Camden Town,” accessed 26 October 2015, 
http://www.locallocalhistory.co.uk/industrial-history/piano/page1.htm  
71 Dolge, 128. 
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Around 1860 London had reached its zenith as the leading piano manufacturing centre 
in the world and the industry was about to face enormous pressure from both Germany 
and America. As previously stated, England was slow to adopt new methods of piano 
design and generally continued to manufacture older styles of instruments, rather than 
adopting what was then considered the “American style” of piano construction, which 
included a full iron plate and cross stringing.72 The industry, which pioneered factory 
production in the eighteenth century, was now slow to adopt machinery into its 
manufacturing process, unlike its American competition which had embraced 
industrial machinery in its piano manufacturing in the late nineteenth century. The 
machines aided in sawing, planing, boring, mortising, and tenoning the various parts 
of the pianos. The addition of machinery allowed American companies to speed up 
production whilst limiting costs. England, on the other hand, continued to rely on a 
large supply network, readily available cheap labour willing to do manual work, and 
local demand for pianos in order to continue to be competitive.73 The importation of 
affordable American and German pianos was about to change England’s supremacy 
in the piano trade.  
The end of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 was another influential moment for the 
British piano industry. With the end of the war came the unification of Germany and 
the beginning of the German industrial machine.74 By 1875 the number of workers 
involved in musical instrument manufacture in Germany had doubled from the less 
than 8,000 workers listed in 1861, and would triple by 1882. It is estimated that of the 
roughly 45,000 people working in instrument production in 1882, 63%, or around 
28,350 people, were employed in the manufacture of pianos.75 Between 1850-1890 
more than 200 piano factories were started in Germany.76 Of the large number of 
pianos manufactured in Germany during this time, only half of the instruments were 
                                                 
72 The full iron plate was a product of American innovation, but it took the addition of overstrung 
strings to improve the sound quality of the new technology. This combination of a full perimeter plate 
and overstrung strings was first demonstrated in 1855 by Steinway. In the 1862 London exhibition 
and the 1867 Paris Exposition, American pianos of this design took the top honours and thus the 
“American system” was born. German companies were quick to adopt this system, but French and 
English companies resisted. Ibid, 71.   
73 Erhlich, 39.  
74 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 119. 
75 Erhlich, 68.  
76 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 122. 
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sold domestically, the other half were exported to countries eager for well-made but 
affordable instruments and England became one of Germany’s largest markets.   
Initially German imports filled the gap between expensive instruments (like those 
made by Broadwood) and cheap pianos. The importation of these instruments made 
the piano market in the U.K. more competitive, broke up the British monopoly on 
pianos, lowered piano prices, and in general was a benefit to consumers – but not to 
English makers.77 The rise of German dominance in the industry was remarkable and 
by 1912 Germany exported £2,136,700 worth of pianos while British exports totalled 
£325,280. Germany’s exports to Britain alone totalled well over £500,000.78 The 
production of German pianos increased from fewer than 15,000 instruments produced 
in 1870 to 70,000 instruments in 1890.79 The German pianos were so well sought after 
that “stencil” instruments made in Britain were labelled with Germanic names to make 
them more appealing.80 Much of Germany’s success could be attributed to its 
willingness and ability to adopt the latest technology; its widespread reputation for 
technical, commercial, and scientific education; use and distribution of catalogues; and 
the prestige of German music and composers.81  
But Germany was not the only country chipping away at Britain’s dominance in the 
world piano market. America was also gaining a larger foothold on foreign markets. 
An indicator of the growing popularity of American pianos was in 1890 when 
Steinway received its first Royal Warrant. Soon Steinway could boast selling to 
patrons as prestigious as Queen Victoria, the Prince and Princess of Wales, and many 
dukes, earls, and lesser nobility.82 By 1890, the United States would become the largest 
                                                 
77 Ehrlich, 88. 
78 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 123. 
79 Ehrlich, 221.  
80 A “stencil” instrument was generally a cheaply made instrument made by a manufacturer but 
labelled and sold under a different name with no mark from the manufacturer. These instruments were 
commonly sold by department stores, mail order catalogues, and distributers. The stencil refers to the 
name which could easily be changed and “stencilled” on the instrument. There were a number of 
piano factories in London which specialised in this type of piano production. Ehrlich, 90. 
81 Sonja Petersen, “Piano Manufacturing between Craft and Industry: Advertising and Image 
Cultivation of Early 20th Century German Piano Production,” Icon (2011), 20. 
82 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 119. 
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manufacturer of pianos in the world, producing 72,000 instruments and by 1910 that 
production number would more than quintuple.83  
 
 
Table 1. Production numbers of instruments made in Britain, Germany, and U.S.A. according to Edwin M. Ripin, 
et al. "Pianoforte." Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press, accessed January 19, 
2017, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/21631. 
 
There were no trade restrictions or tariffs on imported pianos in the nineteenth century, 
and German and American pianos were flooding the British market. The lack of tariffs 
initially helped British makers keep the price down on their own pianos as they did not 
have to pay tariffs on imported piano parts or raw materials for their own manufacture, 
but would prove hurtful to the British industry when foreign imports became more 
affordable than domestically produced pianos.84 Even with the influx of foreign-made 
instruments, there was still a favourable supply and demand balance for pianos in 
Britain. Much of this was a result of the rise in living standards, not only among a 
growing middle class, but also for the working class.85 This bourgeoning socio-
economic group was purchasing pianos in record numbers and in order to make pianos 
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84 Ibid, 150. 
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more affordable to the working class, piano companies began selling instruments 
through “deferred payment” plans.86 This system allowed a buyer to “hire” a piano 
over the course of three years and pay instalments toward its purchase. This system 
was widespread by the 1860s.87 Stencil pianos were also marketed to this group of 
buyers (often through deferment plans) and companies who manufactured stencil 
instruments included Danemann & Co., Brasted, Bansall, Cremona, Kemble, Triumph, 
Spencer, Squire, and Zender.88   
The division of classes was also evident amongst the piano industry at the end of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with three distinct “classes” of pianos makers 
in London. There was the established, “high quality” firms of Broadwood, Collard and 
Collard, and Kirckman, who acted almost as the landed gentry of the piano industry 
and very much above their fellow piano makers, dealers, and musicians. Ehrlich 
described this group of makers’ behaviour towards their fellow industry members this 
way:  
For such men, hobnobbing with the elite was a delightful and essential 
perquisite of their business, more important than those close relationships with 
musicians and craftsmen which their predecessors had carefully nurtured. This 
position in society was to be sullied by too familiar a relationship with dealers 
or lesser piano makers. There was cause here for much inefficiency and bad 
feeling in the trade.89  
These firms resisted change in piano design and technology and relied on the strength 
of their brand and customer loyalty. As a result, they were facing dwindling sales.90  
Next there was a group of medium-sized “middle class” makers such as Allison, 
Barrate & Robinson, Brasted, Brinsmead, Challen, Chappell, Cramer, Danemann, and 
Rogers. These companies tended to manufacture upright pianos and embraced new 
technology and designs. Many of these companies also produced stencil instruments 
which were sold wholesale to retailers. The final group comprised the small-scale 
                                                 
86 Also called “hire-purchase” plans by companies such as Broadwood & Sons.  
87 Erhlich, 100. 
88 Laurence, Five London Piano Makers, 74. 
89 Erhlich, 43.  
90 Kirckman was so slow to respond to changing technology and desires of its clients that the firm 
closed in 1896. 
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“lower class” manufacturers who had very few employees and tended to make pianos 
of poor quality.91 The 1881 census lists 233 piano makers operating in London. Of this 
number 106 firms and partnerships comprised the “first” and “second” classes of piano 
makers, many of which had hundreds of employees working in their factories, and 127 
smaller concerns could be considered as part of the “third class” groups of makers, 
who sometimes employed the owner and just one assistant.92 
As the piano industry developed throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in 
London, the geographical location of the industry changed. These changes allowed the 
industry to move to prime locations, utilising the shifting transportation networks of 
the city, while optimising the balance between the cost of land and the need for space.  
From the establishment of first piano companies in the 1760s until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the piano industry was mainly centred in London’s West End, and specifically 
near to Soho Square. Around 1851 companies began to look for areas in the city which 
had more space and lower rents. This led many manufacturers to move north to Kentish 
Town, Camden Town, Chalk Farm, and Islington, while others moved to Hackney and 
Stoke Newington. All of these locations were increasingly better connected with the 
expansion of the railroads and canal access.93 Cheaper land was also desired so that 
the companies could expand factory space not only to increase production but also to 
accommodate a larger workforce.94  
By 1911, 133 of 136 British piano manufacturers were located in London and out of 
that group only nine manufacturers were south of the Thames.95 One-third of piano 
manufacturers had moved to Islington, a borough to the east of St. Pancras.96 Others 
                                                 
91 Erhlich, 143-144. 
92 Marie Kent, “The Piano-Industry Workforce in Mid-Victorian England: A Study of the 1881 
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93 Stephen Inwood, City of Cities: The Birth of Modern London (London: Macmillan, 2005), 116. 
94 Erhlich, 35.  
95 According to Wainwright, the reason for the concentration of piano makers north of the river was 
twofold: (1) piano trade was established before London had adequate bridges across the Thames, and 
roads to the south – and long before the development of the residential suburbs south of the river, and 
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Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 131.  
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spread to the adjoining boroughs of Camden Town and Chalk Farm to the west, and 
Hackney and Stoke Newington to the east. 97  
Of Dolge’s list of manufacturers of 1911, the three companies not located in London 
were located in Halifax, near Leeds.98 That year was also when George Glover moved 
Bentley pianos from Islington to the Village of Woodchester, outside of Stroud.99 He 
renamed the company Stroud Piano Company, training local labour in the craft of 
piano making.100 Although there was potential to expand the piano industry outside of 
London, these companies were exceptions to the norm. Throughout the twentieth 
                                                 
97 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 131.  
98 Dolge does not list the names of the three manufacturers, but Pohlmann & Sons, a company 
founded in 1823, would be one of the manufacturers. The company’s founder, Henry Pohlmann, is 
thought to be related to Johannes Pohlmann, one of the first makers of pianos in London. The firm 
stopped making pianos in the 1930s. National Archives, “Pohlmann and Sons, Piano Manufacturers, 
etc.” Reference WYC1118, accessed 13 August 2017. 
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99 Oliver, 277. 
100 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 136.  
Figure 3. Map of piano manufacturing locations in London in 1911. The black dot indicates Soho, the historic 
centre of the industry. The red dots locate centres north and east of Soho, including Stoke Newington, Islington, 
Camden Town, Kentish Town, Chalk Farm, and Hackney. The blue pins indicate manufacturing sites south of 
the Thames: Stockwell, Lewisham, and New Kent Road. London County Council and Parliamentary Divisions. 
Map. Edinburgh: John Bartholomew & Co., 1900. From The Anglotopia Magazine. 





century, and during the study period of this thesis, the piano industry continued to be 
overwhelmingly located in London.101   
 
                                                 
101 As will be discussed in Chapter 4, only two piano manufacturers were located outside of London 
for the study period of this thesis.  
Figure 4. Distribution of industry including firms located outside of London in 1911. Excerpt from The 
Royal Atlas Of Modern Geography Exhibiting, In A Series Of Entirely Original And Authentic Maps, The 
Present Condition Of Geographical Discovery And Research In The Several Countries, Empires, And 
States Of The World By The Late Alexander Keith Johnston ... With Additions And Corrections To The 
Present Date By T.B. Johnston ... With A Special Index To Each Map. A New Edition. Map. Edinburgh and 
London: W. & A.K. Johnston, 1912.  From Stanford University, David Rumsey Historical Map Collection. 
http://www.davidrumsey.com/ Stanford University Library (accessed 25 August 2017). 
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The British Piano Industry at the Turn of the Twentieth Century 
Before the start of the First World War, the British piano industry was reasonably 
prosperous. In the decade before the war, British piano exports had doubled,102 
domestic sales were steady, and a renaissance of the British piano seemed just on the 
horizon. The British piano, which largely took the form of an upright piano, appealed 
to the middle and lower classes and the industry was mainly producing instruments for 
this market. But, not all was well as a large trade imbalance continued to plague the 
industry. For example, just prior to the beginning of the First World War 24,500 pianos 
had been imported into Britain – a total of around 20% of the domestic market – and 
at this time it was estimated that one out of every six pianos purchased in England was 
a German piano.103 In addition to the competition faced from German and American 
imports, the industry as a whole continued to rely heavily on piano parts, such as 
actions and wrest pins, which were imported from Europe.104 Adding to this was 
competition within the trade itself as price cutting wars between retailers continually 
lowered the profit margin on wholesale pianos and strained the relationship between 
makers and dealers.105  
Even with these obstacles, in general, piano companies had a positive attitude towards 
the immediate future. Although the trade faced competition, companies such as 
Chappell had increased piano production by a third and their production of grand 
pianos increase six-fold in the pre-war years.106 If the 1910s continued in this positive 
trend, then the British industry was well placed to continue to be a significant player 
on the domestic and international piano market.  
Unfortunately, the upward trend in British piano manufacturing would be short lived. 
The First World War would put an end to the rise in exports, prevent British 
manufacturers from importing crucial pianos parts, force many piano manufacturers 
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104 Ibid, 158. 
105 The competition between the department stores was one of the factors that led to the founding of 
the Music Trades Association in 1913. Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 138. 
106 A portion of Chappell’s success in its selling of grand pianos was due to the company’s 
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to either severely limit piano production, convert to war production, or close their 
factories. Overall it was a trying time for the industry and the First World War was a 
test run for Government policies that would return during the Second World War.  
World War I: the First Mobilised British Economy 
At the outbreak of the war, the situation in Europe did not immediately impact upon 
the piano industry. Initially, the British Government believed that the war would be 
over quickly and few restrictions were placed on domestic production. Once the 
Government realised that the war would not be won in a few months, there was a 
period in which restrictions began to be placed on production. This was done in an ad 
hoc basis as the Government was hesitant to place restrictions on the economy because 
it was believed at the time that these restrictions would weaken Britain’s economic 
position, which was to be avoided.107 By 1916, the Government realised that in order 
to meet the enormous demand on materials caused by a vast military force, Britain 
needed to impose unprecedented controls over the economy in order to mobilise 
resources for the war effort. These controls marked the first time in which Britain fully 
mobilised its economy108 and the controls put strict restrictions on piano production. 
Although piano production was restricted, it was never fully stopped during the First 
World War. The situation during the Second World War would be vastly different.   
The Great War had both positive and negative impacts on the piano industry. Although 
piano manufacturing was greatly restricted after 1916, many piano firms were able to 
switch to war production and learned new techniques and skills through this work. 
Companies who did not find war contracts either eked out a meagre existence on repair 
work or piano sales, or closed down. In general, the First World War culled weaker 
piano manufacturers and by its end many of the small-scale piano producers had gone 
out of business.109 A terrible impact of the war on piano manufacturing was the great 
loss of the many skilled men who joined the war effort and never returned.  
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Piano manufacturers employed a large workforce of mainly skilled carpenters and 
during the war many companies were able to find contracts to build wooden 
components for the war effort. This included companies such as The Brasted Brothers, 
who made biplanes used by the Royal Flying Corps,110 and Broadwood and Sons, who 
made everything from tool and ammunition boxes to a variety of aircraft parts for 
companies such as Airco, De Havilland, Rolls Royce, Royal Aircraft Factory, and 
Hendon Aircraft Factory.111 The aircraft industry relied heavily on piano 
manufacturers to produce component parts as the airplanes of the day were mainly 
wood-bodied. The piano makers’ skills could easily adapt to the manufacturing 
techniques needed to make these parts and the piano firms were able to supply much 
needed labour and factory space.112   
Some of the piano companies that switched to aircraft production during the First 
World War benefitted from the experience. The benefits of the war were mainly due 
to the need for the firms to adjust to rapid production in order to meet manufacturing 
schedules. In order to do so, piano companies integrated standardised parts, adopted 
new management structures, reorganised factories, and used new techniques and 
machinery.113 
Negative impacts of the war on the piano industry largely revolved around the lack of 
supplies and the loss of labour due to enlistment and casualties. When war was 
declared on 4 August 1914, trade ceased with Germany. That meant that piano 
manufacturers were not able to import actions, wrest pins, wire, and other supplies. 
British firms were able to purchase actions from Herrburger in Paris and wrest pins 
and other piano components made of metal from companies in the United States, but 
as the war continued, importing these supplies became increasingly difficult. This led 
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some companies, such as Broadwood and Sons, to begin manufacturing their own 
actions in 1915.114  
As the war continued many materials became scarce and those that were available were 
significantly more expensive. For example, in December 1915, the Government 
commandeered the entire supply of methylated spirits, a crucial component for French 
polishing. When the material was once again available for civilian purchase the price 
has risen from 2s 3p per gallon to 4s per gallon. Similar price increases affected the 
price of timber and even glue.115 In the final years of the war the British Government 
implemented material rationing and completely banned the use of some materials in 
civilian manufacturing.116 The lack of materials made piano manufacturing difficult 
and production numbers were greatly reduced, but at no point did the British 
Government ban the manufacturing of pianos. If companies had materials available, 
they could continue to produce instruments.   
In regard to labour, piano manufacturers, like all aspects of Britain’s manufacturing 
sectors, were heavily affected by their workforce joining the war effort, particularly 
by young men joining the military. These men were temporarily replaced by female 
workers, but unlike in the future world war, the increase of the female workforce in 
British factories only amounted to a 25% overall rise.117  
The Chappell Piano Company serves as stark example of the sacrifice that many 
companies and their employees made during the war period. It is estimated that of the 
roughly 130 employees of Chappell working at the firm at the start of the First World 
War, 61 employees joined the military. By the end of the war 38 of these men had 
died,118 which means the firm lost 29% of its workforce to the war. It is believed that 
this is indicative of much of the industry.  
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Post-War and the Inter-War Years  
After the First World War ended on 11 November 1918, the British piano industry was 
poised to make a significant impact on the international piano market. Although the 
industry had mainly switched to war production and many smaller manufacturers had 
closed, the overall state of the piano manufacturers was strong. The companies had not 
suffered from war damage, and, as Britain was the victor of the war, British 
manufacturers should have had an advantage over their German competition. 
Unfortunately, shortages of materials, cost increases, and competition from new forms 
of entertainment prevented Britain’s piano industry from capitalising on their potential 
advantage. 
The immediate post-war years saw a continuation of raw material shortages. 
Companies were still heavily reliant on imported piano parts and these parts were 
being imported at exorbitant prices. For example, in July 1919, Herrburger sent only 
72 actions from France and these actions were imported at a price of 200% above their 
pre-war cost.119 Timber prices had risen 170% and iron frames cost 100% more than 
they had before the war.120 This caused the price of the post-war British piano to be 
more than double that of a pre-war instrument. For example, the base price for dealers 
between 1910-1916 for a Challen grand piano was £60. This increased to £103 in 
January 1918, £112 in July 1918 and to £138 by the end of 1919.121 It is worth noting 
that the increase in the cost of pianos coincided with an overall increase in the cost of 
living in Britain which was two and half times greater by 1920 than it was in 
1913.122  Adding to the industry’s difficulties was that the quality of post-war British 
pianos was generally considered to be substandard to their German and American 
competition.  
The slow recovery of the post-war era was detrimental to a number of piano 
manufacturers. This included Brinsmead, which closed in 1920 and had its company 
name purchased by Cramer. The company was then relaunched in 1921 as John 
Brinsmead and Sons Limited. In April 1923 B. Squire and Son was bought by Kemble. 
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Kemble then bought Cramers, John Brinsmead, and Moore and Moore in the inter-war 
years. J & J Hopkinson’s name and business were sold to George Rodgers and 
Company. Between June and August 1924, seven additional manufacturers went into 
liquidation.123 
Although the inter-war years were difficult, some companies saw opportunity. 
Whelpdale and Maxwell, importers of Blüthner pianos, began to investigate 
manufacturing their own pianos under the ‘Welmar’ name. They contracted with 
Squire and Longson to manufacture these instrument and in 1919 they had 150 Welmar 
uprights made. Herrburger amalgamated with Brooks of London in 1920 and began to 
manufacture actions in London.124 The locally made actions were popular with the 
industry and by 1925 imports of foreign-made actions had almost ceased.125 Overall, 
in the 1920s piano manufacture began to adopt simpler and standardised procedures 
for production in order to stay competitive in the post-war years. This included the 
first kilns being used to mature wood and dry soundboards.126 
When the war ended large numbers of civilian workers lost their war-time production 
jobs and found themselves unemployed. The number of unemployed swelled as 
demobilised soldiers returned from the continent. As unemployment increased, the 
British Government did little to alleviate the situation and instead relied on private 
industry to provide relief.127  
As piano production increased, manufacturers were able to hire additional piano 
makers, but as their labour returned, difficulties arose. Employees who had joined the 
military and those who had left piano making for war production jobs had become 
accustomed to higher wages.128 In addition, many of these factory men had unionised 
and they were now demanding better pay and refusing piece-work rates.129 Some piano 
companies negotiated with their labour force, like Brasted Brothers who agreed to 
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offer year-round employment in the 1920s; the first company to offer this type of 
employment.130  
The rise of unions and the socialist movement was not isolated in the piano industry, 
but was seen throughout England. This resulted in upheavals in labour during the 
1920s, eventually resulting in the General Strike of 1926.131 Although Brasted 
Brothers is an example of a company that acquiesced to their employees’ demands, the 
overall relationship between piano factory owners and their employees was strained 
across the industry. After the 1926 strike, the management and owners of piano 
companies refused to acknowledge the unions, adding to the tension in the factories.132  
After the end of the First World War, very little was done to rectify the pre-war trade 
imbalance which plagued the piano industry. An import duty of 33⅓% was added onto 
imported goods, but there were no restrictions as to the total volume or value of goods 
which could be imported. The duty, which was known as the “McKenna Duties,” had 
been in effect since 1915 and in general did little to limit imports.133 As the German 
mark declined in value during the post-war years, German-made products, including 
pianos, once again flooded the market.134 
The first German-made pianos began to be imported to the U.K. in 1920. Most of the 
instruments were high-end pianos and sold for double the pre-war price. 
Unfortunately, Britain could offer little by way of competition to the high-end German 
pianos as few British makers were manufacturing comparable instruments, so German 
pianos made by companies such as Blüthner were a popular choice.135 In addition, 
German pianos companies had cultivated their image from one of small craftsman to 
that of an industrialised industry resulting in the consumer seeing the industry as 
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progressive.136 By purchasing a German instrument the consumer was not only buying 
quality but also the idea of progress in the post-war years.  
Imports were not limited to instruments coming from Germany. Since the end of the 
First World War, American pianos were being shipped to British soil. Additionally, in 
1921 Petrof pianos were brought in from Czechoslovakia and in July 1922 Bösendorfer 
of Vienna were imported into Britain.137 The British Government exacerbated the 
situation when it waved the McKenna duties from August 1924 until June 1925. At 
that time many importers ordered large numbers of foreign-made pianos which they 
could bring into Britain tax free.138  
Although many instruments were being imported into Britain, British piano makers 
were exporting instruments during this period.139 The export of British pianos did not 
match the number of imported instruments and the trade imbalance continued. For 
example, in 1921, British piano makers exported 1,538 pianos but during that same 
year 9,079 pianos were imported into Britain. In 1924 British makers had more than 
quadrupled the number of pianos exported out of the country and had sold 6,542 pianos 
abroad. This number of pianos still did not match the number of instruments being 
imported into the U.K. as 10,797 pianos arrived from foreign makers that year.140  
The popularity and perception of the superior quality of foreign pianos was prevalent 
throughout the country. In 1928 an analysis of concert performances in Britain showed 
that less than 10% of concerts were performed on British pianos. If the British industry 
was embarrassed by this statistic they did little to improve their reputation. Rather than 
uniting in a joint effort to push for greater import duties or coming together to create a 
pro-British piano advertising campaign (or even actually improving the quality of 
British pianos), the leadership of the piano industry squabbled amongst themselves 
and reverted to rhetoric to bash German imports in their individual advertisements.141 
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As the 1920s drew to a close, the British piano industry had stagnated. The companies 
who had survived the difficult post-war years continued to focus on producing 
instruments which appealed to the general population of the U.K., but overall the 
instruments were not perceived as high quality and British piano makers were facing 
considerable competition from imported instruments, especially for good concert 
pianos. The 1930s would be yet another turbulent decade, one which would see the 
impact of the Depression, the emergence of the minipiano, and the beginning of 
another world war.  
The ripple effect of the stock market crash in the United States and the resulting Great 
Depression had a significant impact on piano production. During the Depression 
British exports fell 37% in two years and piano exports faced a similar reduction.142 
Globally, at the end of the 1920s international piano production was around 500,000 
instruments a year, but within two years after the beginning of the Depression, 
production had dropped to half.143 The situation was bleak. Piano firms tried to 
maintain production and appeal to consumers who had little expendable income and 
less desire to purchase a piano than ever, especially with alternative sources of 
entertainment, such as the radio, cinema, and the gramophone available to them. 144   
A saving grace for the industry was the introduction of a small, compact piano which 
could easily fit in a small home and came at a reasonable price. This piano was the 
“miniature piano” and it appealed to British families on a modest budget.  
The miniature piano was introduced in 1934 by Brasted Brothers. The company had 
not invented the instrument, but instead purchased the design from C.A.V. Lundholm 
of Stockholm and patented the design in the U.K.145 The company named the 
instrument the “Minipiano” and sold them under the Eavestaff name. The pianos had 
a compass of six octaves, a simple action mechanism, and the soundboard in the front 
rather than in the back. Interestingly, the tuning pins were also at the front of the 
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instrument and were accessed under the keyboard.146 Originally the pianos came in 
three designs: Ritz, Modern, and the De Luxe – complete with electric lights. Although 
the design of the piano was quite plain, the instruments could come in a variety of 










The pianos became incredibly popular, especially since they cost half the price of a 
regular upright piano, and in the first year Brasted sold 7,000 instruments at 28-38 
guineas apiece. The popularity of the instruments led other makers to copy the 
miniature format. This included the Ministrelle piano by Barratt and Robinson and the 
Minx piano by Kemble, both introduced in 1935.147 Overall the miniature piano 
became the dominant design of British pianos and it helped to revitalise the industry 
in the mid-1930s.   
A good indication of the improvement in the health of the piano industry in the mid-
1930s is through examining export numbers. Between 1935-1937, British piano 
exports increased, as can be seen on the table below. This number then begins to 
decline as the rise to power of the Nazi party in Germany causes uncertainty in the 
political climate of Europe.  
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Figure 6. 1934 Brasted Brothers "Minipiano" 






- Quantities Value 
 
1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Pianos – not automatic – complete Number Number Number Number Number £ £ £ £ £ 
Eire 656 638 695 652 655 14,187 12,129 13,669 12,320 12,275 
Union of South Africa and South-west 
Africa Territory 599 667 747 705 719 19,389 21,667 26,638 25,581 25,998 
Australia 399 421 679 615 626 15,486 18,607 28,988 22,489 23,582 
New Zealand 260 646 747 823 497 9,070 19,606 23,594 24,142 13,880 
Other British Countries 431 372 364 302 239 14,481 12,998 13,035 10,462 8,934 
Total to British Countries 2345 2744 3232 3097 2736 72,613 85,007 105,924 94,994 84,669 
 
  
        
  
Netherlands 362 228 174 182 302 9,039 5,430 4,510 5,445 9,388 
Other Foreign Countries 163 183 193 184 198 6,992 7,359 6,738 6,932 6,916 
Total to Foreign Countries 525 411 367 366 500 16,031 12,789 11,248 12,377 16,304 
 
  
        
  
Total export 2,870 3,155 3,966 3,463 3,236 £88,644 £97,796 £117,172 £107,371 £100,973 
 
 
Table 2. Piano production totals 1935-1939. Compiled by the author from “Extract from Volume II of the Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with British Countries and 
Foreign Countries.” BT 64/1786. National Archives.
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By the end of the 1930s the British piano industry had gone through many obstacles 
over its circa 150-year history. The rise of the industry had been impressive as it grew 
from a small cottage industry of the late eighteenth century to the largest piano 
manufacturer in the world in the mid-1800s. London was the central location of the 
trade with its easy access to supplies and connection to shipping. As the piano industry 
grew, auxiliary industries developed and these companies all relied on supply and 
demand to produce instruments for both the domestic and global markets. The 
downfall of British piano companies started with the industry’s failure to incorporate 
new technology, adapt to changing markets, and to modernise in order to maintain its 
competitive edge over German and American imports. Additionally, as the twentieth 
century progressed, external forces, such as a global war and economic depression, 
helped to downsize the British industry and by 1938 only around 40 companies 
remained. According to the Pianoforte Manufacturers Association, Ltd., 38 of these 
companies were located in London; one manufacturer was located in Stroud, 
Glocester; the other in Nottingham.148 Many of these manufacturers had survived 
extremely difficult times during the First World War, while others were optimistically 
started in the inter-war period.  
As the situation in Europe again progressed towards war, the British piano industry 
would once again be called upon to provide materials and factory space for the war 
effort. Unlike in the First World War, the Government had planned the mobilisation 
of the British economy well in advance and once war was declared piano 
manufacturers would immediately feel its effects, ultimately resulting in the complete 
closure of all piano making. The closure of the industry, as well as the limitations 
placed on piano manufacturing in the post-war era, would permanently damage the 
British piano industry.  
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Chapter 2: Mobilisation for War 
 
The Second World War was the second conflict in the twentieth century in which the 
United Kingdom completely mobilised its economy. This mobilisation affected all 
aspects of life within Britain and the monumental scale justifies the use of the term 
“total war” in referring to the British war effort. Jill Stephenson defines the term thus: 
“in a total war, where the very survival of a nation was at stake, the totality of the 
population had to be involved in its defence, in however small a way.”149 Based on 
this criterion, there is little doubt that Britain was fighting a total war. But, how did the 
British Government organise the war effort and how did it persuade or force 
manufacturers to change from civilian production to war production?   
To say that the organisation of the British war economy went smoothly would be a 
misconception. Mobilising the economy was a difficult process and many industrialists 
and manufacturers fought Government regulations. But, the need to harness the power 
of British industry in order to defend the country and eventually fight abroad became 
paramount. This resulted in possibly a greater degree of compulsory mobilisation of 
the British people and economy than in any other combatant power aside from the 
Soviet Union.150  
Interestingly, Britain was well situated for the mobilisation effort. Its population was 
mainly centred in cities with 70% of the British people living in large urban centres.151 
At the time London was the largest city in the world, with greater London boasting 8.2 
million inhabitants – one-fifth of the entire population of the U.K. London was also an 
important manufacturing centre and its port handled more tonnage than any other port 
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in the world.152 The United Kingdom had a network of colonies, protectorates, and 
Dominions that stretched around one-third of the globe,153 controlled large areas of 
land in Asia and Africa, influenced much of the world’s trading, and directly or 
indirectly financed more than half of the world’s international trade through 
London.154 These factors enabled Great Britain to harness the full power of its 
industrial machine, focusing the available labour in urban centres on war production, 
and relying on its international networks to control as much raw material as possible 
to supply the war effort.  
 
Beginning of Mobilisation 
Following the end of the First World War, Britain had allowed her military to dwindle 
to a defence force, with most of its resources focused on the navy. During this time the 
country’s policy was to follow the “Ten Year Rule,” an idea that if a war was not 
foreseeable in the next ten years, then no rearmament would take place.155 The belief 
in a long-lasting peace in Europe began to falter with rising tensions brought on by the 
rise of the Nazi party in Germany. Although wary of this political party, Britain 
initially saw a strong Germany as a valuable bulwark against the spread of Russian 
communism.156 When the Nazi party took an unprecedented 230 seats in the Reichstag 
in 1932, the outlook towards the party changed and the “Ten Year Rule” was revoked. 
By 1934 the first armament expansion programme began to be discussed.157 
Although discussions had begun, Britain did not race to begin any extensive 
rearmament programme. The country was still recovering from the Depression and the 
financial burden of rearming the nation was thought to be potentially ruinous for the 
economy.158 It took until 1937 for the rearmament of Britain to slowly and quietly 
begin. Much of this was due to reports regarding the amount Germany was spending 
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on defence and on the rate of German aircraft production, which far exceeded that in 
Britain.159 This set in motion Britain's rearmament programme. The programme 
initially focused on anti-aircraft defence at home as the Government saw no need to 
plan for the production of heavy tanks or other major items of equipment as the strategy 
of the time was one based on defence rather than on ground offences or an invasion 
force.160  
The covert building of Britain’s defences continued during most of 1938, but the 
country lagged behind the military spending of Germany. During 1938 Germany spent 
16% of its national product on defence whereas Britain spent only 7.9%.161 Although 
fearful of Germany’s growing military advantage, Britain’s overall policy was one of 
appeasement rather than confrontation.162 The continued policy of concession is 
evident with the Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938.163  
The crisis surrounding the Munich Agreement awakened England’s need to prepare 
for a possible war with Germany.164 One indicator of the seemingly sudden need for 
war readiness was when 90% of the inhabitants of London were equipped with a gas 
mask within a few days of the signing of the Munich Agreement.165 After Germany 
invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939, it became clear that the appeasement strategy 
was a failure and the policy was abandoned.166 The inevitability of war became the 
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reality and it was decided to double the size of the Territorial Army and to introduce 
conscription.167 Although war was not declared until 3 September 1939, the period of 
relative peace following the Munich Agreement allowed Britain to plan for the 
mobilisation of the British economy.168  
When Britain declared war on 3 September 1939 it was on behalf of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and on the behalf of India, Burma and 
the colonies. The Dominions of the Crown – Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and Ireland – were free to choose if they were going to declare war.169 Even 
after the declaration of war, the immediacy of the conflict was not apparent as 
following the declaration of war, the “Phoney War” began and rearmament and 
mobilisation continued to move slowly.170  
Throughout the war the organisation of the mobilisation effort was controlled by a 
number of different cabinet positions. In order to understand how mobilisation and the 
subsequent laws and restrictions affected the piano industry, it is important to 
summarise the organisation of the government war machine.  
 
Overview of the Government War Machine and Structure 
Two weaknesses in the mobilisation of the First World War hindered the transition to 
a war-time economy: lack of labour and lack of supplies. In order to prevent the same 
weaknesses in a future war the Man Power Committee and the Principal Supply 
Officers’ Committee (P.S.O.C) were formed in the inter-war years.171 Although the 
two committees would be superseded by other organisations by the outbreak of the 
Second World War, these committees were integral to the planning process for 
mobilisation.  
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The P.S.O.C. was formed in May 1924 under the Master of the Ordinance and was 
absorbed into the Board of Trade in April 1927.172 The committee was charged with 
economic and industrial planning and “to direct peacetime investigations in respect of 
all matters connected with supply in war.”173 The committee had four functions:  
1. ascertain and maintain a watch upon the national stocks of raw materials; 
2. prepare a schedule of what would be required in war;  
3. plan for increasing supplies in an emergency;  
4. maintain a list of suppliers and prepare, if necessary, for national 
production.174  
Two subcommittees assisted the P.S.O.C. in their tasks. They were the Board of Trade 
Supply Organisation, which looked after raw materials and important commodities,175 
and the Supply Board, a subcommittee in charge of planning for production of war-
stores.176 The P.S.O.C. functioned largely through sub-committees whose work was 
co-ordinated by the Supply Board. The Supply Board’s importance would expand 
throughout the war as it decided what materials would have to be controlled at the 
outset of war and allocate between services the productive capacity in the country.177 
The Supply Board was also responsible for collating the estimates of the quantities and 
types of supply actually required; examining the capacity of industry to supply these 
requirements; and supervising the preliminary measure for industrial mobilisation for 
war.178   
The P.S.O.C. met annually and mainly discussed policy issues.179 An important 
contribution to the war effort by this committee was the preparation of the supply 
arrangements for which the Ministry of Supply became responsible before the 
outbreak of war in September 1939.180  
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The Man Power Committee was established to prepare for the needs of labour. The 
organisation was charged with estimating the numbers of workmen that would be 
needed for war production. This organisation became part of the Ministry of Labour 
and National Service in 1939. Additionally, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence 
was established in February 1936 and was in charge of all aspects of rearmament, 
including those of war-production potential.181  
From 1936 to 1938, the planning for war production was carried out by various 
ministries and committees instead of from one central office.  To mitigate the difficulty 
of organising the entire economy by multiple smaller organisations, the Director of 
Planning of War Production (D.P.W.P) was established at the end of 1938.182 Although 
this office did begin to crystallise a plan for war production and rearmament, the needs 
of war did not yet dominate the life of the nation, and economic resources were not yet 
fully mobilised.183  
Just prior to the declaration of war, The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1939 
was passed.184 The Act gave the Government unprecedented powers, in effect 
“complete control over persons and property, not just some persons of some particular 
class of the community, but of all persons and all property.”185 The legislation was 
considered necessary in order for the Government to be able to successfully fight the 
impending war. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act massively increased the 
powers of the state in wartime over individuals, companies and whole industries.186 It 
allowed the Government to arrest anybody who went against regulations, detain 
anybody deemed to be a threat, take over any property needed by the Government for 
the war effort, enter and search any property, and change any existing law if it was 
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necessary for the war effort.187 The legislation was the cornerstone for the 
government’s power over the economy and its citizens during the war period.  
With war looming on the horizon, a War Cabinet was set up by Chamberlain’s 
Government. Within the cabinet the administrative machinery of war production was 
one of the earliest to appear in the form of various ministries. The first was the Ministry 
of Supply in August of 1939, which was in charge of coordinating the supply of 
equipment to the British armed forces. This was shortly followed by the Ministry of 
Labour and National Service, charged with ensuring manpower and consequently 
supplies of labour for the war industry.188 Over the war, and during the change in 
government brought on by Winston Churchill’s administration, the war cabinet would 
be expanded and the existing ministries were joined by the Ministries of Aircraft 
Production, Home Security, Shipping, Food, Economic Warfare, and Information. The 
new ministries reflected the changes in priorities of the war economy, particularly the 
Ministry of Food, which was charged with ensuring enough food to the people of 
Britain while simultaneously rationing its supply.189 
Through the War Cabinet and its various ministries, Britain mobilised her resources 
for war in four main ways:  
1) by increasing the total volume of production,  
2) by reducing civilian consumption,  
3) by drawing on capital at home,  
4) by drawing on capital abroad.190  
During the war, the War Cabinet discussed strategic issues while the ministries saw 
that production priorities were met by restricting civilian production through limiting 
material availability, rationing, and moving labour to war production factories. But, at 
the beginning of the war priorities were not always clear and according to Henry 
Pelling “at first there was too little distinction between goods which were genuinely 
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essential, such as saucepans, and those for which the demand was less immediate, such 
as pianos.”191  
 
Government Controls and Rationing   
Overall, the British Government controlled the conversion process from a peace-time 
economy to war economy through direct control and rationing. Direct control applied 
to labour, raw materials, industrial capacity, import and exports, as well as to the 
amount and type of goods that could be manufactured and supplied. Rationing limited 
the amount and quality of goods civilians could buy. These methods were used to 
encourage manufacturers to switch to war production, reduce civilian consumption, 
and direct materials to the war effort.192  
Initially, many manufacturers began to switch to war production from a sense of 
patriotic duty, but the main practical inducement was taxes on profits which 
culminated in the Excess Profits Tax of 100% in 1940.193 The tax was an attempt to 
stop wartime profiteering by firms, and it taxed profits in excess of peacetime levels.194 
The Government then continued to push manufacturers to convert to the war effort 
through its control of raw materials and limitations of production.  
The control of materials was not uniformly organised at the start of the war. At that 
time materials were grouped into three categories for control. The first was that of 
essential commodities, which included iron and steel, some non-ferrous metals, wool, 
leather, timber, hemp, flax, jute, paper, and aluminium and these materials were 
quickly put under control. The second group was subject to voluntary control through 
trade associations and included rubber, mica, asbestos, and silk. The third group, which 
included plastics and some non-ferrous metals, was left uncontrolled. Throughout the 
war materials could be moved from one group to another as needs demanded.195  
                                                 
191 Pelling, 114.  
192 Overy, 119. 
193 Postan, 88. 
194 Broadberry and Howlett, 164. 
195 Postan, 90-91. 
51 
 
The three-tiered system of material regulation was deemed too disorderly by the spring 
of 1940 as too many industries were taking advantage of the voluntary controls.  It was 
then decided that raw materials would be controlled by a series of allocations and 
industries would receive their allocation based on need.196 To enforce this, the 
Government took control over all materials and distributed them as it deemed 
necessary. The allocation of supplies became the most important way the government 
controlled materials.197 
Rationing was another powerful tool used by the Government to control materials and 
consumer consumption. To better understand how to utilise rationing, the Registrar-
General supervised the registration of the entire population on 29 September 1939. 
This was done for the purpose of registering able-bodied men for national service and 
to understand the needs of the population for goods rationing.198 Rationing began 
immediately: first with petrol by the end of September 1939. Food rationing began on 
8 January 1940 with the introduction of rationing of butter, bacon, and sugar.199 Other 
consumables that would be rationed included clothing and soap.  
As the war continued, the controls placed on manufacturing and the rationing used to 
inhibit civilian consumption helped Britain to switch from a peace-time economy to a 
war-time economy. To ensure the structure of the war economy, and to aid in the 
direction of mobilisation and the war effort, Churchill appointed a Minister of 
Production in 1942.200 This solidified the hierarchy of the war economy with the 
Minister of Production in charge of directing the overall plan of production while the 
various ministries ensured that the production quotas were met.  
 
The Need of Labour 
As the economy transitioned to mobilisation the need for labour became paramount. 
Luckily for the Government, prior to the beginning of the war the British economy had 
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been operating below maximum capacity and there was a willing pool of 1.5 million 
unemployed people looking for work. Although these people took time to train, they 
filled the initial gaps created by the first steps of conversion to war production.201 But, 
as the British war economy continued to develop, labour needs continued, which led 
to the conscription of not only soldiers, but men and women to work in essential war 
production jobs. 
Under the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939, the Ministry of Labour joined 
with the Ministry of National Service and was renamed the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service. The combined ministry was in charge of preventing manpower 
problems and consequently the supplies of labour for the war industry. This 
responsibility led the ministry to become a linchpin in the administration of war 
production.202 The importance of manpower in the war effort was so imperative that 
when Churchill became Prime Minister, his war cabinet included the Minister of 
Labour and National Service, alongside the Minister of Supply, Minister for Economic 
Warfare, and Minister of Aircraft Production.203 As the need for labour became 
paramount, the Government gave the Ministry of Labour and National Service 
extended powers, including the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act of 1940, which 
endowed the Minister of Labour with the power to conscript labour. The Act required 
skilled workers to register so that they could be directed to necessary war production 
factories. It also created a “Schedule of Reserved Occupations,” which exempted 
skilled men from being called-up into the armed forces if they were employed to 
undertake “essential work.”204   
As the British war economy developed, the opportunities for workers to find better 
positions with higher wages created a mobile workforce. Factory workers with 
essential skills were sought after, putting these labourers in the position to choose the 
work which paid the most money.205  As an example, it was estimated that the number 
                                                 
201 Postan, 10. 
202 Ibid, 79. 
203 The first Minister of Labour and National Service was Ernest Bevin, who was appointed on 3 
October 1940. Pelling, 78. 
204 Pelling, 112. 
205 The average salary of the workforce rose during the course of the war. Skilled workmen (and 
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subcontracted companies or alternative employers. Andrew Thorpe, “Britain,” in The Civilian in War: 
53 
 
of workers in the motor vehicle, aircraft, and general engineering industries employed 
on work for the home and export market fell from 252,000 to 152,000 during June 
1940 to September 1941 as workers left the industry to work in the higher paying 
munitions industry.206  
In order to stop the movement of labour between factories and in order to direct labour 
to particularly essential industries, the Essential Works Orders were introduced in 
February 1941. This order was an amendment to a May 1940 law which enabled the 
Ministry of Labour to “direct any person to perform any task which s/he is capable 
of.” The Essential Works Orders made it so that an employer could not fire workers, 
except for extreme misconduct, and employees were not allowed to quit without the 
agreement of the National Service Officer – all of which was designed to reduce labour 
turnover.207  
Eventually the need for labour grew so great that in March 1941 the Government 
decided to mobilise women with the Registration for Employment Order, which 
required workers not covered by the National Service Act to register for civilian 
employment. This Act mainly affected women and men over the combatant age of 41 
who were unemployed or in part-time work. By the early summer of 1941 is was seen 
that the number of women mobilised was too small and the age limitations were 
expanded. Although this increased the number of women engaged in war work, it was 
estimated that the number of women transferred to war work or to vital civilian 
industries between April and November 1941 was less than 200,000. In order to 
increase the number of working women, the National Service (No. 2) Act went into 
effect in December 1941. This Act conscripted unmarried women and childless 
widows aged 20 to 30 years old, with most of the women conscripted working in 
munitions factories.208 In 1942, the age range for conscription of women was extended 
to women aged 19 to 40 with the Employment of Women (Control of Engagement) 
Order of 1942.209 Overall, women who had not previously been employed, or had been 
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housewives, formed 80% of the additional half million extra people who came into the 
work force between 1939 and 1943.210 
By 1942 Britain was considered fully mobilised and all available resources were being 
used for the war effort.211 Factories throughout the country had been either built or 
converted for war production and those not engaged in war production were making 
items marked as essential for civilian life.212 By 1943 the working population of Britain 
was evenly divided between those serving in the armed forces, working in war 
production factories, or working in industries deemed otherwise essential. Of this 
population about one million men and women over the age of 65 were in paid 
employment.213 The all-encompassing nature of the war effort would remain over the 
next two years as controls, restrictions, rationing, and limitations continued. The piano 
industry was greatly affected by mobilisation during the war years. In particular, the 
restrictions placed on the raw materials needed to make pianos made manufacturing 
increasingly difficult.   
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Chapter 3: The Restricted Materials Used in Piano Production 
 
Pianos are complicated mechanisms containing a large number of individual parts. The 
materials used to make these parts are varied, and include but are not limited to a 
number of species of wood, different metals, and wool. The size of a piano, even a 
small “mini” piano, is substantial and requires large amounts of timber and iron. The 
materials needed for the construction of pianos were the same materials that were 
critical for the war effort. According to the Board of Trade, four materials were of the 
utmost importance: timber, steel, iron, and wool, but almost all of the materials used 
in piano construction would come under restrictions and regulation during the war 
years. The need for these materials was one of the driving forces behind the 
Government’s restrictions on piano building and eventual shut down of the industry.  
According to a report sent to the War Production Board of the United States, on 
average, each piano contained: 
Lumber 198.4 ft. 
Veneer and cross banding  186 sq. ft. 
Packing lumber   24 board ft. 
Packing plywood   87 sq. ft. 
Brass     3.6 lbs 
Cast iron     150.0 lbs 
Copper wire    5.3 lbs 
Lead     1.0 lbs 
Steel     35.8 lbs 
Lacquer    2.03 gallons 
Finishing filler    0.25 gallons 
Shellac     0.21 gallons 
Stain     0.30 gallons 
Celluloid 0.58 lbs 
Felt     2.10 lbs 
Glue    7.40 lbs 
Pumice stone  0.50 lbs 
Sandpaper    1.00 quire214 
Table 3. Materials used in piano production from the National Piano Manufacturers Association, "The Piano 
Industry," report sent to the War Production Board, 1941. PG 179, 585.6205. National Archives, USA.215 
                                                 
214 A quire is a measurement of paper consisting of 24-25 sheets. 
215 Although this information comes from a report from the National Piano Manufacturers Association 
some of the figures seem inflated, particularly the total of veneer and cross banding used in piano 
production and the lacquer. 
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In order to understand the importance of these materials to both the piano industry and 
the war effort, a more detailed investigation of the restricted materials and a 
comparison of their use in piano production and in war production is necessary. This 
is followed by a summary of the restrictions placed on these materials by the 
Government and how these restrictions impacted piano production. When possible the 
source of the materials is discussed and how the trade of the materials was affected by 
the war.    
 
The Need to Control Materials  
In order to maximise war production while limiting civilian production during the war 
years, the British Government needed to find ways of regulating the distribution and 
consumption of raw materials. Controlling these materials was not a simple matter. 
First, the Government conducted a survey of all available national resources to 
understand (1) the sources of the materials, (2) who distributed the materials, and (3) 
which manufacturers produced items with the materials. After this survey was 
completed the Government created criteria which decided priority in allocating raw 
materials. This priority was in place to ensure that manufacturers producing items for 
the war effort were able to obtain the necessary materials while simultaneously 
restricting domestic production. Finally, the Government needed to implement this 
priority system throughout all manufacturing, which was done through a licensing 
system.216  
Licensing enabled the Government to cut down on private or domestic production of 
needed raw materials by refusing licences to companies who did not have a contract 
from a Government department. This then reduced private consumption by limiting 
the availability of products made with these materials. The controls also regulated the 
price of raw materials to prevent profiteering by unscrupulous dealers.217  
                                                 
216 Bowen and Worswick, 77.  
217 A number of articles and books describe the manner in which the Government was able to take 
control and regulate large amounts of raw materials. The sources consulted in this chapter include the 
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Controls and War Finance,” published in the Oxford Economic Papers, gives an overview of the 
planning of controls, as well as, case studies of the control of timber, iron and steel, paper, and wool. 
Worswick’s follow up article “British Raw Materials Control,” again published in the Oxford 
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The Government organised the control of materials by creating “Control Boards.” 
These boards oversaw the distribution and use of raw materials or commodities. If a 
material was vital to the war effort and was in demand, the material had its own control 
board, for example, the Timber Control Board was charged with regulating the supply 
of timber, whereas the Non-ferrous Metals Control Board was in charge of copper, 
zinc, and tin. As war production increased and materials became more scarce, controls 
were expanded. At the start of the war around 20 materials were under control, but by 
October 1941 over 60 materials were regulated under various control boards.218 These 
boards reported directly to the Ministry of Supply. The boards impacted production 
and distribution through the issuing of Control Orders. The orders placed restrictions 
on the amount of materials available to manufacturers, set the price of raw materials, 
stated which institutions or companies were able to purchase raw materials, and 
determined how manufacturers were able to use previously held stocks.  
The time frame of controls and their severity varied as each control board was 
independent of the others. In general, during the first nine months of the war the release 
of materials to the domestic market was not consistently restricted as each board 
enacted and enforced the controls of materials at different times. This led to wool 
coming under the complete control of the Government by the end of September 1939, 




                                                 
Economic Papers, expands the case studies to include discussion on non-ferrous metals, aluminium, 
and jute controls. Frank House’s monograph Timber at War gives an in-depth look into the control of 
timber and its uses during the war years and A. Brigg’s November 1947 article “The Framework of 
Wool Control” in the Oxford Economic Papers outlines how the U.K. Government structured the 
wool industry during the war years.  
218 Worswick, 1.  




Table 4. Example of the overarching organisation of the control of raw materials 
 
   
Timber 
The majority of the parts of a piano are made from wood, including the frame (also 
called the rim or the case), bracing, soundboard, and action. According to the War 
Production Board, on average 198.4 feet of lumber is used in the construction of a 
piano with an additional 186 square feet of veneer and cross banding (see Table 2). A 
variety of species of trees are used in piano construction.   
In the 1927 supplement to his book A Treatise on the Art of Pianoforte Construction, 
Samuel Wolfenden goes into detail regarding the woods used by British piano 
manufacturers, especially the timber used in the construction of the soundboard. His 
writing mentions how British piano makers were not able to manufacture an “All 
British Piano” because the industry relied on materials which were imported into the 
country. He said, “There are natural products for which, by reason of our insular 
position, climatic and other conditions, we must always depend upon foreign 
countries.”220 In general, Great Britain was not able to grow the volume or variety of 
the timber needed to supply the industry and had to source its supplies elsewhere.  
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Figure 7. Price list showing the three sizes of pianos produced before the war.  "Wholesale price-list 1939" Kemble 
Company Archives. Hackney History Centre. Image by author. 
 
On average it was estimated by the Board of Trade that a piano required 50 square feet 
of timber in the construction of the outer case and another 50 square feet for the 
construction of the internal components including the soundboard, action, and keys.221 
There are a number of types of timber used in the construction of each piano including, 
but not limited to birch, maple (often referred to as sycamore in United Kingdom),222 
beech, mahogany, walnut, spruce, and poplar.  
                                                 
221 This amount of material is in contrast with the American piano makers’ report to the War 
Production Board. The difference in material use may be a result of the popularity of smaller 
instruments, such as the miniature piano in Britain. These pianos were less popular in the United 
States, which preferred full-sized upright and grand pianos. Memorandum A – Factual Survey. March 
1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
222 In Britain, trees from the genius Acer are often referred to as sycamore if the timber was harvested 
in the United Kingdom. If the tree was harvested outside of the United Kingdom, then the wood can 
be referred to as sycamore or maple. The most common maple species in Europe is the sycamore 
maple (Acer pseudoplatanus); the most common species in North America is sugar maple or hard 
maple (Acer saccharum). “Sycamore (Acer pseudoplatanus)” Woodland Trust, accessed 01 November 
2016, https://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/visiting-woods/trees-woods-and-wildlife/british-
trees/common-non-native-trees/sycamore/.   
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Use of Timber in Piano Production 
Piano rim: In grand piano construction the rim consists of layers of thin strips of wood 
laminated together and bent into shape to form a continuous rim with no joints.223 The 
wood used to make the rims included American ash (Fraxinus americana), sequoia 
(Sequoiadendron giganteum), whitewood (Liriodendron tulipifera),224 maple (Acer 
pseudoplatanus or Acer saccharum), or any wood with a fairly long grain. The higher 
quality rims were made entirely of layers of maple; rims made of other lower quality 
woods had the two outer layers made of maple.225 The number of layers and their 
thickness were not universal, with each manufacturer having their own particular 
construction techniques.226 Some pianos used an “inner/outer” construction in which 
the inner rim was made of less expensive strips of poplar (Populus tremula) with the 
braces, soundboard, and iron plate fitted to this rim. As the piano neared completion, 
outer boards of maple were fitted around the outer rim of the piano.227 In either 
construction technique, the outer surface of the rim would be covered in a decorative 
veneer228 or lacquered. After the rim was completed, the back frame and braces, which 
support the weight of the iron plate, were built into the case. The type of wood used 
for braces varies between manufacturers with spruce being the most common.  
                                                 
223 William White, Theory and Practice of Piano Construction (New York: Edward Lyman Bill, 1906; 
reprint, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1975), 67. 
224 There are a number of woods which are referred to as “whitewood” including Bucida buceras, 
Liriodendron tulipifera, Tabebuia heterophylla, and Elaeocarpus kitonil. Of these species, the most 
likely timber used for piano construction is Liriodendron tulipifera, or tulip tree. This tree is a fast 
growing tree from North America which grows tall and straight. The other trees are subtropical or 
tropical trees with slow growth rates. “Liriodendron tulipifera: tulip tree” Royal Horticultural Society, 
accessed 27 August 2016, https://www.rhs.org.uk/plants/details?plantid=1177.  
225 Wolfenden, 147. 
226 Steinway uses 17 layers of wood in their rims. James Barron, Piano: The Making of a Steinway 
Concert Grand (New York: Times Books, 2006), 2.  
227 Ibid, 8.  
228 Many different types of wood were popular choices for the veneer of pianos. These include but are 




Figure 8. Exploded view of a grand piano. Image courtesy of http://www.radfordpiano.com/structure/ and modified 
by the author.  
In upright pianos, the case of the instrument is not integral to the resonant body of the 
piano, but instead serves as a support for the keyboard and action.229  Since the case of 
the instrument had no acoustic implications, it was made from a number of different 
woods, all of which could be as decorative or as simple as the maker desired. Common 
woods used for upright piano case construction were varieties of oak (Quercus), pine 
(Pinus), and spruce (Picea), which were often veneered with decorative woods. Unlike 
in the construction of grand pianos, the case of an upright piano was built up around 
the soundboard and iron frame.230 
 
                                                 
229 According to White, the exterior walls of the upright “exist chiefly for the purpose of giving 
support to the key-board [sic] and action, and of affording a foundation whereon may be constructed 
the elaborate architectural and decorative structure that, in its entirety, is denominated the pianoforte 
case.” The frame of the grand piano, on the contrary, is charged with not only supporting the key 
frame and action but is also an essential part the resonant body. White, 67. 










Sound board: Perhaps the most important wooden structure in a piano is the sound 
board. This thin piece of wood acts as the main resonating device of the piano and it 
requires a wood which can both flex easily and vibrate freely. Sound boards of pianos 
are usually constructed of a sheet of spruce.231 According to Wolfenden, the timber 
used in the piano industry for the construction of sound boards was called “Swiss 
pine”232 by British makers but it is actually Norway spruce (Picea abies),233 which 
grows throughout northern and central Europe. For instrument making the preferred 
region to source this wood was between latitudes 45 and 50 degrees north in 
mountainous countries extending from the Alps to the Carpathian ranges. English 
piano makers in particular were receiving a large portion of their wood supplies in the 
late 1920s from the Balkans.234 In addition to Norway spruce, English piano makers 
                                                 
231 Barron, 74. 
232 According to Wolfenden, the piano industry called Norway spruce “Swiss pine” because they 
originally sourced the wood from Switzerland. When the forests of Switzerland were exhausted of 
quality timbre the wood was then sourced from other countries. Wolfenden, 234. 
233 In the treatise, Wolfenden refers to the Norway spruce as “picea excelsa” which is an obsolete 
scientific name for Picea abies. Ibid, 235.  Information on the Norway spruce was sourced from 
“Spruce, Norway (Picea abies),” Woodland Trust, accessed 1 November 2016, 
https://www.woodlandtrust.org.uk/visiting-woods/trees-woods-and-wildlife/british-trees/common-
non-native-trees/norway-spruce/.  
234 Although Wolfenden did not elaborate as to the countries from which England imported its sound 
board wood, today the Balkans are considered to consist of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovinia, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, and parts of Turkey. 
Most likely British makers were importing wood from Romania, as this was referenced in S. A. 
Hurren, Secretary of the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group to E. A. Fisher, Board of Trade. 
“Messrs. Chas. H. Challen and Sons,” 16 October 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
Figure 9. Exploded view of an upright piano. Image courtesy of 
http://www.thepianospace.com and modified by the author. 
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were using silver spruce (Picea engelmannii) sourced from America, and the silver fir 
(Abie alba) sourced from Europe.235  
The ribs attached to the underside of the sound board are made of pine and are aligned 
so they run perpendicular to the grain of the sound board.236  Glued to the top of the 
sound board are two bridges. These bridges are made from several strips of beech 
(Fagus sylvatica) or maple which are glued together so that the grains of each layer 
cross each other.237  
Piano action: Historically, wood such as hornbeam (Carpcinus hetulus), beech, or 
maple (Acer platanoides) have been the favoured timber for making piano actions.238 
Action parts need to be made of a wood that has a reliable structure that can withstand 
not only the repetitive motion and impact of the striking hammer, but also be resistant 
to wear from the multiple moving parts. As the action is a complicated mechanism, 
the wood used should be easily shaped but dimensionally stable as small changes in 
the environment can cause swelling of the wood grain which could affect the efficiency 
and “feel” of the action. The hammershank, a small stick in which the piano hammer 
is attached, is traditionally made of birch 239 but maple and hickory were also used.240 
The keys of the piano rest on a keybed made of spruce and are held in place by cheek 
blocks which were often made from cut-off sections of the rim. The wood used for the 
keys of British-made pianos was common lime (Tilia x europaea),241 but as the 
material grew scarce, makers switched to using Norway spruce or basswood (Tilia 
americana), a tree native to eastern North America with a similar colour and texture 
to common lime.242 
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Needs of Timber for the War Effort 
During the Second World War, not only were many naval ships and airplanes made of 
wood, but so were the devices which cleared ocean mines, allowed tanks to cross 
muddy land, and built the impromptu bridges which allowed invasion forces to enter 
into Europe. Wood was also used to transport ammunition, supplies, and food to 
soldiers on the ground.243 It was one of the most important materials needed for the 
war effort and was quick to come under restrictions.   
The Ministry of Supply was the largest consumer of timber during the war, followed 
by the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Air Ministry. The Ministry of Supply 
was responsible for seeing to the needs of the army, and as a result it had a varied need 
for timber. The material was used for everything from packing crates to munitions 
boxes, tool handles to gun carriages, rifles stocks and office furniture to coffins.244  
The Ministry of Aircraft Production needed timber for the construction of aircraft, not 
only for the bodies of planes such as the Mosquito bomber, but also for the construction 
of jigs and patterns used in the construction of wood and metal bodied aircraft. Silver 
spruce was the preferred wood for much of this work as it could be cut into long lengths 
and was free from serious defects. The demand for silver spruce, and spruce in general, 
put the wood at a higher price than that of other European woods.245 In addition to 
military needs, timber was needed on the home front, where it was used to build homes, 
repair damage to buildings caused by the Blitz, and for basic needs such as furniture.  
Control of Timber 
Prior to the outbreak of war, the government began to create a scheme for the control 
of timber that would be implemented should war be declared. The planning for these 
controls began by the Board of Trade towards the end of 1936 and continued in earnest 
in the later months of 1937. By the autumn of 1938 a draft scheme had been written.246 
Under the scheme there would be a virtual closing down of commercial trade and all 
timber would come under the control of the Timber Control Department of the 
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Series (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953), 101-103. 
245 Wolfenden, 238. 
246 House, 4. 
65 
 
Ministry of Supply. The Timber Control Department was organised by the Controller 
– a person who regulated the production, purchase, transport, storage, distribution, and 
sale of timber. He would be aided by a Joint Advisory Committee which was made up 
of members of various trade bodies. Under the Controller there were four departments: 
1. imported timber supplies; 
2. home-grown timber supplies; 
3. distribution, inland transport, and price control; 
4. finance.247 
In the draft scheme timber was defined as: 
…any wood which is not further prepared than felled, barked or peeled, cleft, 
split or riven, hewn or sawn, planed, dressed, tongued, grooved, matched, 
beaded or v-jointed, dried or seasoned, soaked or steamed, bent, treated with 
any preservative or painted; and any shingles, weatherboards, lap or strips, 
however prepared; and salvage or reclamation timber; provided that the 
expression ‘timber’ does not include any 
 
(i) Growing trees 
(ii) Willow rods or willow sticks 
(iii) Unused boxboards 
(iv) Unused plywood 
(v) Veneer  
(vi) Firewood blocks or kindling wood 
(vii) Round timber or underwood of which the butt diameter 
measured under bark or without bark does not exceed two-and-
a-half inches.  
This meant that manufactured and semi-manufactured articles made of wood were not 
under the control of the Department. For the piano industry, this meant manufacturers 
were able to continue to make pianos using manufactured or partially manufactured 
wooden piano parts but that stocks of raw lumber fell under controls.  Overall, timber 
controls worked by having the Government purchase timber supplies and then 
implement a licence system in which the Government distributed and controlled 
consumption. The licensing system safeguarded supplies, ensuring they went to vital 
war purposes.248  
Making matters more difficult was the need to import timber from sources outside the 
U.K.  A large portion of the supply of timber, other than veneers, was from Canada, 
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but timber was also imported from Norway, the Balkans, and the Baltics. As Germany 
expanded its territory through invasion and military success,249 these sources of timber 
were cut off and by the end of the first year of the war the U.K. was unable to access 
60% of the previous year’s timber imports.250 Romania was also a source of timber in 
the early months of the war, but when that country allied with Germany in November 
1940 this supply was also cut off.251 Eventually, in March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act 
was passed and the U.K. began receiving wood from the U.S.A.252 
When war was declared on 3 September 1939, the first Control of Timber Order (No. 
1) went into effect.253 This order restricted the amount of timber that could be used in 
manufacture and sold to the domestic market to “10% of the seller’s stock in each 
category with the exception of timber required by Government Departments or by 
public authorities for use under the Civil Defence Act. Merchant to merchant trade was 
exempted.”254 The order restricted the sale of timber to 10% of what the retailer had 
sold in the previous year, unless the retailer was selling to the Government, public 
authorities, or to another merchant. This allowed for the government to purchase 
almost all supplies of timber and then begin implementing a licence system in which 
the government distributed and controlled consumption of the raw material.  
For the piano industry, this meant that by September 1939 piano firms could continue 
to make pianos with any manufactured or partially manufactured wooden components, 
but they were limited to using only 10% of their stocks of raw materials in order to 
manufacture new parts. The rest of their stocks were to be sold to the Government. 
Over the war period, the Timber Control Order would be refined 36 times,255 each 
refinement placing more restrictions on the acquisition and use of different types of 
timber. The restrictions placed on timber during the first year had a significant impact 
on piano making, ultimately aiding in the eventual shutdown of the entire industry. For 
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250 This is in terms of value. Bowen and Worswick, 79. 
251 House 15. 
252 Ibid, 17. 
253 The order was dated 1 September 1939. Bowen and Worswick, 79. 
254 House, 24. 
255 Ibid, 26. 
67 
 
example, Timber Control Order (No. 4) restricted manufacturers from trading timber, 
boxboard, and plywood abroad, thus limiting piano manufacturers from acquiring 
many of the woods needed in piano production. Timber Control Order (No. 5), dated 
30 September, introduced a licensing system for the acquisition of timber for 
consumption. The licensing system allowed the Government to control who was able 
to purchase timber supplies by requiring companies to have a licence from the Minister 
of Supply.256 A striking blow to the piano industry came with Timber Order (No. 7), 
enacted in March 1940. This order prohibited the use of a holder’s own stock without 
a timber licence. For piano manufacturers it meant that they were only able to use 
previously manufactured or semi-manufactured wooden components in the production 
of pianos and they were not able to manufacture new wooden components from their 
own stocks of raw lumber without a licence. Overall, licences were granted to 
manufacturers who were making products for the war effort or who had government 
contracts for domestic production.257 The sale of veneer also came under a licensing 
scheme on 3 April 1940 with Control of Timber Order (No. 10) which limited the sale 
of veneer only to manufacturers who received a timber licence.258 
On 1 July 1940, Timber Order (No. 13) went into effect. This order set “fixed prices259 
for imported timber and prohibited, except under licence, the acquisition and 
consumption of timber for any purpose.” 260 The order stopped merchant-to-merchant 
trade as well as any acquisition of timber for non-government related production. It 
coincided with the Consolidation of Industry Scheme and helped to end domestic 
production of pianos because manufacturers were unable to purchase the necessary 
supplies to produce pianos (see Chapter 4 for more details). Once piano manufacturers 
had used their existing stocks of manufactured or semi-manufactured parts, they would 
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not be able to acquire timber for the production of pianos unless the company had a 
specific licence from the Government to do so.  
After July 1940 the acquisition of timber for the piano industry was impossible without 
a timber licence. As the Government pushed for companies to switch to war 
production, the number of licences granted to piano manufacturers for the production 
of domestic pianos lessened and in August 1941 the Ministry of Supply informed the 
piano industry that timber was no longer available for the production of pianos to be 
sold domestically.261 From this time forward piano manufacturers were only able to 
obtain timber licences if they had contracts for the production of pianos for the export 
market (available until April 1942), for instruments to be sent to the military (until 31 
August 1943), or if they were making products for the war effort.  
 
Iron and Steel 
Iron and steel were imperative materials for the war effort. As iron is the main 
component in steel, the two materials were controlled by the same Control Board and 
control orders. Although grouped together by the Ministry of Supply, iron and steel 
were used for very different purposes and in different quantities in piano 
manufacturing and it is important to examine their uses independently before exploring 
how the materials were needed for the war effort and subsequently controlled.   
The Use of Iron in Piano Production 
Iron constitutes the second largest amount of raw material used in the production of 
pianos with an average of 150 lbs of iron used in every instrument. Iron is used in the 
production of the iron frame, also called the iron plate, which acts as a major structural 
element in the piano. The iron plate absorbs the downward force exerted by the tension 
of the strings, protects the soundboard, and prevents the other timber elements from 
warping under the pressure of the strings.  
British piano manufacturers did not make, or “cast,” their own frames but relied on 
iron foundries who produced the frames to the specifications of each manufacturer. In 
the 1940s the British piano industry relied on three iron foundries to supply frames to 
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the entire industry. These were: The Brown Foundry in Northampton; Booth and 
Brooke in Burnham on Crouch; and John B. Clark in the Tottenham area of London.262   
Each frame was made from a combination of both scrap iron and red hematite pig 
iron.263 The mixture of the two irons increased the low tensile strength of pig iron. 
Scrap iron was preferred to raw pig iron because repeated melting and cooling of the 
iron contributed to an increase in the tensile strength. Using scrap iron was a cheaper 
alternative to repeatedly heating and cooling large amounts of iron in order to temper 
the iron for use. The combination of materials resulted in a frame which was strong 
enough to withstand the pressure of the strings but soft enough to be drilled for the 
placement of tuning pins and positioning screws.264  
 
The Use of Steel in Piano Production 
Compared to the amount of timber and iron used in pianos, the percentage of steel used 
in the making of a piano is very small. Steel is used in the production of piano wire 
and tuning pins and each piano contains, on average, 4 lbs of high tensile steel wire265 
and 3⅓ lbs of Siemens-Martin low carbon content mild steel266 used in tuning pins. 
Bass strings were actually a combination of a steel wire core and some other metal, 
usually 4½ lbs of copper or iron wound over the core.267 Although less than 8 lbs of 
steel was used per instrument, the material is an essential component of a piano, and 
when steel came under restrictions piano production suffered.  
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Needs of Iron and Steel for the War Effort 
Iron and steel were used for a large range of materials during the war, but their primary 
use was for armaments. Iron and steel were used in the production of tanks, airplanes, 
naval ships, and weapons. Iron, as the main component in steel, was controlled in order 
to ensure the supply of this material for steel production and as a result the distribution 
of iron for the manufacture of piano frames was strictly controlled.  
Although small amounts of steel were used in the production of pianos, this material, 
particularly the type of steel used in piano wire manufacturing, was of the utmost 
importance to the war effort. High tensile steel was in very short supply and was not 
only used in the production of the hulls of naval ships and submarines,268 but also 
required for balloon barrages, as well as Long Aerial Mines, otherwise known as 
“piano wire bombs.”269 
Barrage balloons were a passive means of defence used in the Battle of Britain and 
were designed to force enemy planes to fly at higher altitudes, thus making them 
vulnerable to anti-aircraft weapons. The balloons consisted of a helium- or hydrogen-
filled balloon anchored to the ground by up to 5,000 feet of cable made from high 
tensile steel and deployed by a winch.270 In addition to rerouting German aircraft flight 
patterns, the balloon cable could cut through the wings of the aircraft, causing it to 
crash.271 The use of barrage balloons was controlled by Balloon Command, a part of 
Fighter Command under the RAF.272 By August 1940, Balloon Command had 2,368 
barrage balloons and would maintain close to 2,000 operational balloons until the end 
of the war.273    
Long Aerial Mines (LAM) were designed to be able to break up enemy aircraft 
formations by creating a bomb field in the air.  Each LAM consisted of a cylindrical 
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container measuring 14 inches long and 7 inches in diameter and weighing 14 pounds. 
The containers were released from an aircraft and were positioned in a line in the flight 
path of an advancing German fighter squadron. When each container was deployed, a 
parachute unfurled at the top. It was followed by a length of shock-absorbing cord, the 
cylindrical container, an AAD bomb, 2,000 feet of piano wire, and at the bottom, a 
second parachute.  
As enemy aircraft flew into the path of the LAM, the wings would catch on the piano 
wire. This would cause the main parachute to be released which also armed the bomb. 
The force of the momentum of the plane would pull the bomb down onto the aircraft 
resulting in an explosion.274  
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Figure 10. Diagram and description of the Long Aerial Mine. Image courtesy of Mitch Williamson, 
http://airwargreatbritain.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/world-war-ii-churchills-aerial-mines.html. 
 
In the end the LAM proved unsuccessful. It was not ready in time for the Battle of 
Britain and when it was used from September 1940 until October 1941 it failed to 
down a significant number of enemy planes. In general, the bombs were used as a 
defence during night time raids and were deployed out at sea for fear that unexploded 
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bombs would land and explode on British soil. In total it is believed that only 4-6 
German airplanes were destroyed with LAM bombs over a one-year period.275  
Control of Iron and Steel  
At the beginning of the war, the United Kingdom sourced iron and steel domestically 
and imported materials from Europe and from across the empire. This included large 
amounts of iron and steel from Norway, France and Belgium,276 South Africa, 
Australia, New Zealand, and India; as well as Algeria.277 As Germany took control of 
Europe, Britain was cut off from its European suppliers and had to rely more heavily 
on other sources of materials. By 1941 Britain was importing large quantities of iron 
and steel from the United States.278 
The controls placed on iron and steel followed a similar pattern to those placed on 
timber with the Government taking over supplies, restricting acquisition, and 
implementing a licensing system for use with the distribution of the material controlled 
by the Iron and Steel Control Department of the Ministry of Supply. 
Unlike the timber industry, the complete Government control of iron and steel did not 
take place within the first few months of the war, but over the course of nine months. 
The initial principle of the Iron and Steel Control279 department was that of “business 
as usual” with the belief that the industry could “produce as much iron and steel as she 
wants” by working overtime, increasing employee numbers, restarting idle furnaces, 
and building new furnaces. This resulted in both Government ministries and private 
industry placing orders well in excess of the output capacity of the industry. 
Companies were encouraged to quote Government contract numbers when ordering 
steel and iron with the idea that these numbers would influence which contracts were 
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given priority. Not surprisingly, this system was faulty and both deliveries to 
Government and domestic orders fell in to arrears.280  
The first Control Order went into effect on 3 September 1939 and stabilised the price 
of iron and steel products, except for scrap. Scrap was given a maximum price on 22 
September with Iron and Steel Order (No. 3). Also included in the first order was a 
licensing of the purchase and sale of iron and steel, but, unlike the timber order, there 
was a long list of exemptions from the licensing. This included:  
Government defence departments; other Government departments; local 
authorities for Civil Defence purposes; persons requiring supplies under the 
Civil Defence Act 1939, or otherwise for A.R.P.;281 shipbuilders and repairers; 
collieries; persons requiring steel to fulfil orders made before 1 September; 
persons with urgent requirements in the next fourteen days; persons purchasing 
10 cwt.282 or less.283 
This meant that piano makers who had orders placed before 1 September were still 
able to purchase iron and steel. This loophole was closed at the end of 1939 when the 
Minster of Supply cancelled the exemption of pre-war contracts.284 Companies that 
had war production work only needed to supply a contract number or reference to their 
contract in purchasing the material. 
The system of ‘business as usual’ ended in April 1940 when all manufacturers had to 
obtain a licence to acquire iron and steel. This was through the Control of Iron and 
Steel Order (No. 8). The aim of the order was to allocate every ton of iron and steel to 
the best possible use.285 Just as in the case of timber, obtaining a licence was difficult 
as the applications favoured industries that were manufacturing items for the war 
effort.286 The Iron and Steel Control Department allocated global tonnages of iron and 
steel in advance and the contracts each department could issue were not allowed to 
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exceed the total tonnage allocated. This resolved the issue of too many orders being 
placed without enough materials to fulfil the orders.287  
Although piano manufacturers were not responsible for producing their own iron 
frames or steel piano wire, the restrictions placed on these materials for domestic 
production would make acquiring iron frames and piano wire increasingly difficult and 
then impossible in the war years.  The acquisition of iron frames and the restrictions 
on the material did not seem to concern the piano industry in the first year of the war, 
which is evident in Eugene Sotheran’s July 1940 article in the Music Trades Review 
where he stated that the “question of iron frames is well in hand.”288 It is possible that 
the industry had foreseen the potential restrictions on iron and had purchased excess 
stocks of the materials before restrictions went into place.  
By 1941 the piano industry had used its stocks of iron and steel and had to apply for 
licences for the production of pianos for the export market and for the production of 
pianos for the military. From 1 July through 30 September 1941 the industry was 
allocated 154 tons of iron for the production of piano frames, 2 tons of high tensile 
steel for wire, and 8 tons of low carbon content mild steel for tuning pins. The iron 
was enough for the production of 2156 piano frames;289 the steel produced 500 sets of 
piano wire and 2400 sets of tuning pins.290 The disparity between the number of frames 
and sets of wire shows the priority held by high tensile steel within war production 
capacity. This allocation of iron and steel granted to the industry during 1941 would 
be the last amount of these materials released for piano production until after the end 
of the war.   
Wool 
The Use of Wool in Piano Production  
The wool used in piano production was for felt. Felt parts included piano hammers and 
dampers, key bushings, action felt, rail and action cloth, and punchings.291 Like iron 
                                                 
287 Bowen and Worswick, 80. 
288 Eugene Sotheran, “Keeping the Piano Industry Alive: Piano Trade Committees Act” Music Trades 
Review, July 1940, 127. 
289 The average weight of a piano frame was 150 pounds and each ton of iron could produce, on 
average 14 frames.   Memorandum A – Factual Survey. March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
290 Ibid. 
291 Balance rail and key rail punching are small disks of felt placed under the keys which were used to 
regulate and balance the “touch” of the action.  
76 
 
frames, felt was not manufactured by piano makers but was obtained from piano action 
makers or suppliers. Overall there was 2.10 pounds of felt in each piano.292  
 
Figure 11. Examples of wool materials used in a grand piano action. Action diagram courtesy of 
http://thetunersblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/10/grand-action-diagrams.html and modified by the author.  
 
Needs of Wool for the War Effort 
Wool was needed for the production of clothing, specifically uniforms and other 
military fabrics, during the war. The need for the material was great because the British 
Government was producing items not just for their own war effort, but also for that of 
the Empire.293 This increased demand for the raw material put pressure on the textile 
and clothing industry.  In order to ensure that the needs of service men and women 
were met, Britain needed to redirect raw materials and labour away from civilian 
clothing production.  By reducing production and consumption of civilian uses of 
wool, the British Government could safeguard raw materials and release workers and 
factory space for war production.294 
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Control of Wool 
Of all the materials controlled by the Board of Trade during the Second World War, 
wool was the first commodity to come under complete control. During the war the 
Government would not only enforce strict controls over the manufacture and 
consumption of wool, thus reducing domestic production, but it would also institute a 
rationing system on clothing, ensuring that the minimum amount of wool would be 
used for civilian purposes.295 The Government would also go to great lengths to ensure 
that it, and it alone, was the sole buyer of all of the wool not only in Britain, but also 
the surplus wool in Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. The control of the raw 
wool trade was so swift that by the end of October 1939, the British Government was 
the sole buyer of all raw wool in the Empire.296  
Twelve months before the beginning of the war, the British Government was planning 
how it would take over control of the international wool industry. Mr. J. F. Murphy, 
Australian Secretary of Commerce, recalled how he met with representatives of the 
British Government in 1938 and came to a verbal agreement amongst partners in the 
Empire that if war was to break out Britain would buy the wool clips of Australia, New 
Zealand, and South Africa for the duration of the war. In April 1939, the British 
Government began placing large orders for uniform-grade cloths from fabric suppliers 
and at the end of August 1939 the Government warned exporters from the Empire not 
to sell wool to Germany.297 
On 1 September 1939, two days before the declaration of war, an order was issued that 
prohibited all dealings in privately owned wool, in essence freezing the market.  This 
freeze was lifted on 3 September when the Wool Control Order (No. 1) went into 
effect.298 At this time the Ministry of Supply, through the Wool Control Department, 
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took control of all supplies and prices of “wool, tops, broken tops, noils, and combing 
laps.”299 The order stipulated that manufacturers and spinners were required within 
five days to report all of the details of their wool consumption and production as well 
as the details of all of their contracts. In addition, all sales and transfers of wool were 
now to take place under licence.300 
The Wool Control Department was complex and included appointed controllers for 
both raw materials and manufactured materials. Each part of the wool production 
process, from clipping the raw material to final clothing production, was under the 
control of the department.  
 
Table 5. Structure of Wool Control from A. Briggs "The Framework of Wool Control" Oxford Economic Papers 
(November 1947), 42. 
In addition to the issuing of the first control order, in September 1939 the Wool Control 
Department contracted to buy the entire exportable surplus of the wool clip from 
Australia and New Zealand for the “period of the war and one clip thereafter.” This 
agreement was incredibly important in regard to controlling global wool supply. In 
1937-1938 Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa accounted for 80% of the output 
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of the production of surplus wool. By purchasing the supplies of these Dominion 
countries (Great Britain would come to a similar agreement with South Africa in 
August 1940301) Great Britain was able to gain control over the global wool trade, 
blocking Germany from acquiring large amounts of the material.302  
The domestic wool clip was acquired with Control of Wool Order (No. 5) of 20 
October along with all stocks of raw wool in the country. All imported wool came 
under Government control with the Control of Wool Order (No. 6 & 7) of 27 October, 
which gave the Ministry of Supply the ability to purchase all imported wool. With 
these orders, by the end of October 1939, the Government was the sole buyer and 
distributor of raw wool in the country.303   
As the Government took over the national and international supply of wool it began to 
implement a strict rationing system on consumers. On 1 November 1939, 19 months 
before the Government began its clothing rationing scheme and issuing coupons for 
clothing purchases,304 it began restricting the production of wool products for domestic 
consumption. This was done by limiting the production of items for civilian purposes 
to 10% of its pre-war levels.305  
To ensure that no wool was being produced without coming under control of the 
Government, any person raising sheep in the United Kingdom was required to 
maintain books about their business and could be requested to present these books for 
scrutiny and their premises could be inspected at any time.306  Even waste was covered 
by wool controls. From 1 June 1940 any waste material created as a result of a 
Government contract or from using Government allotted materials (which at this point 
was all wool fibres) was considered property of the Ministry of Supply and 
manufacturers were required to return the material. This prevented manufacturers from 
acquiring wool waste and using it for civilian production. As a result of these controls, 
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from August 1940 the U.K. Wool Control Board owned 96% of the available world 
supplies of wool.307 
In regard to piano manufacturing, the restrictions on the production and ownership of 
wool made it difficult for piano companies to purchase the necessary supplies. The 
industries that manufactured wool piano components quickly switched to war 
production, many manufacturing garments for the military. The piano industry was 
able to obtain materials if they had a Government licence for the manufacturing of 
pianos, but otherwise, the industry had to rely on its stocks of materials and wait for 
the end of the war to resupply.  
By restricting raw materials, the Government was able to ensure that critical materials 
needed for the war effort were directed to war production. The orders worked swiftly 
and by the end of the first year of the war obtaining raw materials for piano production 
was only possible through a licence. The limitation on the use of raw materials was 
devastating to the piano industry but this was just one way that the Government saw 
to the cessation of piano production. In addition to the limitations placed on raw 
material use through Control Orders and licensing, the Government would use taxes 
to prohibit both production and purchasing of pianos, directly limit the production of 
pianos, and force the industry to consolidate together in order to free labour and factory 
space. The combination of these multiple approaches to limiting domestic production 
would result in the complete shutdown of the industry.   
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Government Restrictions on Piano 
Production 
 
During 1938-1939, Britain’s economy was considered semi-mobilised. Prior to the 
declaration of war, the country was trying to maintain a “business first” status quo, 
which included a voluntary change to war production and an emphasis on rearmament, 
but no restrictions on materials or labour.  This changed with Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain’s announcement to the House of Commons on March 24, 1939 that “men 
and material will be required, and rearmament work must have first priority in the 
nation’s effort.  The full and rapid equipment of the nation for self-defence must be its 
primary aim.”308  
Although there is urgency in Chamberlain’s speech, the need for “men and materials” 
did not immediately take priority over domestic production and it would not be until 
1940 that the restrictions placed on industries throughout the U.K. ensured that the 
need for materials for war production took precedence over all other types of 
production.309 During this time products designated as “essential” were exempt from 
restrictions but pianos, categorised as “luxury” items, received no protection from 
Government restrictions. Piano companies were part of the total industrial potential of 
Great Britain and these companies could manufacture the necessary tools to fight the 
war. To ensure the conversion to war work the piano industry, like all producers of 
“luxury” items, would encounter crippling material restrictions; be forced to 
consolidate into joint companies with their competition; lose the majority of their 
skilled workers to war work; and face well-intentioned tax laws that were meant to 
spark international trade but instead prevented the industry from reconverting after the 
war.     
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Prior to Government regulations affecting the production of pianos, the political unrest 
in continental Europe was having a negative impact on piano sales. M.E. Ricketts of 
the Chappell Piano Company wrote in the June 1938 Music Trades Review:  
The lowest production was shortly after the political upheaval and business 
slump of 1931 and production began to increase again until hit by the general 
trade uncertainty created by the men of the Continent who are flashing sabres 
and parading guns.310   
 
According to Ricketts, the production of pianos from 1930-1937 was as follows:  
 
Table 6. Piano production numbers according to M. E. Ricketts of the Chappell Piano Company, Music Trades 
Review, June 1938, 186-190. 
 
The industry’s height of production in the 1930s occurred at the beginning of the 
decade, with 66,668 instruments produced in 1930. By 1932 production had fallen to 
only 35,984 instruments: a result of the impact of the Great Depression on the British 
economy.311 As the British economy recovered, so did piano making with 1936 seeing 
60,259 instruments manufactured.  But this recovery was to be short lived with 
production slumping from 1937 onwards.  
                                                 
310 M. E. Ricketts, “The Outlook of the Pianos Industry: Paper Prepared by Mr. M. E. Ricketts 
(Chappell Piano Co),” Music Trades Review, June 1938, 186-190. 
311 During the inter-war years, 1932 was the year when Great Britain suffered from the highest 
unemployment rate at 17%. W. R. Garside, British Unemployment 1919-1939: A study in public 
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The situation in Europe continued to impact on piano sales negatively and the industry 
saw a 30% reduction in sales by October 1938 compared to 1937.312 As the possibility 
of war became more of a reality, the piano industry began to discuss strategies and 
possible impacts. Eugene Sotheran, editor of the Music Trades Review, had a 
pragmatic view of what the industry could face and even wrote about potential benefits 
to war, including a demand for pianos. He encouraged the industry to “stock up” for 
the prospective rise in instrument sales. He wrote: 
Let us not forget the lesson of 1914, when the factories were depleted of 
workmen, supplies were at a minimum and the demand most difficult to meet.  
During that period any second hand piano commanded a fabulous price, and 
the creation of Navy and Army canteens throughout the country made big 
demands upon the piano trade for instruments.  We reiterate all this for the 
benefit of our readers to justify our appeal to keep their stocks up to the 
maximum, thereby not only protecting their own interests but also safeguarding 
the economic stability of the trade.313 
 
Although Sotheran wrote of the potential benefit of war on piano sales, the truth of the 
situation was bleak. Throughout 1937 and 1938 piano sales continued to decline. 
Although the Munich Crisis of September 1938 gave a reprieve to the imminent 
outbreak of war, the Munich Agreement did little to help with sales. The political 
situation throughout Europe was too volatile for consumer confidence to overcome 
and piano sales and production fell to levels similar to those of the economic crisis of 
1930-1932.314 
In addition to a slump in domestic piano sales and production values, the export trade 
was also affected. By January 1939 exports to Spain were completely stopped.315 Later 
that same year, the New Zealand Government released a licensing system for 
importing into their country.316 The system stopped all imports of musical instruments 
into New Zealand during the second half of 1939.317 This was a considerable blow to 
                                                 
312 Eugene Sotheran, “Action! Action! Action!,” Music Trades Review, October 1938, 359. 
313 Eugene Sotheran, “Facing the Music,” Music Trades Review, September 1938, 323. 
314 Eugene Sotheran, “Taking Stock,” Music Trades Review, December 1938, 439. 
315 Spain’s political situation and alliance with the Nazi Government made trade with the country 
difficult. All exports to Spain from Great Britain were stopped at the beginning of 1939. 
316 The licensing system was established to protect New Zealand industry by restricting items 
imported into the country.  
317 “Only Sheet Music in New Zealand,” Music Trades Review, May 1939, 137. 
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the British piano industry, as during the 1930s the export trade to New Zealand had 
grown substantially to become a considerable portion of the overall export trade. For 
example, in 1935 exports to New Zealand amounted to 10% of the total British piano 
exports. By 1936 and 1937 this had grown to 20% of the export trade, and in 1938 
New Zealand exports accounted for 22.5% of the total of British piano exports.  The 
ban of piano exports to New Zealand in the second half of 1939 reduced the overall 
export trade to 13% of the total export value before falling to zero in 1940.318 
It is evident through the purchases of supplies by the piano industry that many 
manufacturers heeded Sotheran’s advice to “stock up” in preparation for war. One 
significant indicator of this preparation was a disparity in the number of iron frames 
produced by iron foundries compared to that of piano actions. The first six months of 
1939 witnessed a 20% increase in the production of iron frames but no increase in 
piano action manufacture. As a piano cannot be built without both components, this 
discrepancy indicates that piano manufacturers were beginning to stock pile piano 
parts that would be difficult to obtain during war.319 The industry had learned during 
the First World War that metal was one of the most regulated commodities in wartime, 
and it behoved them to obtain as many piano frames as possible while they were still 
available.320 This planning would enable many manufacturers to continue to assemble 
pianos for a period even after metal restrictions stopped the supply of materials later 
in the war.  
After the declaration of war on 3 September 1939, the piano industry was not put under 
any immediate production restrictions. The first impairment to the “business as usual” 
attitude to the industry was the Trading with the Enemy Act of 5 September 1939. This 
act made it a crime to conduct any business with “the governments of, companies 
within, or persons residing in any country at war with the United Kingdom.”321 
Although Britain sold very few pianos to Germany, the industry did import German-
                                                 
318 “Extract from Volume III of the Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with British 
Countries and Foreign Countries.” BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
319 It is worth noting that these two parts of pianos were rarely made by the piano maker themselves. 
They were produced by auxiliary industries: iron foundries and piano action manufacturers.  
320 Captain Evelyn Broadwood, “The Crisis, the Piano and the Trade,” Music Trades Review, June 
1939, 173. 
321 Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939. 2 & 3 Geo. 6. Ch. 89. 
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made piano parts, such as wrest pins.322 The industry also imported wood from areas 
that would later come under German occupation and thus be cut off from the supply 
chain.  
Although rationing and material restriction were not immediately imposed, it would 
seem that the industry knew they were imminent. In the Music Trades Review and The 
Pianomaker, the prominent trade publications of the industry, articles and editorials 
printed in 1939 encouraged piano manufacturers to stock up on supplies and for 
retailers to purchase as many completed instruments as possible – while there was still 
a chance.  
An additional sign of the industry preparing for the effects of war was when the piano 
manufacturers organised two committees immediately after the declaration of war. 
These were the Piano Trade War Council, which was formed to regulate price and 
production during wartime, and the Piano Trade Joint Committee, which was further 
divided into five sub-committees and dealt with matters relating to timber, metal, 
general imports (manufactured and unmanufactured), exports, and labour.323  The 
committees quickly jumped into action and the first order of business of the Piano 
Trade War Council was to raise the price of pianos 10% starting on 2 October 1939.324 
The Council then raised the price an additional 5% starting on 1 November 1939.325 It 
was published in the Music Trades Review that the increase in piano prices was to 
protect the interest of piano manufacturers as sales were continuing to decline. This 
created tension between manufacturers and retailers, as the increased prices did 
nothing for the retail companies who would have to explain the higher prices to 
customers.326 
The Piano Trade Joint Committee began collecting data from manufacturers regarding 
the quantities of raw materials they would need in the upcoming months.  According 
                                                 
322 Wrest pins and tuning pins were not available domestically in Britain. They were made by a small 
number of manufacturers in Westphalia, Germany, and the makers had a monopoly on their 
manufacture. Dolge, 128 
323 “Piano Trade Joint Committee,” Music Trades Review, September 1939, 299. 
324 “First Piano Trade War Council,” Music Trades Review, September 1939, 297.  
325 “Further increase in Piano Prices,” Music Trades Review, October 1939, 317. 
326 In the January 1940 issue of Music Trades the magazine refers to the “internal squabbling among 
the industry” and complaints that the Piano Trade Joint Committee was not acting in the best interest 
of the entire piano industry. “Piano Trade Joint Committee,” Music Trades Review, January 1940, 21. 
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to the Music Trades Review the collected information was sent to various committees 
of the Board of Trade in order to ensure a fair share of the surplus materials would be 
available for the piano trade. This indicates that although piano manufacturing had not 
yet been placed under restrictions in October 1939, the availability of raw materials 
was already a worry to the industry. In particular, the price of many raw materials was 
rising dramatically. By October 1939 the price of timber had already risen as much as 
60% and the metal used in piano cases (such as that used for hinges, pins, and locks) 
had increased by 70%.327 These price increases were some of the first indicators of the 
difficulties to come in regard to obtaining such materials.  
According to Eugene Sotheran, “the piano trade was possibly faced with a 60% 
reduction in their output for 1940. This amount would result in only 20,000 pianos 
produced.”328 As the war effort accelerated and as more restrictions were placed on the 
industry, Sotheran’s estimate of production would prove to be incredibly optimistic.  
The declaration of war, Trading with the Enemy Act, and general anti-German 
sentiment throughout the U.K. prompted one piano maker to change their German 
sounding name. In December 1939, Blüthner & Co. changed its name to Whelpdale, 
Maxwell and Codd, Ltd. The firm had been a successful importer of Blüthner pianos329 
but had been manufacturing their own instruments since 1933.330 According to a press 
release printed in the Music Trades Review the company wanted all to know that:  
The necessary permission had been granted by His Majesty’s Board of Trade, 
and the company will be known in future as WHELPDALE, MAXWELL & 
CODD, LTD., the offices and showrooms remain at 17-23 Wigmore Street, 
London. Mr. Whelpdale told me that he and his co-directors were most anxious 
to clarify their position.  The capital of the company is entirely British, as also 
are its directors and employees.  Further, the late Mr. W. M. Maxwell, who 
founded the business in 1876, and the late Mr. W. J. Whelpdale, the father of 
the present director of that name, who joined Mr. Maxwell in partnership in 
1889, were of British birth and descent.  The company will continue to 
manufacture and market the well-known Welmar pianos, which have gained 
such an amazing popularity in recent years.  Mr. Codd is on full-time National 
                                                 
327 “Further increase in Piano Prices,” Music Trades Review, October 1939, 317. 
328 Eugene Sotheran, “Piano Trade Meeting: General Situation Reviewed,” Music Trades Review, 
November 1939, 331.  
329 The company was forced to end any importation of Blüthner instruments as a result of the Trading 
with the Enemy Act of September 1939. 




Service, and we might mention Mr. A. W. Whelpdale served in the last war as 
a captain in the Royal Artillery, and was mentioned in dispatches.331 
This change of name is indicative of the tension felt throughout the country.  
 
Government Ministries and their Role in the Piano Trade 
In 1940, the laws and restrictions passed by the government of the United Kingdom 
began to have a larger impact on the piano industry. Before investigating the various 
laws and restrictions that affected piano construction, it is important to review which 
ministries of the war government would have a direct impact on piano production. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the infrastructure of the British war machine was 
extensive. The Government oversaw everything from airplane, tank, and ship 
production to clothing, furniture, and children’s toy manufacture. A significant portion 
of this regulation was through the control of the raw materials that went into everyday 
manufacturing and the control and movement of the labour needed for war production. 
For every product produced in the U.K. there were numerous ministries and boards 
controlling the minutest detail of manufacture. 
In the case of the piano industry the influencing agencies were the Board of Trade, 
which had overall control of piano production. The piano industry reported to the 
Board of Trade throughout the war. This organisation granted licences for 
manufacture, controlled production quotas, and could help the piano industry receive 
Government contracts for piano manufacturing. The Ministry of Supply coordinated 
the supply of equipment to all three British armed forces. Because of the vast resources 
needed to fight the war, this ministry controlled the release of raw materials to ensure 
these materials went to war production. The ministry determined who received which 
materials, how much, and when. Additionally, the Ministry of Labour and National 
Service saw to the demands for labour. This organisation was responsible not only for 
military recruitment and deferment, but also for supplying labour to the necessary 
factories supporting the war effort. The ministry influenced which industries were to 
be shut down in order for the labour to be transferred to war work. 
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In addition to organisations that were restrictive to the industry, there were also 
government agencies that benefitted the piano industry through contracting companies 
for war work. Some of the work was for piano production, but the majority of the work 
required the industry to change to war production. These included the Admiralty, the 
Directorate of Woodworking, and the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes 
(N.A.A.F.I.). 
Although no direct law had been passed limiting the manufacture of pianos, the 
industry was under the complete control of the Board of Trade and the Ministry of 
Supply by January 1940. This control was established through the supply of raw 
materials which was allotted based on the needs for war production.332  A way piano 
manufacturers were able to ensure they could obtain raw materials was if the pianos 
produced using the raw materials were being sold to export markets. The Board of 
Trade made special concessions for this type of manufacturing as it brought much 
needed cash into Britain.333  
 
The Excess Profits Tax and the Purchase Tax 
Tax was an important source of revenue for the British Government throughout the 
war period. Two different taxes were put in place that affected piano production and 
sales.  The first was the Excess Profits Tax. This was an attempt to stop wartime 
profiteering and price gouging by firms through taxing profits in excess of peacetime 
levels. Initially set at a rate of 60%, it was raised to 100% in March 1940.334  The 100% 
tax was applied to any profits a company made on non-war related production, but 
made exemptions for any item sold for export trade.335 In addition to preventing 
profiteering during war time, the tax was enacted to encourage manufacturers to switch 
to war production.   
The exemptions of the tax on export trade encouraged the piano industry to shift its 
emphasis on expanding its export trade. In addition, exported products were exempt 
                                                 
332 “Piano Trade Joint Committee” Music Trades Review, January 1940, 21.  
333 Eugene Sotheran, “Export More Pianos” Music Trades Review, February 1940, 23. 
334 The Excess Profits Tax had been issued in 1939 and set the tax rate at 60%. [Finance No. 2 Act, 
1939 (2 & 3 Geo. 6 c. 109)]. Ashworth, 84.  
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from material quotas at the time.  Unfortunately, due to trade embargoes and uncertain 
shipping routes caused by German submarines sinking merchant ships, there was no 
guarantee that products would be able to leave the country or ever reach their 
destination. To make matters worse, the Limitation of Supplies Order of 1940 would 
directly limit the number of pianos that the already struggling industry was able to 
manufacture.  
The second significant tax that was levied on piano manufacturers was the Purchase 
Tax. Initially proposed in May 1940 but met with resistance, the Purchase Tax went 
into effect in October 1940.336 The initial tax was set at a flat rate of 33⅓% of the retail 
value of an item deemed as luxury goods (such as musical instruments) sold in the 
United Kingdom. The purpose of this tax was to manipulate the buying power of 
consumers and to collect revenue from purchases that were deemed unnecessary by 
the U.K. government. Although the production and manufacture of every consumer 
item was controlled by the U.K. Government, the national income was on the rise and 
the British people had money to spend on consumer goods. By putting a tax on luxury 
items, the Government could deter consumers from purchasing items that might seem 
frivolous with the added Purchase Tax while simultaneously reaping the benefits of 
consumers who were willing to pay the extra money for the item.337 It is worth noting 
that items fitting within the Utility Programme of 1942 were exempt from this tax, as 
were items sold as export.338 This helped to steer consumers to purchasing Utility 
Programmes products. 
Included in the tax were a number of rules regulating the trade of materials within the 
manufacturing sector and important definitions which impacted piano trade (for a 
transcript of the law, see Appendix 5). Firstly, the tax applied only to firms making 
more than £2,000 a year in profit and companies making less were exempt.339 The 
manufacturers who were subject to the tax were able to sell materials to one another 
without paying the tax if the materials were being used in the production of other items. 
                                                 
336 Arnold M. Soloway, “Economic Aspects of the British Purchase Tax,” The Journal of Finance 9:2 
(May 1954): 189. 
337 Ibid, 191. 
338 This included clothes, shoes, and furniture produced according to specifications by the Board of 
Trade. Ibid, 190.  
339 The tax states that this was subject to change. Later in the war the minimum amount of profit 
needed to have the tax applied to a firm would drop to only £500. 
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This allowed manufacturers to sell stock to each other, such as timber supplies or iron 
frame, without being penalised with the tax. Companies with excess stock, switching 
to war production, or who were shutting down their factories were able to liquidate 
their supplies through this stipulation.  
Items and services that were exempt from the tax included repair work, second hand 
instruments, and any goods sold through export. The export exemption encouraged 
manufacturers to focus on exporting goods, which was a way to bring in much needed 
revenue into the country. Conversely, manufacturers purchasing imported goods were 
charged the tax, but the tax was not chargeable until it reached the factory, a condition 
that protected manufacturers from paying tax on items that were lost at sea or destroyed 
while in storage or transit.   
The tax was to take effect in March 1940, but if goods were delivered on or before the 
operation date the tax would not apply and existing stocks in the hands of the retailers 
would not be retroactively charged the tax. Interestingly, the tax stated that if firms 
were seen to ship an extraordinary amount of products to retailers of their own business 
before the operation date, which was not in accordance to their typical sales, taxes may 
be charged. The tax was applied when the product was transferred from factory to 
retail shop or when a manufacturer or wholesaler sold goods directly to the public. 
Finally, manufacturers were given a period of time to raise the price of pianos to adjust 
for the tax but any other changes in the price were subject to scrutiny.340  
In April 1942 the Purchase Tax was increased to 66⅔% and then one year later, in 
April 1943, the tax was increased to 100%. The dramatic increase in the tax rate helped 
to balance the needs of controls versus the desire to raise revenue. Whenever a 
consumer decided not to buy a luxury good because of the high price caused by the 
Purchase Tax, it helped to control the restrictions of needed materials for the war effort. 
If a consumer did have enough revenue to pay the exorbitant price on a luxury items, 
it meant that needed revenue was going to the war effort.341   
The Purchase Tax, although bringing much needed revenue to the British government, 
was detrimental to the piano industry. Already faced with increased prices because of 
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the Excess Profit Tax, the Purchase Tax made the price of a piano unaffordable to most 
consumers. The dramatic price increases, combined with the restrictions placed on the 
supply of raw materials, were enough to close many manufacturing companies.342    
 
The Limitation of Supplies Order 
In 1940 the U.K. was faced with a consumer dilemma. Although the country had 
increased its war production in the previous two years, many industries were still 
manufacturing goods intended for the domestic market and using vital materials in the 
process. The Government needed to reduce the supply of goods available to civilians 
in order to ensure that materials were diverted to the war effort. To do this, the 
Government took over ownership of raw materials (thus controlling their distribution), 
controlled food supplies through the Ministry of Food, and enacted the Limitation of 
Supplies Order.  
The Limitation of Supplies Order restricted the overall quantity of most non-food 
consumer goods manufacturers and wholesalers could sell to retailers. The main 
objective of the order was to divert raw materials, plant, capacity, and labour from the 
production of goods for the home trade to the production of goods vital for the war 
effort. It also granted exemptions for goods that would be sold as export.343 The orders 
were necessary because although the U.K. had natural resources of raw materials, 
factories, and labour, the amount in the country would not be sufficient to maintain 
war production and civilian production simultaneously. War production materials, 
such as munitions, aircraft production, tank production, etc., were the priority and thus 
took precedence over civilian goods.344 The raw materials needed for the war effort 
and used by the piano industry consisted of steel, iron castings, timber, and felt.345  
                                                 
342 The number of piano manufacturers who were counted by the Board of Trade in the First Census of 
September 1940 was just 22. Of these, eleven of the firms employed fewer than ten workers and four 
had no workers. At this time many of these companies had already stopped manufacturing pianos and 
were relying on repair work. Board of Trade First Census, November 1940. BT 64/1786. National 
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344 “Limitation of Supplies: Steps Taken to Assist Bombed Wholesalers and Retailers” Music Trades 
Review, January 1941, 13.  
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The first Limitation of Supply Order, issued on June 1940, included restrictions of 
musical instrument production.  Additional products covered in the Order included: 
clothing, toys, office appliances, cosmetics and toilet preparations, carpeting, pottery, 
luggage, cameras, jewellery, vacuum cleaners, refrigerators, washing machines, 
wringers, lawn mowers, dishwashers, metal furniture, furniture made of cane or 
wicker, mattresses, and other household goods.346   
The order restricted the sales of pianos during the period of June 6 to November 30 
1940 to two thirds of the value of goods supplied in a designated time period. The base 
figure of sales was based on the value of pianos sold from 1 June to 30 November 
1939.347 (For a transcription of the order as printed in the Music Trades Review see 
Appendix 4.) In addition to the restriction of manufacturing, the order required firms 
to register with the Board of Trade, defined the roles of wholesaler and dealer, and 
outlined what types of sales and trade were exempt from the restrictions.  These details 
are as follows.  
Under this stipulation producers and wholesalers: 
 needed to register with the Board of Trade as “controlled suppliers”; 
 could sell to any retailer or customer as long as the sales fell within the 
restricted sales quota. 
Some items and types of trade were unregulated. This included:  
 any class of controlled goods could be sold to another person or company listed 
on the Controlled Suppliers list; this allowed piano companies to sell their 
completed stock to each other;  
 goods required for completing government contracts (this did not include 
goods sold to local authorities); 
 goods being made for the overseas markets. 
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347 As an example, if a piano manufacturer had sold a total of £100,000 worth of pianos to retailers 
during the June 1 – November 30 1939 period, that manufacturer could now only sell £66,666 worth 
of pianos from June 6 – November 30, 1940.   
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The government gave a formula for calculating what the production value would be 
for the controlled goods:  
(a) ascertain the total value thereof as invoiced to customers in the period from 
June 1 to November 30, 1939; 
(b) subtract from that total the value of those supplies which are unrestricted; 
(c) subtract the amount of any discounts (including cash discounts), commissions 
or allowances to buyers and of any delivery charges applicable to the remaining 
supplies; 
(d) from the net total subtract one-third. 
In the order, wholesalers and manufacturers were encouraged to store their goods at 
retail establishments. As bombing raids were focusing on industrial areas, 
manufacturers were encouraged to spread out their finished products in smaller 
establishments to avoid substantial losses from bombing.348  
In November 1940, the Board of Trade set new production limits for the period 
commencing December 1 to May 31, 1941. The new limit put piano manufacturing at 
25% of the output for the corresponding period 1939-1940. This significant reduction 
saw piano manufacturing limited from a one-third reduction in March 1940 to a 75% 
reduction nine months later. According to Eugene Sotheran this reduction would result 
in “the closing down of nearly all, if not all, of the 40 piano factories in this country.”349 
The effect of the Limitation Orders was even more severe, by January 1941 the 
industry was reporting that it was only producing 15% of the normal output and that 
the “piano trade has been slaughtered by the B.O.T.”350  
It was estimated that the Limitation of Supply Orders reduced the volume of consumer 
goods available to the U.K. public by 20% in the first quarter of 1941 and by 50% that 
summer.351 Although very successful in reducing production, the Limitation Orders 
did not stop all piano production. Technically, as long as companies had materials and 
stocks in their factories, they could continue to produce instruments.  That said, piano 
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production for the consumer market had all but stopped as the 100% Purchase Tax 
made pianos unaffordable to all but the wealthiest clientele. According to Denzil 
Jacobs, an employee and future manager of the Kemble Piano Company, “most piano 
manufacturing stopped in 1940 unless the company had a store of materials from 
before the war.”352   
The Limitation of Supplies Orders were being used not only to transfer raw materials 
from consumer production to war production, but also to release labour to the war 
effort.  It was believed that as companies reduced production, employees would be 
released and labour would transfer to essential work. The Limitation of Supplies 
Orders did have this impact, but the amount of labour released through the orders was 
not enough to fulfil essential war work requirements. In order to satisfy the demand on 
labour the Concentration of Industry scheme was issued.353 The scheme would make 
rivals and competitors join together, albeit unwillingly, under one roof. 
 
The Concentration of Industry Scheme  
The Concentration of Industry scheme was issued in March 1941.  The scheme 
required non-essential industries, such as piano companies, who did not have war 
contracts to consolidate with their competitors and then to release unused factory space 
and workers for essential war work.  
Consolidating companies was not an easy task.  In addition to proprietary concerns 
from the piano companies, there were the logistics of combining independent 
businesses, deciding which factory other companies would move in to, and how 
multiple companies would work together. To aid companies in determining these 
logistical difficulties, the Board of Trade issued guidelines on how to consolidate.  
Firstly, a company had to determine if it could apply to be considered a “nucleus firm.” 
Nucleus firm was the designation given to the company that would become the main, 
or leading company, in a consolidated scheme. This company would retain its factory 
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and would absorb other firms in some fashion. This was done by having the nucleus 
firm purchase the raw materials ration from the absorbed firm, by physically carrying 
the machinery of the absorbed firm into the nucleus and transferring remaining 
employees, or through outright purchase of the absorbed firm depending on the 
circumstances.354  
In order to be eligible to become a nucleus firm and have other industries consolidate 
within it, a company was required to: 
1. find the average monthly production during the period June to November 1939; 
2. find the current monthly production (on any work whatsoever, not just piano 
production); 
3. if production under (1) was £10,000 and production under (2) was £5,000 then 
a further production of at least £5,000 was necessary before a condition of 
“running full” had been achieved;  
4. make arrangements with another firm or firms to take over its (or their) 
production to the extent of at least £5,000; 
5. arrange for closing the factory or factories of the firms the trade of which has 
been taken over; 
6. arrange for the plant of the closed firm to be kept intact unless the premises 
should be requisitioned; 
7. arrange for maintenance by the surviving unit of the production for export and 
the government of the closed firm; 
8. apply to the Board for approval of scheme and give details of arrangements; 
9. if a firm had two factories, the company could close down one of the factories 
in order for them to be considered “running full.”355   
Firms who were considered to be “running full” because of government and export 
work were deemed as first in line to be considered as nucleus firms, but did not need 
to concentrate if not desired. Small firms who employed fewer than 20 men and did 
not make more than £2,000 profit per year did not need to apply for recognition as 
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“nucleus firms.” The firms were encouraged to combine with other firms but if they 
decided not to follow through with concentration, they would not be penalised in any 
way.356  
The purpose of the Concentration of Industries Scheme was to reduce, as far as 
possible, the number of men and factories involved in the production of non-essential 
items, so that labour and buildings could become available for urgent production, such 
as munitions work. According to S. A. Hurren, the secretary of the Pianoforte Export 
Group:  
…too many companies were teetering on the verge of collapse and were 
waiting in hopes of securing government work.  By forcing companies to 
consolidate, then these firms could be closed down, labour released and 
factories turned to war production, rather than the firms holding on in hopes of 
orders that might never come.357 
 
Through the Concentration of Industries Scheme, many smaller piano companies, or 
companies that did not have any or enough government work to be granted nucleus 
status, approached larger firms or those with war contracts, in order to concentrate. 
The scheme allowed the unsuccessful firms to close their factories, release labour, but 
not declare insolvency – in essence it allowed the firms to suspend business until the 
end of the war. Examples of this type of concentration include the companies that 
approached Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd Ltd. in order to concentrate.   
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd, Ltd. easily fitted the criteria to be considered a nucleus 
firm. The firm had an overall turnover of £26,254 in June to December 1939, far more 
than the requirement. In addition, the firm was able to maintain an export trade to 
Argentina, South Africa, and New Zealand (until that country banned piano imports) 
throughout 1939-1941. The company was approached by John Broadwood & Sons 
Ltd., George Rogers & Son, Sir Herbert Marshall & Sons, Ltd., and Vincent 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. with the proposal of consolidating. Whelpdale made the 
application to the Board of Trade and was granted nucleus status in June 1941.The 
                                                 
356 According to Denzil Jacobs, this scheme was “voluntary.” He said in actuality it was mandatory to 
volunteer, otherwise a company would be taxed on keeping the factory while it was idle. Denzil 
Jacobs, interview. 
357 S. A. Hurren. “Pianoforte Export Group” Music Trades Review, March 1941, 41. 
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other piano firms closed down their factories and moved their remaining employees to 
the factory of Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd, Ltd. 
Other examples of consolidated piano companies included:  
1. Alfred Knight (nucleus firm) consolidated with Alfred Taylor (factory closed) 
and Leswein Piano Ltd (factory closed); 
2. Brasted Brothers (nucleus firm) consolidated with Hulbert & Jones (factory 
closed) and Danemann & Co. (factory closed); 
3. Chappell Piano Co. Ltd. (nucleus firm) consolidated with J. B. Cramer and Co., 
(factory closed) and John Spencer & Co (factory closed); 
4. Kemble & Co. Ltd. (nucleus firm) consolidated with Buckland & Co. Ltd 
(factory closed) and King Bros. Pianos Ltd. (factory closed); 
5. Monington & Weston (nucleus firm) consolidated with Warwick Piano 
Company (factory closed);  
6. Triumph Auto Pianos (nucleus firm) consolidated with A. W. Lee (factory 
closed) and Fleet Piano Company (factory closed).358  
 
Although the piano industry cooperated with the Board of Trade in consolidating the 
industry, they were not happy. Writing in the Music Trades Review Eugene Sotheran 
summed up the feelings of many of the members of the industry in regards to this 
government initiative. He stated that with the Consolidation of Industry Scheme the 
government would: 
…close down the “small man” and he is forever lost to the industry.  For a mere 
consideration he hands over the names of his customers and his trade marks to 
his to one-time competitor; he has to reveal his methods of trading to his rival.  
The lucky firms who have been selected as “nucleus” establishments will be 
armed with all this invaluable data when peace returns and Government control 
is lifted.  How can the unfortunate devil who has been “axed” hope to start 
again with the odds so heavily against him?359 
 
To add insult to injury and under the auspices of facilitating cooperative working 
between the companies in consolidated factories, the Board of Trade recommended 
                                                 
358 Factual Survey of the Piano Industry. Appendix B. March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
359 Eugene Sotheran, “The Regimentation of the Industry,” Music Trades Review, May 1941, 71.  
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that the piano industry standardise the production of pianos with just one standard 
instrument produced for each grade.360 Included in this proposal was the idea to brand 
all standardised instruments with the logo of St George and the Dragon. The piano 
industry decided to reject this suggestion, citing that piano design was proprietary and 
that each firm wished to continue to maintain their own designs or not produce 
instruments at all.361  
The Concentration of Industry Scheme was detrimental to many of the piano 
companies. Nevertheless, the scheme enabled companies to close down their factories 
and release workers without having to declare insolvency.  All in all, the Concentration 
of Industry Scheme, according to the Federation of British Industries, released 255,900 
workers and 61.2 million square feet of capacity for munitions and related industries. 
Many luxury goods manufacturers, like the piano industry, had to close their doors, 
but the overall results were beneficial to the war effort.  
In April 1941, companies that had 80% of their sales or output going to Government 
or export sales during the period of January through March 1941 were invited by the 
Board of Trade to apply to become a “protected” establishment. A protected firm was 
one in which the labour employed at that industry would not be transferred to other 
work as long as the company maintained this designation. Keeping labour in factories 
was important to the industry and those that were labelled as such had the backing of 
the Ministry of Labour and National Service to help them prevent the undesirable 
transfer of essential labour to other firms or munitions work.362 Having the designation 
of a protected firm also helped companies receive additional war work and contracts. 
The designation acted like an endorsement from the U.K. government signalling that 
the protected firm was reliable and would be able to fulfil contracts.  
Although the invitation to apply for protection status seemed like a welcome 
designation for the piano industry, it was another way for the Board of Trade to shut 
                                                 
360 The grades of pianos at the time included miniature pianos, upright pianos, and grand pianos. This 
idea fitted within the Utility Scheme, which regulated everything from furniture design to clothing 
available during the war. 
361 S. A. Hurren, “Pianoforte Export Group: Report on Executive Committee meeting held on April 
16, 1941.” Music Trades Review, April 1941, 57. 
362 S. A. Hurren, “Pianoforte Export Group: Report on Executive Committee meeting held on April 
16, 1941.” Music Trades Review, April 1941, 57. 
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down the piano firms that had not been able to secure war production contracts. 
According to the Music Trades Review after the applications were made, only seven 
companies were granted protection status.363 Unfortunately the Music Trades Review 
does not list which seven companies were given this designation. By reviewing the 
records of export trade and war production during the war period found in the Board 
of Trade documents at the National Archives, a potential list of protected piano firms 
can be extracted. These companies are: 
1. Alfred Knight, 
2. Brasted Brothers, 
3. Chappell, 
4. Kemble, 
5. Monington & Weston, 
6. Supertone, 
7. Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd.364  
What did this mean to the remaining 30 piano manufacturers in Britain?365 According 
to the Music Trades Review, all other piano makers had to shut down.366   
Supertone Pianos is an interesting example of a protected company. This piano 
manufacturer was unusual as it was located in Nottingham, England and is one of only 
two piano companies located outside of London (Stroud Piano being the second). Its 
location prevented the firm from concentrating with other piano firms. Rather than 
needing to concentrate with another piano company Supertone was able to secure 
extensive war contracts. According to documents in the Board of Trade papers 
preserved at the National Archives, in April 1941, Supertone had £3,192 in 
government orders for products other than pianos. In May 1941, this order had 
                                                 
363 Eugene Sotheran, “The Axe Falls,” The Music Trades, July 1941, 105. 
364 Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order. July 
1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
365 In an article in Music Trades Review it is noted that there were roughly 30 piano manufacturers in 
1941. Eugene Sotheran, “The Music Industries at War,” Music Trades Review, September 1941, 137. 
This number is at odds with documents at the National Archives which state in November 1940 there 
were only 23 firms engaged in the “manufacture” of pianos. It is also noted that manufacture meant 
little more than repair. Board of Trade First Census. November 1940. BT 64/1784. National Archives. 
366 Eugene Sotheran, “The Axe Falls,” Music Trades Review, July 1941, 105. 
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increased to £5,300 and by June of the same year it more than doubled to £13,966367 
in government orders for products other than pianos.368 These orders enabled 
Supertone to receive protected status. The firm was able to maintain a workforce of 
270 employees (only three of which were working on piano-related work) at the time 
of the Census of Manufacturers report issued in 1942.369    
 
Export Trade  
The Excess Profit Tax and the Purchase Tax contained exemptions for items exported 
out of the United Kingdom. These exemptions were in place to encourage companies 
to sell items to foreign markets. In addition to the exemptions in the Excess Profit Tax 
and the Purchase Tax on exported goods, items sold overseas were unregulated in the 
Limitation of Supplies Order. From 1939 to 1941, the British government strongly 
encouraged luxury goods manufacturers to focus on selling their products outside the 
U.K as these sales would bring in much needed revenue into the country. In March 
1940, Sotheran wrote:  
Government attaches the greatest importance to the development of overseas 
trade and if licences are to be obtained for the supply of necessary raw materials 
the piano industry will have to convince the Government that the major part of 
the supplies are required to meet the demands of purchasers from abroad.370    
 
For their part, the piano industry did attempt to increase overseas sales. The Pianoforte 
Industries and Export Group helped the industry secure materials for production of 
pianos for export markets and acted on behalf of the industry at meetings with the 
Board of Trade. In the Board of Trade papers at the National Archives there are 
numerous letters from S. A. Hurren fighting for the piano industry. This 
correspondence gives a good indication of the types of difficulty facing the industry 
                                                 
367 When adjusted for inflation these amounts adjust to £145,350, £241,339, and £635,952 in today’s 
money according to the Bank of England inflation calculator. “Inflation Calculator,” accessed 03 
March 2016, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/education/Pages/resources/inflationtools/calculator/ 
368 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order,” 
Board of Trade Post War Re-Construction Pianoforte Industry. June 1941. BT 64/1784. National 
Archives. 
369 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order,” 
Board of Trade Post War Re-Construction Pianoforte Industry. July 1942. BT 64/1784. National 
Archives. 
370 Eugene Sotheran, “The Future of the Piano Industry” Music Trades Review, March 1940, 45.  
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even when it came to exporting instruments. Chiefly among them was that piano firms 
had many orders on hand for pianos for export, but not enough materials or labour to 
complete the orders. Later, as overseas trade become increasingly difficult, the 
industry complained about the lack of export licences.  
Although the Board of Trade and the Music Trades Review encouraged the industry to 
increase their exports of pianos, this was not an easy task. Piano production for export 
may have been exempt from taxes and the Limitation of Supplies Orders, but it was 
not exempt from the difficulty the industry faced in procuring restricted materials, 
maintaining a labour force, and securing export licences for pianos. In addition, with 
most of the world involved in the war, there was little market for British pianos.   
Prior to the war, piano exports were rising. Although not a large portion of the overall 
piano trade, the industry increased exports from 4.86% of the total production in 1935 
to 5.23% in 1936 and then to 7.37% of the total trade in 1937.371 The trend of the rising 
export business ended in 1937, when the industry shipped £117,172 worth of pianos 
outside the United Kingdom. After this year, overall export value began to decline, 
with 1938 having £107,371 worth of pianos exported and in 1939 this dropped to 
£100,973.372 
Unfortunately, records of the export trade for 1940-1942 are incomplete. Although the 
Board of Trade received reports from the industry, the reports are sporadic and do not 
show the cumulative total for the years, thus, it is not possible to calculate the total 
sum of exports for these years.373 But, by studying the reports, it is possible to see the 
trends in export manufacturing over time.  
The piano industry was requested by the Board of Trade to submit the value of their 
export business in late 1941 or early 1942 for the creation of a “Factual Survey” 
                                                 
371 These figures are compiled from “Appendix A” of the 1942 report compiled by The Pianoforte 
Manufacturers’ Association Ltd. BT 64/1786. National Archives, as well as the overall production 
figures as given in Music Trade Review June 1938. Unfortunately, the Music Trade Review only lists 
production values through 1937 so the percentage of the export trade in comparison to overall 
production is not able to be configured for 1938 and 1939.   
372 Export production values found in the “Extract from Volume III of the Annual Statement of Trade 
of the United Kingdom with British Countries and Foreign Countries” undated. BT 64/1784. National 
Archives. 
373 The records include reports from September 1940, April 1941, May 1941, June 1941, August-
September 1941, and March-May 1942. After May 1942 piano production was stopped. Production 
reports can be found in BT 64/1784. National Archives. 
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circulated in March 1942.374 In this report only nine piano firms (Brasted Brothers 
Ltd., Broadwood & Sons Ltd., C. H. Challen and Sons, Ltd., J. B. Cramer and 
Company, Kemble & Company, Ltd., Alfred Knight Ltd., Monington & Weston, Ltd., 
A.Taylor & Sons, Ltd., Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd, Ltd.) reported the value of their 
trade. It is unknown if more firms were engaged in exporting pianos but chose not to 
report. Unfortunately, like the other production reports in the files of the Board of 
Trade, the reporting is inconsistent. Some firms reported on the entire value of their 
export business for the years 1939 and 1940, while others only reported partial 
production values, such as Cramer which reported export turnover for June to 
December 1939, June to December 1940, and January to May 1941. Whether the firm 
was shut down during the winter months of 1940 is unknown. Another firm, Chappell 
Piano Company, sent a letter to the Board of Trade stating that “they were entirely 
engaged on export trade” but did not send any numbers to back up their claim.  
Even though the reports are incomplete, they are a good source of information 
regarding who was receiving the majority of the export orders. Kemble & Company 
had the largest export sales in 1939. The company reported that they exported £11,836 
worth of pianos in that year. In a note in the report it stated that Kemble was the firm 
with the largest export trade of pianos in the United Kingdom. Of the other companies, 
Whelpdale Maxwell & Codd, Ltd. exported £8,018 worth of pianos in 1939, Brasted 
Brothers reported £6,745, Monington & Weston, Ltd. reported £6,243, Challen & 
Sons, Ltd. reported £6,118, Broadwood & Sons, Ltd. reported £6,068, Cramer & Co. 
reported £2,564, Knight & Co. reported £2,000 in 1939, and Taylor & Son Ltd. 
reported a mere £610 in exports for both 1939 and 1940.375 Overall, these companies 
reported £52,202 worth of pianos exported out of the U.K in 1939.376 The companies 
                                                 
374 This report was compiled prior to a meeting between the Board of Trade, the Pianoforte Export 
Group, and the Pianoforte Manufacturers’ Association. The meeting was arranged in order to discuss 
the post war problems of the trade. The B.O.T. wanted to know the value of exports of the piano trade 
in order to understand how to restart the industry after the war. The meeting took place on 30 July 
1942. 
375 “Appendix B of the Memorandum A – Factual Survey,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
376 This total does not match the value of exported pianos listed in the “Extract from Volume III of the 
Annual Statement of Trade of the United Kingdom with British Countries and Foreign Countries” 
indicating that the reporting happening to the Board of Trade was not complete. The annual survey 
stated that there was £100,973 worth of pianos exported in 1939, not £52,202 as indicated in the 
Appendix B of the Board of Trade Papers.  
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reported that they exported to Africa, Argentina, Australia, the British West Indies, 
Ceylon, Holland, Iceland, India, Iraq, Malaya, New Zealand, South Africa, South 
America, and the U.S.A.377  
As previously mentioned, the reporting for 1940 is incomplete, so much so that it is 
difficult to make definitive statements in regard to trends of export business. The nine 
companies that reported export values for 1940 reported a total value of £28,629. This 
loss in export trade is most likely indicative of a downturn in manufacturing for export, 
possibly caused by the difficulty in obtaining materials for the production of pianos 
and the loss of production due to labour movement, or it could be the result of 
incomplete reporting.378  
The Board of Trade received three reports on the export of pianos for 1941 as part of 
the “Census of Manufacturers Registered under the Limitation of Supplies.” These 
included the figures for April, May, and then a combined report for August/September. 
As these were the only reports for 1941 in the papers of the Board of Trade, one might 
assume that the industry was only asked to submit information for these manufacturing 
periods, but that information is unclear. Although the reports do not give a complete 
picture of the export trade for 1941, it does show a rise in exports from April 1941 to 
May 1941. The industry reported £6,292 worth of pianos exported in April and then 
£9,060 in May.  The combined export total for August and September was £14,064. 
As there is no information as to how these exports were divided between the two 
months, there is no way to know if the rise in export trade continued in August and 
then sharply declined, or if the trade was more evenly distributed between the two 
months.379  
Interestingly, the May 1941 report included the ‘Orders on Hand’ for June 1941. 
According to this report the piano industry had orders for £67,603 worth of pianos for 
                                                 
377 Brasted Brothers reported that they exported to Africa but did not elaborate as to with which 
country they traded. Knight made a similar report with instruments going to South America. The 
British West Indies are now the British Overseas Territories in the Caribbean, Anguilla, Bermuda, the 
Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, and Montserrat. Ceylon was the current name of Sri 
Lanka. “Appendix B of the Memorandum A – Factual Survey,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
378 “Appendix B of the Memorandum A – Factual Survey,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
379 “Census of Manufacturers Registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous Order),” 
April 1941, May 1941, and September 1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
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the export trade. This number is more than ten times the value of the instruments that 
were sold for export in May 1941. Although there are always more orders on hand than 
sales, mainly due to the length of manufacturing time, this significant discrepancy 
between the value of the orders on hand and the actual output of export sales is a result 
of the industry’s inability to acquire materials because of government restrictions.380 
The lack of materials was so great that in November 1941 all piano dealers and makers 
had to put a disclaimer in their advertising which read: “The fact that goods made of 
raw materials in short supply owing to war conditions are advertised in this magazine 
should not be taken as an indication that they are necessarily available for export.”381 
Although by the beginning of 1942 piano manufacturing for export was not a major 
industry, the manufacturing of these instruments was also put under restriction in 
January 1942 with The Export of Goods (Control) Order No. 4 (S.R. & O., 1942, No. 
68). This order required piano manufacturers and action makers to obtain a licence 
before they could export any of their goods abroad.382  Furthermore, in January of that 
year British makers were banned from shipping any instrument made partially or 
wholly of any non-ferrous metals anywhere in the Western hemisphere under the 
Lend- Lease Agreement.383 The copper used in the bass strings of pianos and in brass 
hinges meant that pianos were included in this restriction.  
In April 1942, manufacturing pianos for export came to an end when the industry was 
notified in the Music Trades Review that it would no longer receive export licences. 
The notification read:  
The Industrial Supplies Department requested to notify all members that 
applications for licence to export pianos (including pianos parts wholly or 
mainly of metal, and piano actions) received by the Industrial Supplies 
Department or by the Export Licensing Department, after March 31, 1942 
will not be granted. Export licences which have already been granted, but 
against which goods have not yet been exported, will not be cancelled, but 
                                                 
380 “Census of Manufacturers Registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous Order),” 
May 1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
381 “Pianoforte Exports Group Bulletin: P.E.G,” Music Trades Review, November 1941, 20.  
382 Eugene Sotheran, “General Meeting of the Piano Trade: Drastic Governmental Proposals,” Music 
Trades Review, December 1941, 193.  
383 The Lend-Lease Agreement was a policy in which the United States would give supplies, food, and 
armaments to Allied nations in return for use of army and naval bases in Allied territory during the 
war. The policy was enacted in March 1941 and lasted until August 1945. As part of this agreement 
Allied nations agreed to restrict competitive manufacture and exports. “Lease-Lend Agreement: 
Another Blow for the Industry,” Music Trades Review, January 1942, 6.  
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such licences cannot be renewed when they expire.384  
 
The Census of Manufacturers report to the Board of Trade for March-May 1942 shows 
the impact of these restrictions and eventual cessation of export. During this period the 
industry reported that only £1,847 worth of pianos were exported. After this period, 
the piano trade stopped reporting to the Board of Trade the value of exported pianos 
and all production for export was stopped.385  
 
Government Contracts and War Work  
As the war progressed and piano production decreased, piano firms sought alternative 
sources of revenue. As many of the restrictions created by the U.K. Government were 
put in place to encourage industries to convert to war production through limiting 
available materials and increasing the taxes on products, resulting in plummeting 
consumer sales, industries sought alternative revenue, mainly through producing items 
for the war effort. Throughout the Second World War companies had the potential to 
                                                 
384 “Cessation of Export Licences,” Music Trades Review, April 1942, 53. 
385 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order,” 














April/May 1941 August/September 1941 March-May 1942
Piano Export Trade Total Value
Table 7. Compiled export value of the piano industry from the “Census of Manufacturers registered 
under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order” for April 1941, May 1941, 
August/September 1941, and June 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. The impact of export 
restrictions is clearly visible. 
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secure either direct contracts with the Government or to work under a firm with direct 
contracts as a subcontractor. 
A direct contract involved a company fulfilling an order that came directly from the 
Government: either through the Board of Trade, a branch of the military (such as the 
Ministry of Aircraft Production), or one of the many governmental departments tasked 
with supplying the war effort. The ability of securing a direct contract through the 
Government was difficult for many piano companies. One of the main factors in 
determining the successful application for contracts was that of production capabilities 
and by the beginning of the Second World War many British piano firms were 
considered to be “small firms”386 and did not have the requisite factory space or labour 
force to fulfil contracts in the eyes of Government departments.  This prevented many 
of the firms from receiving direct contracts387 and Sotheran wrote in the Music Trades 
Review in April 1940 that “The Piano Trade has been attempting to get Government 
contracts but has not succeeded.”388 That said, companies like Supertone, were 
eventually able to secure direct contracts, but generally, the smaller firms (fewer than 
200 workers) were mainly enlisted as subcontractors by other manufacturers.389 
According to Postan the use of subcontracting was desirable in order to distribute 
contracts among a number of firms as an insurance against bombing.390 
Subcontracts fell into two categories. The first type entailed the subcontracted firm 
supplying the main contractor with materials, specialised components, or completing 
a particular process in the manufacture of an item (such as electroplating metal parts). 
The second type had the secondary firm sublet part of an order which the main 
contractor could not complete.391  
                                                 
386 According to Postan, a company with fewer than 200 employees was labelled as small. 
387 An example of a piano firm having trouble securing government contracts is that of John 
Broadwood and Sons. The firm repeatedly applied for contracts through the government for making 
items such as airplane part and wooden boxes, but they were repeatedly denied. See Chapter 6 for 
more details.   
388 Eugene Sotheran, “British Pianoforte Industry Faces a Crisis,” Music Trades Review, April 1940, 
69. 
389 Postan, 390. 
390 Ibid, 412. 
391 Ashworth, 84. 
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But what types of product could the piano industry manufacturer that would benefit 
the U.K. war effort? The piano industry, although not highly mechanised, was 
departmentalised, with specific people completing one task in the overall production 
of instruments. The workers completing these tasks included craftsmen, mainly 
carpenters, and French polishers. After the piano was completed another group of 
employees would “finish” the instrument. These employees were regulators and 
tuners.392 In regard to demographics, the industry employed men who fitted within a 
wide range of ages, from apprentices to master craftsmen. 
In general, piano companies who were able to secure war contracts performed 
woodworking related tasks. According to a memorandum from the Directorate of 
Woodworking, part of the Ministry of Supply, “we are employing quite a number of 
piano firms…”393 Although the Directorate did not elucidate what this branch of the 
Ministry of Supply was using the piano firms for, it is possible to surmise some of the 
types of work completed by the firms, such as wooden boxes for ammunitions 
shipments, rifle stocks, and medical stretchers. Additional tasks may have included 
coffin manufacture.394 According to Wainwright, one company, Danemann, made 
army stretchers and wheels for gun carriages.395 Additional examples of woodworking 
contracts are companies that made furniture such as Eavestaff and Supertone. In the 
November 1941 issue of the Music Trades Review Eavestaff ran an advertisement 
which mentions “Also selling occasional tables.” An example of this type of work by 
Supertone is a side table on display at the Coleton Fishacre Historic House, a property 
under the care of the National Trust in Devon. The table is signed “Supertone Pianos 
Ltd.” and was made in 1945.    
                                                 
392 A regulator is charged with setting up the balance, or “touch” of the piano action. This includes 
adjusting the weight of the keys, shaping the piano hammers, and adjusting the back check to insure 
the speed in which the piano hammer returns. Tuners would bring the strings up to tension and tune 
the strings for shipment to a retail store.  
393 Memorandum from B. Pattison to R. Postgate. 15 November 1943. Memorandum from S. A. 
Hurren to the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group. 15 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
394 The American piano manufacturing company Steinway and Sons manufactured coffins throughout 
the Second World War and it is possible that British companies did the same. Sarah Deters 
Richardson, “Instruments of War: The Impact of World War II on the American Musical Instrument 
Industry” (master’s thesis, The University of South Dakota, 2010), 231. 














Documentary evidence of the war-time contracts (both primary and subcontracted) 
obtained by the piano industry is difficult to find. The contracts would have been held 
in the individual company’s records and unfortunately most of the documents from 
this time period were not preserved when companies went out of business or were 
absorbed by other firms. Although not specific in detail, the census reports sent to the 
Board of Trade in 1940-1942 give an indication of the amount of work these firms 
were completing, even if they do not give specific details as to what they were 
producing.  
Primary Contracts 
According to the First Census the piano industry had very little in the way of direct 
Government contracts in September 1940.396 The Government was ordering pianos 
from two firms (Kemble, and Vincent which is discussed later in the chapter) but was 
not commissioning large amounts of war production work from the piano industry. 
Only three firms had received orders; these were Challen with a mere £196 worth of 
orders, Stroud with £1,670 worth of orders, and Triumph Auto Pianos with the largest 
                                                 
396 Piano production contracts are discussed later in this chapter. 
Figure 12. Supertone Pianos Ltd., occasional table, 1945. NT 85153. Coleton Fishacre 
Historic House. Photo courtesy of the National Trust. 
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order of £7,266 (see Appendix 1 for additional information). During this time the piano 
industry was still relying on piano production, with the majority of their revenue 
coming from domestic piano sales.397  
The next census reported the value of non-piano Government orders for April and May 
1941, as well as the orders on hand for June of that year. According to this census the 
amount of Government orders had dramatically increased by the release of this 
document. For non-piano orders the Government purchased £12,233 worth of products 
in April and £24,685 in May. The orders on hand for non-piano Government work 
totalled £79,167 but this amount is just a total of the orders taken by the companies, 
not the completed products.398  
The August/September census report includes a cumulative amount for non-piano 
Government purchases for those two months. This amounted to £43,693 worth of items 
sold to the Government.399  The next census, filed in June 1942 reported £93,731 worth 
of non-piano products sold to the Government in March–May 1942. Of this, £65,074 
worth of work was being done by the piano manufacturers in the London area, £185 
was completed by Stroud, and £28,472 was completed by Supertone Piano, Ltd.400 The 
increase in orders for non-piano products is indicative of the industry’s switch to war 
production, or at least a change to production of items approved by the Board of Trade.  
A natural primary contract for piano manufacturers was for the production of pianos. 
According to the documentation found at the National Archives these contracts were 
to supply the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (N.A.A.F.I.) with pianos to be used 
in concerts and for recreational purposes on military bases.401 The Board of Trade 
                                                 
397 Domestic pianos sales amounted to £21,494 for September 1940. 
398 “Census of Manufacturers Registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous Order),” 
April 1941 and May 1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
399 “Census of Manufacturers Registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous Order),” 
September 1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
400 The census reports were divided geographically listing the various regions of the United Kingdom.  
This included London, Eastern, Southern, South Western, Midlands, North Midlands, North Eastern, 
North Western, Northern, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Only Stroud and Supertone were 
located outside of the London area so it is possible to determine what those companies’ sales were 
through these reports. Unfortunately, these reports do not give individual company information for the 
London area manufacturers. 
401 According to the website of the N.A.A.F.I., the organisation supports the British armed services by 
“Serving the Services.” The organisation ran recreational establishments for those in the military and  
sold products to support servicemen. Some of the entertainment included concerts for servicemen and 
during 1944 N.A.A.F.I. employed over 4,000 artists to entertain the troops. “History,” accessed 11 
April 2016. http://www.naafi.co.uk/history. 
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granted an open licence allowing unrestricted supplies of pianos to be sold to the 
N.A.A.F.I., and to the members of the Council of Voluntary War Work. These 
instruments would not come out of the firm’s quota for manufacturing.402  
Even though pianos were sought after by these organisations, not every piano company 
was able to secure contracts. The first and second census of piano manufacturers 
conducted by the Board of Trade demonstrates the disparity between firms, an increase 
in piano orders, and then the eventual cessation of Government-issued piano 
production because of the lack of raw materials.  
The first census listed the orders received by each of the reporting piano firms in 
September 1940. According to this document only two piano manufacturers had 
received orders to provide pianos to the Government. These were Kemble, with a value 
of £5,636 worth of pianos sold, and Vincent, for £1,278. Interestingly, in the document 
the Board of Trade mentioned the need to expand these contracts beyond the two firms 
but the same memorandum stated that a more extensive spread amongst the piano 
manufacturers would not be helpful as there were not enough orders or materials to 
support the entire trade. It was noted that “nearly every firm indicates ability to 
undertake such work,” but the Board of Trade was more interested in maintaining a 
few piano firms and closing the others in order to release labour.403  
Initially the firms chosen to manufacture instruments were most likely picked because 
of the price of their product. Both Kemble and Vincent were manufacturers of 
wholesale or “stencil” pianos and the instruments were relatively inexpensive.404 The 
Board of Trade noted that other companies were too expensive. They singled out 
Broadwood and Sons stating “the Broadwood product probably is too expensive for 
the N.A.A.F.I. or similar use.” The document states that firms that had not received 
                                                 
402 S. A. Hurren. “Pianoforte Export Group,” Music Trades Review, March 1941, 47.  
403 “Board of Trade First Census: Musical Instruments.” November 1940. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives.  
404 The retail price of an upright piano by Kemble was 32 guineas in 1939 (£33 12s). Retail Price-List 
1939. Hackney Archives, 2009/46. This is considerably less than a Broodwood & Sons upright piano 
which, according to their retail sales books were priced at £45-54, depending on the veneer style. 
“Broadwood Retail Sales Books” 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre.  
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contracts for piano production or other products would “gradually decline and their 
employees will take up other work.” 
Throughout 1941 the purchase of pianos by the Government was fairly steady, with 
more than £2,000 worth of pianos sold during each of the months reported. This 
includes the April 1941 census with £2,282 worth of pianos sold to the Government, 
May 1941 sales totalled £2,098, and the August/September 1941 report totalling 
£5,296.405 In 1942, the piano firms reported £10,055 worth of pianos sold to the 
Government for the period of March to April 1942, an increase on piano orders from 
the previous year. All of these instruments were sold by London area piano 
manufacturers.406  
The increase in piano production in 1942 corresponded with a release of raw materials 
to the industry in September 1941. At this time the industry received 10 tons of steel 
and 154 tons of iron which could be used for the manufacture of pianos to be sold to 
the Government or for export.407  
Although the census reports for piano manufacturing stop with the April 1942 report, 
the correspondence in the Board of Trade files gives more evidence that piano firms 
continued to manufacture instruments for the Government well into 1943. It also 
elucidates the difficulty the industry had in obtaining materials even though they were 
manufacturing instruments for the military.  
According to a memorandum from Miss J. E. Meldrum, in 1943 the N.A.A.F.I had 
ordered 600 pianos for themselves and 1,117 pianos for American Forces to be 
completed by December of that year. Half of the instruments for the American forces 
were to be reconditioned second hand pianos. Although this was a direct order for over 
1,100 new pianos for a Government agency, the Director of Iron Castings refused to 
release iron for the manufacture of iron frames. Instead, piano firms were left to finish 
                                                 
405 This could be averaged to £2648 per month. “Census of Manufacturers registered under the 
Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Orders,” April 1941-September 1941. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives.  
406 The census is reported according to geographical areas and in the 1941 and 1942 reports it was 
recorded that all Government ordered pianos were purchased from the London area. 
407 Memorandum A – Factual Survey. March 1942. Board of trade. Post-War Re-Construction, 
Pianofortes Industry. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
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as many pianos as they could from existing, and highly depleted, stocks.408 This caused 
difficulty in the ability of piano firms to fulfil Government orders. For example, in 
April 1943, Lambert Piano reported that the company had been making 50 pianos a 
month for the N.A.A.F.I. but because of the lack of materials, the firm was now 
uncertain if they could continue at the same rate as before because the firm’s allocation 
of iron was running out. Meldrum noted that since no new sources of iron were going 
to be available to the piano industry, the Board of Trade was giving the companies a 
licence to manufacture pianos until 30 June 1943 in order to complete the manufacture 
of their existing stocks with the understanding that all the pianos completed during this 
time were to be offered to the N.A.A.F.I.409  
The piano industry’s response was understandably one of frustration. The companies 
reported that in addition to not being able to complete piano production because of 
lack of supplies, their companies had lost so much labour to the war effort that it was 
difficult to make pianos with their limited staff. Firms such as Monington & Weston, 
Brasted Brothers, and Triumph Auto Pianos reported that they could not complete their 
piano production by 30 June because they were already working for other Government 
departments who were taking up the majority of their labour and resources.410  
Twelve additional firms reported that they had uncompleted pianos and materials 
which would number 500 completed instruments if they were just given additional 
time to finish their manufacturing. These firms estimated that they could complete the 
work in four months, meaning the pianos would be completed by September 1943.411 
Although the Board of Trade “felt that firms should be given a chance to complete 
their unfinished stocks because N.A.A.F.I. is in need of more pianos than their stocks 
represent,” it, and the Ministry of Labour and National Service, were “anxious” to shut 
the piano industry down.412 The Board of Trade informed the industry that piano 
                                                 
408 “Note on the position with reference to supplies of pianos to N.A.A.F.I” from J.E. Meldrum. 
Memoranda. 16 April 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
409 Ibid.  
410 E. A. Fisher. “Production of N.A.A.F.I. Pianos” 3 May 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
411 J.E. Meldrum, Board of Trade, “Letter to Miss Waters, The Ministry of Labour and National 
Service,” 6 May 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
412 Ibid.  
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making would be completely closed down on 31 August 1943.413  Piano firms with 
stocks of unfinished pianos and licences to manufacture pianos had until 30 June 1943 
to complete manufacture on condition that all the pianos must be offered to the 
N.A.A.F.I.414  
To emphasise the seriousness of situation, the Board of Trade withdrew the nucleus 
certificates of the nine piano companies on 30 June 1943. The companies which lost 
their nucleus status as piano producers included Brasted Brothers, British Piano 
Actions, Chappell Piano, Kemble, Alfred Knight, Alfred Taylor, Monington & 
Weston, Triumph, and Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd.415 
By 18 August 1943, a few companies were granted extensions to finish as many of 
their orders as they could for the N.A.A.F.I. These included:  
1. Lambert Piano, licensed to produce up to 200 pianos until 31 August 1943; 
2. J. B. Crammer & Co Ltd., licence expired on 30 June but extended until 31 
August 1943 in order to complete 43 pianos;   
3. Monington & Weston Ltd., licence expired 30 June 1943 but extended to 31 
August 1943 in order to complete 13 pianos;416 
4. Leswein Piano Ltd., licence expired on 31 July 1943 but given until 31 August 
1943 to complete 15 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I;  
5. Triumph Auto Pianos Ltd., licence expired 31 July 1943. Requested extension 
to complete 43 instruments for the N.A.A.F.I.417  
In September of 1943, E. A. Fisher of the Board of Trade wrote to E. C. P. Lascelles 
of the Ministry of Labour and National Service on the status of piano manufacturing. 
He said:  
                                                 
413 E. A. Fischer, Board of Trade, to E. C. P. Lascelles, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
“Piano Manufacture,” June 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
414 Miss Waters, Ministry of Labour and National Service, “Letter to Miss Meldrum ‘Piano Industry’ 
Board of Trade,” 22 April 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
415 E. A. Fischer, Board of Trade, to E. C. P. Lascelles, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
“Piano Manufacture,” June 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
416 It was noted that E. A. Fischer thought it was unlikely that the company would be able to complete 
these pianos by the end of the month. 




All piano firms concerned have completed their stocks of new pianos suitable 
for N.A.A.F.I. except Vaudeville (2 to complete) and Leswein (14 to 
complete). These companies will get extensions to complete the pianos but they 
must be done by any labour that may be left to them after the Ministry of 
Labour and National Service investigates their workforce and transfers 
labour.418   
Once Vaudeville and Leswein completed their remaining pianos for the N.A.A.F.I., 
the manufacturing of new pianos stopped for the remainder of the war. 
 
Secondary Contracts 
Airplane component manufacture was another major part of the piano industry’s war 
related work. Piano firms such as Kemble, Stroud, and Alfred Knight were hired as 
subcontractors by the de Havilland Company419 to manufacture components for the 
D.H. 98, also known as the Mosquito, a versatile airplane that was made of an all wood 
construction. The use of piano manufacturers in the production of this aircraft was so 
well known that Herman Göring once said: 
In 1940 I could at least fly as far as Glasgow in most of my aircraft, but not 
now! It makes me furious when I see the Mosquito. I turn green and yellow 
with envy. The British, who can afford aluminium better than we can, knock 
together a beautiful wooden aircraft that every piano factory over there is 
building, and they give it a speed which they have now increased yet again. 
What do you make of that? There is nothing the British do not have. They have 
the geniuses and we have the nincompoops. After the war is over I'm going to 
buy a British radio set – then at least I'll own something that has always 
worked.420 
Göring was correct, the Mosquito was a beautiful wooden aircraft and it was the fastest 
airplane produced at the time. But his description of its manufacture by “every piano 
factory” was a hyperbole. A number of piano firms were involved in the manufacture 
of parts for the Mosquito aircraft, but not every piano factory was building the plane.  
                                                 
418 E. A. Fisher to E. C. P. Lascelles, “Pianoforte Manufacturers,” September 1943. BT 64/1783. 
National Archives.  
419 The de Havilland Company was a private aviation manufacturer founded in 1920 and located in 
Hatfield, England. Prior to the beginning of the war the company built civil aircraft. “The De 
Havilland Mosquito” undated. AVIA 46-116. National Archives.  
420 Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs and Detlef Vogel, Germany and the Second World War: Volume VII: 
The Strategic Air War in Europe and the War in the West and East Asia, 1943-1944/5 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2006), 407. 
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The Mosquito was designed by the de Havilland Company independent of any Air 
Ministry contracts or advice.421 The innovation of the aircraft was that it utilised an 
all-wood body made of a multiple ply of spruce and balsa wood which was formed 
into the required shape. The airplane was equipped with two Rolls Royce Merlin 
engines and could accommodate two crew members. The aircraft was originally 
conceived as an unarmed fast bomber. The concept of the aircraft relied on its superior 
speed as its defence, meaning that because it was the fastest aircraft in flight it would 
be able to outrun any enemy aircraft that may challenge the plane in combat and that 
it would not need heavy and cumbersome armament in order to protect itself.   
The original design proposal was sent to the Ministry of Aircraft Production in 
September 1939.422  In the proposal de Havilland cited a number of reasons for the all-
wood construction. At the forefront of the justification was that using wood avoided 
using strategic materials such as aluminium. In addition, because the aircraft relied on 
hand-made wooden construction it reduced to the minimum the number of man-hours 
needed to design and construct jigs. This meant that production could begin quickly 
without the need to build speciality equipment. Not needing specialist equipment or 
training in metal working would make the aircraft’s production attractive to a number 
of subcontractors, especially those in the woodworking industry. In addition, in order 
to manufacture the aircraft a high percentage of skilled labour was required, but this 
                                                 
421 “The De Havilland Mosquito” undated, National Archives, AVIA 46-116. 
422 Ibid.  
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was mainly wood-workers so production would use labour and materials outside those 
used in aircraft production.423   
The wooden outer skin construction consisted of a 7/16” layer of Balsa wood424 faced 
on both sides with 1 ½ mm three ply425 of birch.426 The firm chose wood as the material 
not because of any technical advantage over metal aircraft construction, but because 
they would be able to use materials and labour which were not otherwise used in 
aircraft manufacture.427 The outer skin was then covered with an aircraft fabric called 
Mandapolam that was stretched with dope and then painted.428  
                                                 
423 “High Speed Bomber – Proposal by De Havillands,” September 1939. AVIA 46-116. National 
Archives.  
424 Although the planes utilised all-wood construction in order to avoid the risk of material shortages, 
obtaining large quantities of Balsa wood became difficult in early 1945. In a report in the National 
Archives a document discusses how there was difficulty in the procurement of this wood. The 
company had a 10-month supply but they were looking at other sources including Cameroon and 
Brazil. AVIA 46-116. National Archives.  
425 In the construction of the aircraft, the wooden skin had a core of balsa wood.  On either side of this 
core were three thin layers of birch wood which were constructed with the grains of the wood running 
at 90 degree angles from each other.  These three layers are known as three ply.  
426 “High Speed Reconnaissance Bomber to Specifications B1/40 (Mosquito). Preliminary 
Consideration of Design.” Undated. AVIA 46-116. National Archives.  
427 “The De Havilland Mosquito” undated, AVIA 46-116. National Archives.  
428 Mandapolam is a cotton fabric which has equal warp and weft giving it strong tensile strength and 
shrinkage in all directions. Dope is a plasticised lacquer that when painted on fabric makes the fabric 
Figure 5. A jig for the fuselage mould of a Mosquito aircraft. Thin layers of wood would be formed over the 
shape of the jig. The metal strips would then be placed over the wood to hold it in place as it was shaped to the 


















The first production order was placed on 1 March 1940 for 50 aircraft with an initial 
delivery date of July 1941.429 This order was increased to 200 aircraft in October 
1940.430 The first prototype of the Mosquito flew in November 1940.431 The aircraft 
exceeded expectations and the Ministry of Aircraft Production ordered Mosquito 
aircraft to be used as high speed bombers, photographic reconnaissance aircraft, and 
fighter planes.  
                                                 
airtight and waterproof. M. J. Hardy, The de Havilland Mosquito (London: Douglas David & Charles 
Limited, 1977), 15. 
429 After the fall of Dunkirk 26 May – 4 June 1940 the Mosquito programme was officially stopped. It 
was reinstated in July 1940. Hardy, 12.   
430 “The De Havilland Mosquito” undated, AVIA 46-116. National Archives.  
431 Hardy, 14.   
Figure 6. Study for a glider nose by the designer Charles Eames, 
1943. Although this study was for the all-wood gliders 
manufactured by American companies such as Steinway & Sons, 
the construction technique was similar to that of the Mosquito with 




Figure 7. Mosquito Bomber. Image of plane tested in tactical trials at R.A.F. Station, Duxford on 12 November 
1941. AIR 20/2284. National Archives. Image courtesy of the National Archives. 
 
Although the unarmed bomber relied on its exceptional speed as its defence as it 
carried a bomb load of 2,000 lbs, the fighter, on the other hand, was armed with four 
20mm cannon and four 0.303 inch calibre machine guns which were mounted on the 
nose of the fuselage. After its success in its initial role, the aircraft was adapted to a 
number of additional roles including tactical bomber, night bomber, night fighter 
(equipped with radar), high altitude fighter, and naval fighter. When production began 
in earnest in 1941, the Mosquito was the fastest operational aircraft in the world.432 
 
                                                 





Figure 8. DH-98 Fighter. AIR 20/2284 National Archives. Image courtesy of the National Archives.  
 
It was noted in an article from the Times in 1942 that de Havilland had over 400 
furniture and woodworking factories, large and small, working as subcontractors 
making parts for the bombers.433 These included the Educational Supply Association 
Ltd, makers of school furniture, Decca Records, the coach makers Hoopers, and as 
previously mentioned, piano manufacturers.434 Piano makers had experience in 
constructing multiple ply components as well as bending wood, and the firms had 
ample factory space. In addition, many piano firms did not have primary war 
production contracts and were in need of work. Becoming a subcontractor for the 
supply of airplane parts was of mutual benefit both for the piano firms and for de 
Havilland. According to the trade magazine The Pianomaker, the industry could apply 
for contracts to manufacture airplane parts through the Air Ministry beginning in 
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February 1941.435 Piano firms which received work manufacturing airplane 
components included Stroud, Alfred Knight, Barratt and Robinson, and Kemble.436 
The success of the aircraft’s design, as well as the widespread network of suppliers, 
allowed for de Havilland to supply the demands of the war. During the war 6,710 
Mosquito aircraft were built: 5,570 of these aircraft were built in the United Kingdom; 
1,032 in Canada; and 108 in Australia.437  
 
Table 8. Production output of de Havilland Mosquito aircraft produced in the United Kingdom from November 
1940 to November 1946. Production numbers courtesy of Dr Andy Dawson. “The Mosquito Page” accessed 4 April 
2016. www.mossie.org. 
 
Nathaniel Berry & Sons capitalised on the events of the Blitz and began manufacturing 
air raid shelters.  These small shelters ran with the jaunty slogan “Be merry in a ‘Berry’ 
and beat the Blitz.”438 
                                                 
435 “Announcement” The Pianomaker, February 1941, 451. 
436 According to Wainwright, Barratt and Robinson produced some NAAFI pianos but most of the 
factory was turned over to the production of parts for wooden-clad aircraft, such as the Mosquito. 
Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 161. Denzil Jacobs was quoted as saying “we made parts for 
Mosquitos, which were all-wood aircraft and had to learn how to put them together so that they stayed 
that way” in a newspaper clipping found in the Kemble archives. In addition, the end of year report for 
1942 stated that Kemble had sold £127,197 6s 8d worth of aircraft components that year and had an 
additional £14,538 14s 7d worth of airplane component stocks on hand in December 1942. Kemble & 
Co., “Balance Sheet” 31 December 1942. Kemble and Company 2009/46. Hackney Archives.  
437 C. Martin Sharp and Michael J.F. Bowyer, Mosquito (Manchester: Crécy Publishing Ltd, 1995) 83. 
438 “Take Shelter in a ‘Berry,’” Music Trades Review March 1941, 39. 






























































































































Mosquito Production by Quarter 1940-1946
121 
 
Changes in Labour 
As previously stated, a driving force in the restrictions on the piano industry and the 
eventual shutdown of production was the need for labour. In order to meet the 
deficiency in manpower and to transform the economy from one of peace to war, the 
Government facilitated the movement of large amounts of workers from peace-time 
occupations to war-time manufacturing jobs, mainly munitions and other essential 
manufacturing industries.439 Although the piano industry did not employ a large 
workforce in comparison to other industries at the start of the war, each man (and 
eventually woman) was needed for the war effort, and the piano industry with its 
“luxury” status was subject to scrutiny by the Government, leading to most of its 
employees either enlisting in the military or being moved to essential manufacturing 
industries. 
After the declaration of war, the piano industry, like all aspects of British industry, lost 
men to enlistments within the military.  As the war progressed the restrictions placed 
upon the piano industry were done so not only to release materials for the war effort, 
but also to ensure a supply of labour for the war effort. During this time the people 
employed within piano manufacturing changed dramatically. Able-bodied men were 
moved from piano manufacturing to either military service or war production, 
companies with war production contracts had an influx of new workers, and women 
were integrated onto the production floor to compensate for the loss of male workers.  
According to the employment figures sent to the Ministry of Supply in the Census of 
Manufacturing Reports the reporting piano companies employed 586 people in the 
production of pianos in October 1939. This number fell to 483 in June 1940 and then 
rose to 522 in October 1940. In the June 1941 report, in addition to people employed 
in the production of pianos, the industry reported total employment, listing the number 
of employees engaged in “all products” as well as those employed in the production 
of pianos. In June 1941 the industry reported that it employed a total of 1,072 people 
with only 580 (of 54%) of these employees working on piano production. In October 
of 1941, the total employment was 1,017 with 459 (45%) of the workers making 
                                                 
439 Ian Gazeley, “Women’s pay in British industry during the Second World War” Economic History 
Review 61 (December 2008): 654. 
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pianos, and in June 1942, the employment rose to 1,283 with piano workers accounting 
for less than one-third with 386 employees. In these reports the increase of female 
employees is also recorded with the percentage of female employees rising from 5.9% 
in April 1941 to 27.9% in June 1942.440   
 
Table 9. As piano companies received war production contracts the rate of employment of women in the factories 
increased following the employment trends of the U.K. as a whole. Table compiled by author from the “Census of 
Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies Orders,” April 1941 – June 1942. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
 
As previously discussed, taxes placed on the piano industry encouraged companies to 
seek out war contracts while Limitation Orders and the Concentration of Industries 
Scheme placed heavy restrictions on the production of pianos. Under these rules, piano 
companies that received war production contracts and protected status were able to 
maintain their employees while smaller companies were forced to consolidate with 
nucleus firms, thus releasing their employees to the Ministry of Labour so that they 
could be transferred to factories making war products. Even though by June 1942 less 
than one-third of the people employed in the piano industry were engaged in making 
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pianos, the Ministry of Labour continued to press for the industry to completely shut 
down.  
The Ministry of Labour and National Service was heavily involved in the process of 
halting the production of pianos for the domestic and export market, as well as for the 
N.A.A.F.I. During this time the ministry was particularly concerned with the number 
of labourers working on pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. Over a period of five months (April 
1943 to August 1943) E. A. Fisher and E. Meldrum from the Board of Trade 
corresponded with a W. P. Lascelles and M. J. Waters from the Ministry of Labour 
and National Service regarding this issue. The correspondence coincides with the 
removal of nucleus status certificates for piano manufacturers by the Board of Trade. 
In the correspondence the pressure for labour to be released from piano manufacturing 
is evident.  
For example, in May 1943 the office of the Ministry of Labour wrote: 
 …any labour employed only on piano making which is suitable for transfer 
should be transferred, and the firms should be allowed to complete their stock 
with labour which is not suitable for transfer.441  
In response, Fisher from the Board of Trade stated that the nucleus certificates were 
being removed but he cautioned against transferring all suitable labour before the 
N.A.A.F.I. pianos were complete. He wrote: 
To show the trade that we really are serious, I have withdrawn the 9 nucleus 
certificates issued to the firms. I hope, however, that the Ministry of Labour 
will not take any fresh steps towards removing the existing labour until after 
the end of August, as we do wish to satisfy the requirements of the N.A.A.F.I. 
so far as that may be possible.442   
It seems that Fisher’s request was granted as “no further workers, engaged on piano 
production, should be withdrawn until immediately after 31st August.”443 After the 
August deadline passed and the production of pianos for the armed services was 
                                                 
441 Letter from M. J. Waters to E. Meldrum. 21 May 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
442 Letter from E. A. Fisher to E. C. P. Lascelles. “Pianoforte Manufacture.” 21 June 1943. BT 
64/1783. National Archives. 
443 Letter from E. W. P. Lascelles to E. A. Fisher. 6 July 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
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complete, Fisher wrote to the Ministry of Labour that “the Board of Trade has no 
objection to any action you may take with regard to these [piano] firms.”444  
The impact of the transfer of labour on the piano companies left many firms with very 
few remaining piano makers and those that remained were older men who were not 
eligible or able-bodied for other work. For example, C. H. Challen and Sons reported 
that in February 1943 they employed just one full-time worker and four part-time 
workers engaged in piano work and that was for repairs and maintenance for the 
B.B.C. The full-time employee was listed as aged 42 and “crippled;" the part-time 
employees included a 58-year-old man who worked 25% of the time, a 59-year-old 
man who worked 20% of the time and two men aged 42 and 46 who worked 5% of the 
time.445 It is interesting to note that these men were engaged in the repair and 
maintenance of pianos as this type of work was not regulated by the Board of Trade. 
Even so, this small number of employees is indicative of the status of employment of 
piano workers across the entire industry by 1943. 
The transfer of the skilled, able-bodied piano workers from the piano factories would 
have a negative impact on the reconversion of the industry in the post-war era. As 
piano companies were ready to resume manufacturing, the industry would face a 
difficult time finding people to work in the industry and many future employees would 
need to be extensively trained in piano making.   
 
Second Hand Piano Sales 
As piano manufacturers faced restrictions on piano production, companies began to 
rely more heavily on the sales of second hand pianos. Throughout 1940 and 1941 it 
became increasingly difficult to manufacture new instruments and when export trade 
was ended in April 1942, domestic piano production halted in August 1942, and the 
orders for pianos from government agencies halted in August 1943, the selling of 
second hand instruments became the only type of piano sale allowed in the U.K.  This 
type of trade was appealing to manufacturers who did not have sufficient war 
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production contracts, as the selling of second hand pianos did not require a large 
workforce, and for the most part, was unregulated by the Board of Trade.  Some piano 
manufacturers, such as Broadwood and Sons, relied on the revenue earned from the 
sales of second hand instruments and hire pianos for their survival throughout the war 
years. (See Chapter 6 for more information.)  
Although second hand pianos were mostly unregulated, if repairs had been done to the 
piano before the instrument was resold it was subject to the Purchase Tax after October 
1940. To complicate the matter, if a company was just repairing pianos and not 
reselling the instrument, then the cost of the repairs was not taxed. According to the 
Music Trades Review the regulations regarding registration for the Purchase Tax in 
regard to sales and repairs of second hand instruments was as follows:  
Firms engaged in repair work as distinct from manufacture are not required to 
register. Second hand goods as such are not exempt from tax, though in many 
cases no tax may be chargeable owning to the nature of the transaction, e.g., 
sales by retailers of second hand goods bought or taken back from members of 
the public. Firms who make a business of buying chargeable goods second 
hand and repairing or reconditioning them for sale to retailers are carrying on 
wholesale trade and must apply for registration.446 
 
The ability to trade in used instruments, repaired or unrepaired, was an important part 
of the piano trade during the war years. That said, it is difficult to ascertain the sales 
figures of second hand pianos sold to the British public during this time period. Even 
with the Census of Manufacturing reports from the Board of Trade these figures are 
difficult at best. According to the Census, domestic piano orders totalled £38,499 in 
September 1940.  At this time the piano industry was still able to sell new-built 
instruments to the public, without the added cost of the Purchase Tax, but it had been 
subjected to a 33⅓% reduction in production because of the Limitation of Supply 
Orders. Unfortunately, the sales figures are not broken down between new instrument 
sales and used instrument sales.447 
Seven months later, in April 1941, domestic pianos sales were less than half of those 
previously reported with only £15,002 worth of pianos sold to the domestic market 
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and in May of that year they had reduced to £14,329. At this point the piano industry 
was being forced to consolidate through the Consolidation of Industry Scheme, had 
reduced its production to 25% of what it had produced in 1939, and was required to 
charge an additional 33⅓% Purchase Tax on all new instruments sold domestically.  
Most likely these factors had a significant impact on the sales of newly manufactured 
pianos for the domestic market. Although the percentage of second hand pianos is not 
listed on these sales figures, it is probable that some of the sales at this time were of 
second hand instruments and it is highly likely that a large proportion of the sales were 
of used pianos.448  
The next report lists domestic sales figures from August to September 1941 as a total 
of £40,052. By this time timber could no longer be distributed to the piano industry 
for domestic piano production by the Ministry of Supply and the piano industry had 
been consolidated. Most likely the combined domestic sales figure for these three 
months relied heavily on second hand piano sales.449 The same is true for the reported 
figures for March to May 1942, which totalled £57,607.450 It is possible that an even 
greater percentage of these sales were of second hand pianos as the industry was faced 
with a 66 ⅔% Purchase Tax on luxury goods beginning in April of that year. By August 
of 1942 the production of instruments for the domestic market was banned and all 
future sales were only of second hand instruments. 
Although the sale of second hand pianos was generally unregulated, the sale price of 
the instruments was put under price controls by the Board of Trade in May 1942 as 
part of the General Furniture Order.451  In addition, the industry faced difficulty in 
obtaining the raw material needed for the repair and maintenance of pianos because of 
the restrictions on raw material. In May 1942, the industry was granted a small supply 
of raw materials for the repair and reconditioning of used instruments, but after this 
                                                 
448 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order. May 
1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
449 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order. 
September 1941. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
450 “Census of Manufacturers registered under the Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order. May 
1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
451 “Second Hand Goods Now Price Controlled,” Music Trades Review, May 1942, 69. 
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time, the industry would have to rely on their own stocks to maintain and repair any 
additional instruments.452 
According to the correspondence of the Board of Trade preserved in the National 
Archives, it is evident that the piano industry took full advantage of the ability to sell 
second hand instruments without regulation or taxation, and perhaps without being 
truthful as to how much repair work was being carried out on the instruments.  In a 
memorandum dated 23 July 1943, E. A. Fisher of the Board of Trade wrote:  
…second hand pianos may be sold without licence. But, if any work “however 
little” is done on the pianos (e.g. re-felting of hammers or re-polishing a case) they 
may only be sold under licence. 
And   
I have heard that some piano manufacturers may be doing work on second hand 
pianos and selling without licence. I am proposed to look further into the alleged 
activity and stop it.453  
But it seems that not everyone in the Board of Trade was as determined as Fisher to 
track down any offenders of unpaid Purchase Tax in the piano industry when it came 
to the sale of second hand pianos. In a handwritten note to Fisher, C.B.R.454 wrote:  
…certainly refelting [sic] hammers and repolishing [sic] a case should be regarded 
only as repair, and as uncontrolled. If on the other hand, a complete new action 
was fitted we could reasonably say and think, that a new piano had been produced 
and that a licence was required for its sale.455 
From April 1942 until August 1944, the piano industry could sell second hand pianos 
at a fixed price to the domestic market without the addition of the Purchase Tax, unless 
repairs were completed on the instrument. On 28 August 1944 these rules were relaxed 
further. Under the New General Furniture Order which went into effect on 28 August, 
1944, pianos were recognised as instruments of art and second hand pianos and player 
pianos which were reconditioned, restored, or rebuilt were not liable to purchase tax.456   
                                                 
452 Eugene Sotheran, “The Fight to Live,” Music Trades Review, May 1942, 64. 
453 E. A. Fisher, “Sale of Second Hand Pianos” 23 July 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
454 The handwritten note is sign C. B. R. but no other information was available in regard to its author.  
Most likely this is a Mr Richards, who worked in the Solicitor’s Office of the Board of Trade to whom 
the memorandum from Fisher dating 23 July was addressed.  
455 C. B. R. to E. A. Fisher. Memorandum. 7 September 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  




During the first three years of the Second World War, restrictions and limitations 
placed on raw materials, production, and labour slowly stopped the production of 
pianos for the domestic and export market. Compounding these restrictions were 
debilitating taxes which made new pianos unaffordable for British citizens; these taxes 
were used by the Government to persuade industries to switch to war production.  As 
production decreased, many piano firms were forced to consolidate with other 
companies, eventually closing their factories or leasing them to other industries.  The 
need for materials for war production and the need of labour for both military service 
and manufacturing were the driving forces behind these restrictions and by August 
1943 there was a complete shutdown of all piano manufacturing in Britain.  
In order to survive the war years, piano companies sought alternative sources of 
revenue, often seeking primary or secondary contracts for war production. Piano 
companies relied on their knowledge of woodworking to procure contracts to 
manufacturer wooden products such as airplane components and furniture. Firms 
unable to secure these lucrative contracts relied on the revenue from the sales of second 
hand pianos.  
From August 1943 the British piano industry was reduced down to a few companies 
selling second hand instruments and other firms making war products. The 
manufacture of new pianos for the export market would be banned until summer 1946, 




Chapter 5: The Lean Years and Reconstruction 
 
It was estimated that during the war years Britain lost roughly £7.5 billion in national 
wealth from bomb damage, lack of maintenance, shipping losses, and external debt.457 
Although faced with such losses, at the end of the war manufacturing capacity was 
high and economists, including Lord Keynes, believed that after a short period of 
reconstruction the economy would return to normal.458 It was believed that if British 
industry could rapidly convert from war production to domestic production, normal 
economic conditions would be restored, allowing Britain to recover from its substantial 
losses.459  
Unfortunately, the reality of post-war Britain did not allow for the rapid reconstruction 
of industry. Instead of an expedient return to domestic production, it was years before 
the British economy recovered. During this time, materials were scarce, labour was in 
transition, and rationing continued. As long as the economy was unstable, the 
restrictions on the production of luxury goods stayed in place, thus preventing piano 
production. As the industry waited for permission to resume production, it faced the 
challenges of reconversion.  
After the complete shut-down of piano manufacturing in August 1943, companies 
relied on war production contracts, selling second hand pianos, and repairing 
instruments for revenue. Although piano production had stopped, piano manufacturers 
were active in planning the reconstruction of the industry in the post-war era. 
Throughout 1942 to 1945, members of the Pianoforte Industry Export Group, led by 
secretary Stanley Hurren, kept in touch with the Board of Trade. This was done 
through a number of meetings organised by the Board of Trade and through 
representatives of piano firms writing numerous letters expressing their needs, asking 
                                                 
457 The amount is in 1945 prices. The original article gives this amount as $30 billion in American 
dollars as the book was published in the Unites States. According to the website 
www.historicalstatistics.org £1 equalled roughly $4, so this would equate to £7.5 billion. William C. 
Mallalieu, British Reconstruction and American Policy 1945-1955 (New York: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 
1956), 33. 
458 John Maynard Keynes was Britain’s most influential economist best known for his book The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money and is the founder of modern macroeconomics. 
Ibid, 50. 
459 Ibid, 34. 
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when the Purchase Tax would be lifted, and inquiring as to when they would be able 
to once again build pianos for the export or the domestic market. Their incessant 
correspondence led Raymond Postgate, a civil servant working for the Board of Trade 
and part of the department that oversaw the reconstruction of the piano industry, to 
write “I do not feel that I can escape from these detestable instruments.”460  
Although the members of the piano industry were rightfully frustrated with the 
continued prohibition on piano production, the Board of Trade, for their part, was 
devising plans for the reconstruction of the industry. As early as 1942, the organisation 
began to investigate how best to restart piano production and when it would be safe to 
do so without hurting the war effort. But, the strategies and policies devised during the 
war would not help the industry to smoothly restart production, but continue to hinder 
it for many years after the end of the fighting.  
 
Reconstruction Planning 1942-1944 
In order to understand the complexities of restarting the piano industry, the Board of 
Trade developed a series of questions that were sent to Stanley Hurren to disseminate 
to piano producers. The questions were designed to collect information so the 
government would have a better understanding of the needs of the industry in order to 
restart production and to prepare the industry for a meeting that would take place in 
July 1942. These questions were the following. 
Restarting the Industry 
1. As the industry has practically ceased its normal activity, how long will it take 
to restart? 
2. Will new plant [meaning machinery] be required? Is it obtainable in the United 
Kingdom? 
3. Has any estimate been formed of post-war demand? Will there be a redundancy 
problem? If so, are any plans being formulated? 
4. Piano manufacturers are dependent on many ancillaries. Will they be able to 
start readily? Is there any component which will present special difficulty? 
 
 
                                                 
460 In addition to working for the Board of Trade, Raymond Postgate was a well-known author, 
socialist, and gourmand. Raymond Postgate to Dr. Fisher, memorandum, “On the Piano Industry,” 15 




5. Representatives can only be asked what prospects they have of renewing 
export. Their markets were largely in the Empire – but there is loyal 
production, e.g. in Australia and Canada, and competition from Germany and 
the United States.  
6. Is there any possibility of improvement in construction which will help their 
competitive ability: is there any form of research on technical problems? There 
have been complaints that wood used in cases does not stand up to local 
conditions. 
7. Did they benefit from Imperial Preference or other Trade Agreements? 
8. Did they use E.C.G.D.? 461  
 
The questions show the main concerns of the Board of Trade. The Government was 
concerned about the time-frame for reconstruction; needs of new machinery, which 
could potentially be difficult to obtain because of material needs and ability to source 
the machinery from national sources; demand for pianos and whether or not there 
would be enough demand for the instruments to support the reopening of all of the 
piano companies; and the difficulty of the piano industry in sourcing its components 
from its ancillary suppliers (such as ironmongers and piano action makers) which may 
still be involved in war related work or have difficulties sourcing supplies.  
The emphasis on exporting pianos demonstrates that the Board of Trade was inclined 
to increase piano exports. This in turn was part of a larger strategy to increase all 
exports in the post-war era in order to ensure Britain remained competitive in global 
markets. The push for exporting instruments would stay constant throughout the 
remaining war years and during the post-war years, but exports were never enough to 
sustain the industry.  
The next step in the reconstruction planning of the Board of Trade during the war years 
was a meeting with representatives of the piano industry which took place on 30 July 
1942.462 Lord Forres, member of the Industrial and Export Council of the Board of 
                                                 
461 Export Credits Guarantee Department. This is the export credit agency and a ministerial 
department in the United Kingdom. Its objective is to help U.K. businesses export products to other 
countries therefore helping the British economy. Board of Trade internal documents, “Post-War Re-
Construction, Pianofortes Industry,” circa May 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
462 Lord Forres represented the Board of Trade. Piano Export Group representatives were: Mr. 
Whelpdale (Chairmen of the Pianofortes Industry Export Group), Mr. Evans (Challen and Sons), Mr. 
Kemble (Kemble and Co.), Mr. Brasted (Brasted Bros., Ltd.), Mr. Ricketts, Mr Healey (Pianoforte 
Supplies Association), Mr. Hurren (Secretary of the Pianofortes Industry Export Group).  
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Trade,463 was the Chair of the meeting. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the 
readiness of the piano industry for post-war production. The main discussions were 
organised into the following categories: production, labour, conversion to peace-time 
production, machinery, organisation of productions, and research. 
In regards to production, much of the discussion centred on the potential difficulty of 
obtaining raw materials after the war. The largest concern was that of timber. Most 
piano firms had sold their stocks of timber for war purposes and the firms that were 
granted nucleus certificates were quickly running out of their timber stocks, meaning 
no companies would have timber available for piano production at the end of the 
war.464 The industry informed the Board of Trade that the difficulty was not just in 
obtaining timber, but that the timber used in piano production needed to be seasoned 
for three years. If the industry was to restart production, the lifting of timber controls 
would need to happen three years before full production could resume.   
The piano industry warned the Board of Trade that an emphasis on export trade in the 
post-war era would harm the industry. According to the piano company 
representatives, before the war export trade was never a large portion of the piano 
industries’ revenue and sometimes the industry operated at a loss regarding exports; 
rather the piano industry relied on the home trade. The piano companies suggested that 
the Government should protect the British domestic piano market from being flooded 
by low-cost German pianos (similar to the situation after the First World War).465 If 
exporting pianos was to be a major part of the reconstruction plan, then the industry 
urged the government to create preferential tariffs for preference countries such as 
South Africa, Australia, and Canada.466  
An important concern for both the Board of Trade and the piano industry was the 
availability of labour in post-war times. As the piano industry was a craft industry, the 
                                                 
463 “Lord Forres Joins Export Council” Glasgow Herald. 22 June 1940. 158th Year No. 150, pg. 6.  
464 By July 1942 the Timber Control Orders had restricted the use of raw timber in the production of 
pianos. Piano firms were allowed to manufacture pianos using already manufactured or semi-
manufactured parts, but no new timber components could be made.  
465 According to the Pianoforte Export Group, although after the end of the First World War a 33⅓% 
import duty was enacted, this did little to stop the influx of German-made pianos into Britain. “Report 
of Meeting Held at Board of Trade on 30th July, 1942,” Pianoforte Trade Bulletin No. 26 (August 
1942). BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
466 “Notes of a Meeting Held at the Board of Trade on the 30th July to Discuss the Post-War Problems 
of the Pianoforte Industry,” 30 July 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
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labour consisted of trained craftsmen. In order for the piano industry to restart, the 
craftsmen who had been reassigned to war production would need to obtain early 
release from their war work in order to return to the piano factories.467 The industry 
would not be able to produce pianos without the release of their pre-war workforce. 
Even if the piano industry obtained the necessary supplies to build pianos and the 
labour force was returned to the factories, the industry cautioned that it would take at 
least six months for the industry to begin to supply. According to the representatives 
at the meeting, normal production had all but ceased and most firms were diverted to 
war production. Compounding this was the difficulty of machinery and tools. Those 
that had not been removed were used for other work and would need to be repaired, 
while other factories required new machinery, both of which would cause delay.468  
The Concentration of Industries scheme was also discussed at the meeting. Although 
the industry had concentrated, production was quickly stymied because of the 
cessation of material supplies and some firms wanted to dissolve their concentration 
arrangements. Firms such as Kemble, which had significant war production contracts, 
saw no benefit in being concentrated with Buckland & Co., Ltd. and King Bros. Pianos 
Ltd. and requested having their agreement ended before the war.469 Although Kemble 
wished to end their concentration, other companies suggested that they may continue 
the arrangement after the end of the war and may remain so permanently.470  
During the meeting and throughout the war years, the piano industry was encouraged 
by the Board of Trade to innovate through research and development. The Government 
believed that the research section of the piano trade was very disorganised and that the 
only way of assuring the future of the industry was if it became global leaders in piano 
technology. Overall the encouragement to invest in research was largely ignored by 
the piano industry. Piano firms were insistent that each company was responsible for 
                                                 
467 Labour movement and release was controlled by the Ministry of Labour. Workmen and women 
had to receive permission from this ministry if they wanted to change assignments.  
468 “Notes of a Meeting Held at the Board of Trade on the 30th July to Discuss the Post-War Problems 
of the Pianoforte Industry,” 30 July 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
469 “Factual Survey of the Piano Industry Appendix B,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
470 Mr. Whelpdale of Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd suggested that their concentration organisation 
would continue after the war. This company was concentrated with John Broadwood & Sons Ltd., Sir 
Herbert Marshall & Sons, Ltd., and Vincent Manufacturing Co. Ltd . “Notes of a Meeting Held at the 
Board of Trade on the 30th July to Discuss the Post-War Problems of the Pianoforte Industry,” 30 July 
1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
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their own innovations and their research was not shared with other firms.471 The 
encouragement of the Board of Trade went against many of the piano making firms’ 
belief that the piano had reached a “present degree of perfection”472 and that the 
instrument did not need improvements. The industry tried to placate the Board of Trade 
by referring to the Music and Radio Trade School located at the Northern Polytechnic, 
Holloway Road as a research centre473 but the Board of Trade did not agree with this 
assessment.  
The Board of Trade was concerned about the quality of “research” being done by the 
piano industry at the trade school and stated that “no scientists, or even junior ones, 
are employed by the industry.” Furthermore, the school did not investigate how 
materials responded to climatic changes (which would be important if the industry 
wanted to expand their export market); nor did it teach any of the fundamentals of 
sound production, sound quality, seasoning of timbers, or properties of substitute 
materials.474  This assessment may have been slightly unfair, as the Institute of Musical 
Instrument Technology was attached to the school, but this institute’s main work 
during the war years was on improving radios and developing an “electrophonic 
piano.” The Board of Trade suggested that the industry set up a Research Organisation 
but also realised that the poverty of the industry would be prohibitive in this endeavour. 
They suggested the industry combine with other trades to form a general Music 
Instruments Research Association.475 This advice was ignored. 
As the piano industry insisted on individual firms conducting their own research, the 
Board of Trade would agree to release a small amount of controlled materials to select 
piano companies so that they could build experimental pianos and seven piano 
companies applied for this material in October 1943.476 Part of the requirements of the 
programme was that the experimental work could not interfere with essential war work 
                                                 
471 “Meeting Minutes,” 23 July 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
472 This is a quote from the piano industry contained in the “Brief on Post-War Reconstruction in the 
Piano Trade,” April 1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
473 This school offered training to boys aged 13 to 16 and 16 to 18 where students were trained in 
making and repairing pianos, organs, and band instruments. “Meeting Minutes,” 23 July 1943. BT 
64/1786. National Archives. 
474 R.E. Postgate, memorandum, 21 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
475 R.E. Postgate, internal memorandum, 21 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
476 S. A. Hurren to the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group, “Post-War Research,” 16 October 
1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
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so the companies that participated were those who did not have extensive war 
production contracts. The firms and their proposed production included:  
1. Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd – production of one large grand and one 
overstrung model upright; 
2. Chas. H. Challen and Sons – three grand pianos and three upright models; 
3. Monington & Weston – six pianos with the firm’s patent double iron frame; 
4. Triumph Auto, Ltd.  – six pianos; 
5. Brasted Bros., Ltd. – six overstrung minipianos; 
6. Danemann and Co., - three grand pianos and three upright overstrung pianos; 
7. John Broadwood and Sons, Ltd. – three uprights and four grand pianos.477   
 
Although the Board of Trade approved of the manufacture of these experimental 
pianos, it took a long time for the materials to be released to the companies and for the 
companies to begin building the instruments. For example, the copper requested by the 
piano firms was not released until January 1944478 and Broadwood and Sons did not 
begin building their experimental grand piano until October that year.479 The impact 
of this small research programme is unclear. Broadwood experimented with building 
instruments with a lighter metal frame, but ultimately the design was rejected and 
whether the other six piano companies were able to improve their instruments is 
unknown.  
The encouragement from the Board of Trade to invest in research during the war years 
was excellent advice, but the advice was largely ignored by the piano industry as a 
whole. The industry’s resistance to innovation would prove to be detrimental to its 
position in the global piano market in the post-war era.480 
 
                                                 
477 S. A. Hurren to E. A. Fisher, letter, 4 November 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
478 E. A. Fisher to S. A. Hurren, letter, January 1944. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
479 “Minutes of the Board Meeting held on Thursday 19th October 1944,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4. Surrey History Centre. 
480 American piano companies and band instrument manufacturing companies invested in product and 
material research during the war years. These firms were then able to incorporate the results of this 
research into their products after the war ended. The innovation in design helped these companies in 
the post-war era and much of these advertising focused on the integration of new technology. See 
Sarah Deters Richardson, “Instruments of War: The Impact of the Second World War on the 
American Music Industry.” (Master’s thesis: University of South Dakota, 2010).  
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Post-war piano production estimates 
In May 1943, the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group was asked by the Board of 
Trade to provide an estimate of post-war production. S. A. Hurren wrote to E. A. Fisher 
with the estimates on 28 June of that year. The estimates were based on pre-war 
manufacturing levels and with the idea that the British public would have a strong 
demand for instruments once the war was over. The industry estimated that 18 months 
after the cessation of hostilities that materials for 50,000 pianos would be required in 
the first year in order to allow timber to season and to build up stocks. Without this, 
the industry would not manufacture efficiently. 
Hurren indicated that some of the piano manufacturers which maintained stocks of 
wooden components would be able to return to production immediately after they 
received a supply of vital parts such as iron frames, steel wires, and the return of their 
labour force. Other factories would be in a position to resume manufacturing within 
six months. It was estimated that factories which had completely converted to war 
work or were shut down during the war may take twelve months or more to resupply 
and retool their factories. In his estimate, Hurren emphasised that the recovery of the 
piano industry was contingent upon the removal of the Purchase Tax – without the 









                                                 




Estimate of materials needed to restart the piano industry 
Section 1 Timber   
 Soft Woods 3154 Petersburg Standards482 
 Hard Woods 137,500 cubic feet 
 Veneers 10,000,000 feet super483  
Section 2 Metals   
 Iron 5,100 tons 
 Steel (including wire) 750 tons 
 Copper 165 tons 
 Lead 120 tons 
 Brass 90 tons 
Section 3 Textiles, etc.   
 Backing cloth 90,000 yards 
 Baizes, etc. 7,200 yards 
 Bushing cloth 3,600 yards 
 Woven Cloth 1,920 yards 
 Leather (doe or sheep) 19,800 sq. feet 
 Leather (real morocco) 19,800 sq. feet 
 Celluloid 27 tons 
Section 4 General 
Merchandise 
  
 Methylated Spirit, French Polish, Varnish, Bronze Powder, 
Screws, Bolts, Glue, Oils – mineral and vegetable, Plastics for 




Table 10. Estimates sent from S. A. Hurren to E. A. Fisher for the materials needed to restart the piano industry at 
the end of the war. S. A. Hurren to E. A. Fisher. “Approximate Requirements for the Manufacture of Fifty Thousand 
Complete Pianofortes for Home and Export, and Components for Export to Make a Further Ten Thousand Abroad.” 
29 June 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
 
 
                                                 
482 A Petersburg Standard is a unit of timber measurement. It equals 120 pieces of timber measuring 6 
feet long by 11 inches wide by 3 inches high and equals 165 ft. cube. Bernard E. Jones, The Practical 
Woodworker: The Complete Guide to the Art & Practice of Woodworking Vol. 1 (Berkeley: Ten 
Speed Press, 2000), 191. 
483 One superfoot is a measurement of timber equalling one foot long by one foot wide by one inch 
thick. Judith A. Bennett, Pacific Forest: A History of Resource Control and Contest in the Solomon 
Islands, 1800-1997 (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2000), xi.  
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The amount of materials needed for the conversion of the piano industry was estimated 
for 50,000 instruments for both the home and export trade with additional components 
for the manufacture of 10,000 pianos to be made abroad.484 Although this estimate was 
based on the manufacturing numbers of 1938 (when the piano industry had already 
suffered decline in both domestic and export sales),485 the numbers were incredibly 
hopeful. The restarting of the industry would be at the mercy of the Government’s 
release of labour and materials for luxury goods production, as well as the suspension 
of the Purchase Tax.  
The Problem of Labour 
A large issue prohibiting the restarting of production was the release of skilled 
craftsmen and technicians from military service and from war production work in other 
factories. In total the piano industry estimated that the number of skilled workers 
needed to return to the trade would be approximately 5,000 skilled and 1,000 unskilled 
men.486 Interestingly, the piano companies did not include the use of women workers 
in the estimates even though women were currently working in their factories doing 
war production work. It appears that at the time of the Board of Trade meeting the 
piano firms were preparing to release these women workers instead of training them 
for piano manufacturing.  
In a response to the piano industries’ estimates, the Board of Trade explained that there 
would be no possibility of securing the release of anything like 6,000 people all at 
once.487 Instead, the Board of Trade suggested meeting with the industry to inform 
them about demobilisation and the formula the Government had created to release 
labour.488 This formula was created to prevent a repeat of the problems that occurred 
at the end of the First World War. At that time, men were quickly released en masse 
and without thought to whether there were jobs available to them, which caused 
massive unemployment and contributed to the economic depression in the interwar 
                                                 
484 The piano components would be used by factories making pianos in Australia and South Africa 
where piano companies such as Alfred Knight supplied other piano companies with piano parts.   
485 According to M. E. Ricketts of Chappell Piano Company, the British piano industry saw a decline 
in piano production beginning in 1937 when it produced 6,507 fewer pianos then in 1936. In 1937 the 
industry produced 53,752 instruments. M. E. Ricketts, “The Outlook of the Pianos Industry: Paper 
Prepared by Mr. M. E. Ricketts (Chappell Piano Co),” Music Trades Review, June 1938, 186-190. 
486 S. A. Hurren to E. A. Fisher, letter, 28 June 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
487 Mr. Binney to Mr. Postgate, memorandum, 3 November 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
488 Ibid.  
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years. In order to offset this potential problem, the Government created a 
demobilisation scheme.489 
The demobilisation scheme consisted of a formula for releasing men and women from 
military service and war production work. The formula was not based on the length of 
service of the individual nor did it take into account the individual’s skills; instead it 
focused on the individual’s age. In the formula, each year of a person’s age equalled 
two months of service. People who had “served” the longest (but in actuality were the 
oldest) were given a ranking of “Class A” and were to be released first. In all, 
servicemen were divided into 28 hierarchical levels of rankings and those at the lowest 
level (in other words the youngest) were to be released from service last. The release 
of labour would happen in two main stages: the first being the end of the war in Europe 
followed by the end of the war in the Pacific. The two-stage end to the war would slow 
the rate of release of labour from the armed services and from war production factories 
and would allow for released labour to be absorbed into civilian production.490  
Overall, this plan worked with the first stage of labour release beginning after the 
surrender of Germany on 7 May 1945 and the second phase beginning after Japan’s 
surrender on 15 August 1945. The actual release of labour was a complicated process 
and one about which there was dissent. The largest complaint revolved around the 
discrepancies between the rate in which factory workers were released compared to 
military personnel. For example, twice as many munitions workers were released after 
August 1945 than those serving in the military.491 This led to resentment in military 
servicemen who sometimes saw factory workers as those who avoided the perils of 
war. In addition, young men serving in the military believed they were being unfairly 
treated as older men were being released first and had priority over the available 
domestic jobs.492 That being said, by June 1946, 3.7 million men and women had been 
released from the armed forces and by December of that year demobilisation of the 
                                                 
489 Rex Pope, “British Demobilisation After the Second World War” Journal of Contemporary 
History 30:1 (1995): 75. 
490 Ibid, 68-69. 
491 The difference in the rate of release was one of practicalities. With the end of hostilities, it no 
longer made sense for the Government to maintain a large munitions programme and these factories 
became idle. The logistics of returning large number of men and women from overseas added to the 
delay in releasing military service men.  
492 Pope, 73. 
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military was largely completed with a total of over 4.25 million people released from 
service.493  
The formula for releasing labour back to domestic production would impact piano 
companies’ ability to rehire former employees. Most piano makers who served in the 
military or were engaged in other essential war work were not able to return to the 
piano factories until one year after the war had ended. It must be said, this does not 
take into account the number of men who died while fighting.  
In addition to the formula for releasing labour from war work, the Board of Trade and 
the Ministry of Labour and National Service began working on procedures for 
determining priority release from war work for individuals needed to restart other 
industries. These employees would need to be considered “key workers” who were 
absolutely necessary for reconversion. The industries chosen for priority reconversion 
needed to be designated as an “essential civilian requirement” and would have their 
employees given a higher priority for release.  Unfortunately, pianos remained 
categorised as “luxury” items and the employees would not receive this benefit. In 
addition, the Board of Trade did not want piano firms to compete for raw materials 
with essential manufacturers. The Board of Trade was most concerned with piano 
producers competing for materials with furniture makers, particularly companies 
making furniture under the Utility Scheme. In an internal memorandum of the Board 
of Trade regarding the use of materials in furniture and piano production the author, 
Miss Cohen, mentioned that: 
…neither the existence of the priority list nor this fact should be communicated 
to the [piano] industry or to anyone who is likely to let it out. But there would 
be no harm in letting it be known that we attach more importance to an early 
increase in utility furniture production than to a resumption of piano 
production.494 
The movement of much of the piano industries’ labour force to war production work 
rekindled many of the workers’ desire to strengthen labour unions. As the Board of 
Trade was exploring the reorganisation of the industry, the relationship between piano 
manufacturers and union representation was raised. This was done by the National 
                                                 
493 Ibid, 75. 
494 Miss R.I. Cohen to Mr. Postgate, memorandum, 3 January 1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
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Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association (N.A.F.T.A.), a union which represented 
piano makers.495 A.G. Tomkins, the general secretary of N.A.F.T.A., sent a letter to 
H.A.R. Binney of the Board of Trade on 18 May 1943 in regard to post-war problems 
of the piano industry. The letter asked for the Board of Trade to include union 
representatives in future meetings with the piano industry as it was “unlikely the Piano 
Trade Export Group will invite our co-operation.” Tomkins wrote that “up until 1926 
the trade was closely organised...” but the relationship between piano manufacturers 
and union representatives had collapsed after the General Strike of 1926496 which was 
subsequently followed by a labour dispute and strike in 1927. The piano industry had 
not had contact with the union since 1927.497 The unions wanted to be included in any 
additional meetings regarding the restart of the piano industry. The Board of Trade 
responded that they would be obliged to invite the union representatives but had no 
intentions of proceeding or mitigating the relationship between the two. Although the 
union did not believe the piano industry would welcome its presence, S. A. Hurren 
was mentioned as saying that although there had been difficulties in the past, he was 
confident that his organisation would be ready at this time to co-operate with the 
N.A.F.T.A.498 This resulted in N.A.F.T.A. and other associated unions forming the 
Piano Workers Joint Committee, a group of four to five representatives who attended 
meetings of the Board of Trade in regards to the reconstruction of the piano industry.499   
 
                                                 
495 The National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association was just one of the unions which 
represented piano workers. The workers were often represented by labour groups associated with their 
particular job. N.A.F.T.A. represented men involved in carpentry, the United French Polishers Society 
represented French polishers, and the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation represented workers 
involved in making iron frames. The various groups were organised under the Trades Union 
Congress.   
496 The General Strike of 1926 lasted nine days and began on 4 May 1926. The strike was called in 
solidarity of coal miners who were in a dispute over wages. It was the only general strike in British 
history. Although it was considered a failure, the strike did cause tension between business owners 
and union leaders as it showed the potential power of organised unions. A. G. Tomkin to H.A.R. 
Binney, letter, 18 May 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives.  
497 “Note of interview with A. G. Tomkin 26/11/43,” 26 November 1943. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
498 “Internal correspondence of the Board of Trade,” 15 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National 
Archives. 
499 E. A. Fisher to A. G. Tomkins, letter, 12 April 1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
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Emphasis on Export Trade in Post-War planning  
Throughout the correspondence between the Board of Trade and the Pianoforte 
Industries and Export Group the discussion of export trade was a recurrent theme. The 
piano industry consistently warned the Board of Trade that relying on exporting pianos 
was not a viable business option for an industry which was dependent on domestic 
sales. Although warned, the Board of Trade continued to push for the piano industry 
to increase exporting pianos in the post-war years while simultaneously prohibiting 
domestic production.  
Britain’s government pushed its manufacturers to export items for a number of 
reasons. First and foremost, the country needed the influx of money, and second, 
Britain was trying to stay competitive against the USA, which was emerging as a major 
manufacturing power and as a world competitor.500 To push manufacturers to export 
their products, the U.K. government continued to control the domestic market through 
rationing, which would reached its height in 1948.501 Although the Government 
coerced manufacturers into export production through rationing, the reality was that in 
the post-war years shortages in labour and materials stymied the growth of all 
production.  
Overall, British producers historically exported mainly to countries which used the 
pound sterling. These countries are generally considered to be the “Imperial 
Preference”502 countries and in the early post-war years these countries were given 
preferential import and export tax rates. Although Britain was desperate to sell 
products for dollars, it was difficult to break into the North American market and as a 
result, Britain continued to sell products to British colonies or countries in the 
Commonwealth during the war and in the immediate post-war years.503 British 
industry initially benefitted from the cessation of German production in the early post-
war years but as that country recovered, largely thanks to help from the Marshall 
                                                 
500 Paddy Maguire, “Design on Reconstruction: British Business, Market Structures and the Role of 
Design in Post-war Recovery” Journal of Design History 30:2 (1991): 15. 
501 Ibid, 23. 
502 A term used by Maguire and designative countries with direct trading ties to the United Kingdom, 
usually as a result of being a former colony, current colony, dominion, or under the protectorate.  
503 Maguire, 22. 
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Plan,504 Britain’s exports to continental Europe diminished.505 This was compounded 
by the import of American products to these countries. The overall effect was that in 
the post-war years Britain relied more on exporting items to Commonwealth countries 
than to its European neighbours, as can be seen in the table below. 
U.K. Exports   
   
Percentage of U.K. Exports 1935 1951 
   
Commonwealth 48.0 55.5 
Canada 5.2 5.3 
Australia 6.9 12.6 
New Zealand 3.2 4.3 
South Africa 7.9 6.4 
Rhodesia 0.6 1.5 
West Africa 2.2 3.0 
Kenya 0.4 1.0 
India, Burma, Pakistan 8.9 6.7 
Malaya 1.7 3.4 
Hong Kong 0.6 1.4 
   
Non-commonwealth 52.0 44.5 
Western and Southern Europe 19.2 13.9 
Scandinavia 8.2 10.0 
Eastern Europe 3.3 0.6 
European Colonies 2.2 1.9 
United States 5.4 4.3 
Central and South America 7.5 6.2 
Others 6.4 6.5 
     
Table 11: Comparison of U.K. export values to commonwealth and non-commonwealth countries in 1935 and 
1951. Figures compiled by the author from Maguire, “Design on Reconstruction: British Business, Market 
Structures and the Role of Design in Post-war Recovery” Journal of Design History, 23. 
 
Second Hand Piano Sales 
During the war years the Board of Trade explored different scenarios that would aid 
the failing piano industry and provide revenue to piano manufacturers as they waited 
for materials to produce new pianos. One option was for piano companies to 
                                                 
504 The Marshall Plan was a U.S. Government initiative which allowed for the American Government 
to grant or loan money to war affected countries so that they could rebuild their industry and more 
quickly recover from the war. The plan based the European recovery on four main objectives: (1) a 
strong production effort by each nation, (2) internal financial stability, (3) cooperation among 
participating governments, (4) solution of external deficits by increased exports.  Mallalieu, 62. 
505 Maguire, 23. 
144 
 
recondition instruments that were no longer needed by the Entertainments National 
Service Association (E.N.S.A.). The idea was that as the war wound down, pianos 
which had been sent to military bases and canteens on British soil would no longer be 
needed as those sites would be phased out. These pianos could be sent to piano firms 
for reconditioning, which would be in accordance with material restrictions, and the 
instruments could then be sold at controlled prices to the domestic market.506 Although 
this scheme would bring in needed revenue for the industry as it waited for the return 
of its workforce and raw materials, E. A. Fisher warned that the industry may not take 
kindly to the idea of flooding the market with cheap, used pianos right at the end of 
the war.507 This was a large concern of the industry, but as material restrictions 
continued to halt the production of new pianos in the post-war years, reconditioning 
E.N.S.A. pianos (as well as instruments from N.A.A.F.I.) and other used pianos to be 
sold to the domestic market would become the primary source of income of many 
piano manufacturers.  
The Federation of British Industries: A New Champion for the Piano Industry? 
In addition to the Board of Trade, the Federation of British Industries (F.B.I.)508 began 
investigating the reconversion of the piano industry in 1943. This was part of the 
research the F.B.I. was doing in regard to the rehabilitation of industries which had 
been concentrated during the war. To gather information on the impact of 
concentration and the steps that would be necessary to convert to domestic production 
and de-concentrate industries, the organisation sent a questionnaire to S. A. Hurren of 
the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group in October 1943.509 
The questions were as follows. 
1. Are any special difficulties likely to be experienced in re-opening the factories 
of closed firms in your trade due, for example, to exceptional structural 
alterations having been made by the occupants of the factories released or to 
special agreements or leases extending beyond the period of hostilities? 
                                                 
506 Board of Trade, “Internal memorandum,” 25 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
507 Board of Trade, “Internal memorandum,” 28 October 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
508 The F.B.I. was a non-governmental organisation and represented the interests of the U.K. 
businesses. The organisation promoted business interests and lobbied the Government on behalf of 
pro-business initiatives.  
509 It is likely that the F.B.I. sent similar letters to an assortment of industries across Britain. S. A. 




2.  In the case of concentration schemes covering a whole trade: 
a. Does the scheme laid down in the compensation or similar agreement 
provide for the re-opening of closed factories, and, if so, on what terms? 
b. Does it provide for the re-allocation of controlled raw materials within 
the trade after the close of hostilities to permit (i) closed firms to restart, 
and (ii) all firms to expand output in some orderly manner? 
3. Have any preparatory arrangements been made to secure the return of 
requisitioned labour? 
4. Will any special financial assistance be needed before the closed-down firms 
can re-start operations? 
5. Would any closed down firms be likely to consider favourable proposals for 
re-opening in other and less congested areas in accordance with some national 
post-war location of industry plan? And, if so, how would the rest of the 
industry react to such a suggestion? 
6. Has your industry made any general – or detailed – examination of the probable 
post-war situation that will arise, and, if so, have any suggestions been made 
for dealing with it? 
7. Has your association any suggestions to make for dealing with de-
concentration as a national problem?510  
Hurren took the interest of the F.B.I. in the piano industry as a positive sign and sent 
out the questionnaire to the members of the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group.  
He also called an extraordinary general meeting of the group to address the 
questionnaire and members were optimistic that the F.B.I. would be able to help piano 
manufacturers in their reconversion. The questions asked by the F.B.I. emphasised 
many of the issues that the piano industry had been addressing with the Board of Trade 
throughout the war years, including the return of labour and the allocation of controlled 
raw materials. The interest of the F.B.I. in the piano industry was especially important 
to the piano firms which had been closed because of the Concentration of Industry 
Scheme.  
Unfortunately, Hurren was overly optimistic about the interest of the F.B.I. in the piano 
industry. According to correspondence in the Board of Trade papers, the questionnaire 
sent to Hurren was not meant to be shared with the entire industry, but was more in 
the way of a “personal enquiry and certainly not one for consideration by firms in the 
industry.”511 Hurren’s eagerness to find a champion for the piano industry ultimately 
failed as the F.B.I. assured the Board of Trade that they would explain the scope of the 
                                                 
510 Ibid. 
511 Internal Memorandum to Mr. Postgate, 6 November 1943. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
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enquiry to Hurren and that the Board of Trade would “not hear more of it” in the 
future.512  
Board of Trade Meeting April 1944 
On 28 April 1944 the Board of Trade met for the second time with the piano 
industry.513 Lord Forres was again the chair of the meeting and it was attended by both 
members of the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group514 and union representatives. 
The piano industry sent pre-chosen representatives including three people from piano 
manufacturing companies and four from the piano supply industry.515 Unions 
associated with the piano industry in the past, or interested in unionising sections of 
the workforce, were also invited to send representatives to the meeting.516 
Representatives from the Amalgamated Society of Wood-working Machinists, 
Amalgamated Society of Wood-workers, National Union of Musical Instrument 
Makers, National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association, and the United French 
Polisher’s Society were in attendance.517  
It is interesting to note the breakdown of interested parties at the meeting. Six people 
were present from the Board of Trade, one from the Ministry of Supply,518 three piano 
manufacturers, four representatives of the piano parts and suppliers industry, and six 
union representatives. The large showing from the unions is indicative of how much 
the unions wanted to re-establish themselves within the piano industry.  
 
 
                                                 
512 Ibid.  
513 The first meeting took place in July 1942. 
514 The Pianoforte Industries and Export Group was enlarged on 3 February 1943 to include 
manufacturers of parts and supplies and was considered by the Board of Trade to be thoroughly 
representative of the entire industry. “Brief on Post-War Reconstruction in the Piano Trade,” April 
1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
515 R. P. Brasted (Brasted Brothers), M. F. Ricketts (Chappell Piano Company), A. W. Whelpdale 
(Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd) represented the manufacturers and H. Brinsmead, W. Caite, A. E. 
Healey, and E. J. Hughes representing the suppliers. 
516 E. A. Fisher to Mr. Tomkins, memorandum, 12 April 1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
517 These unions were all part of the Piano Workers’ Joint Committee, “Agreed Minutes of Meeting at 
the Board of Trade,” 28 April 1944. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
518 This was a representative of the Directorate of Woodworking. 
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At the start of the meeting Lord Forres gave a status summary on the industry and 
introduced the objective of the meeting.  
Since 1942, apart from the provision of pianos for N.A.A.F.I. and E.N.S.A. and 
a small amount of repair and reconditioning by non-transferable labour, the 
piano trade has been closed down. Some of the works, however, now engaged 
on war contracts, are still under their piano trade managers. The Board of 
Trade’s object in this meeting is to obtain the views of the trade on the problems 
of reconstruction after the war.519 
Many of the same complaints and concerns that were raised in the 1942 Board of Trade 
meeting were again voiced by the piano industry during this meeting. This included 
the concern over the Board of Trades’ insistence on relying on exports, questions to 
the supply of raw materials – most especially wood which needed to be seasoned – the 
Purchase Tax and its potential crippling effects on post-war production, and the release 
of labour for piano production.  
The manufacturers all agreed that pianos released by the N.A.A.F.I., E.N.S.A., and the 
American Forces would all be welcomed to the piano industry for repairs and 
reconditioning. The piano industry did emphasise that if instruments were in the 
London area then they would want to evenly spread the work throughout the 
manufacturers, but the manufacturers were worried about the cost of transport versus 
the profit margin obtained through sales. That said, the industry agreed that the work 
would be very welcome revenue after the end of the war in the period in which the 
manufacturers were waiting for supplies of raw materials.  
The piano industry was informed by H. Freeman, the Directorate of Woodworking, 
that there would be no guarantee of adequate supplies of timber in the early post-war 
period. The manufacturers accepted this news but warned that this would greatly 
hamper any post-war planning of production. The industry, along with the union 
representatives, urged the Government to consider felling hardwood trees now and 
storing them for future civilian requirements. This would allow wood, such as beech, 
to begin to season in the interim and might expedite manufacture once timber controls 
were lifted. This suggestion was not followed by Freeman.   
                                                 




With such a large showing from trade unions, labour discussions were a significant 
part of the meeting. Mr. Tomkins, representing the National Amalgamated Furniture 
Trades Association, said that the labour disputes and resulting strikes of 1926 and 1927 
had been “unfortunate” and that the organisations wanted to reopen discussions with 
manufacturers. The various unions were proposing a National Joint Industrial Council 
to be created that would represent piano workers. The Board of Trade was favourable 
to the establishment of this council, but piano manufacturers were less so. Although 
the manufacturers were “anxious” to establish relations with the trade unions, they 
were hesitant to agree to a joint council as they did not know what unions their 
employees would belong to once they returned from war. They thought that this was 
not the right time for linking up with a Joint Industrial Council and would instead 
prefer to link up with the National Union of Musical Instrument Manufacturers once 
their labour force had returned. 
Finally, once again the Board of Trade urged the piano industry to invest in research 
and development. The piano industry indicated that the cost of investing in research 
was not possible given the current status of the industry. The industry was warned that 
“research was not a thing which should be sampled in half measures” and that they 
should “promote a fully equipped research organisation or be left behind.”520 It appears 
that the stern warning from the Board of Trade did not fall on deaf ears. In a February 
1945 editorial in the Music Trades Review, Eugene Sotheran reported that the industry 
set up a research committee to “help with the transition back to civilian production” 
and that “methods and materials derived from war experiences will be doubtlessly be 
introduced.”521 Although Sotheran sounded optimistic in his writing, no mention of 
the research committee is included in subsequent issues of the trade magazine.  
The piano industry was supported in its desire to have the Purchase Tax lifted by the 
trade unions. The industry projected that there would be a demand for instruments in 
the post-war years in the home market, but with the Purchase Tax, that demand would 
be completely stunted. The industry insisted that people could not afford a piano with 
a 100% tax and the British public would only be able to afford second hand pianos. 
                                                 
520 “Agreed Minutes of Meeting at the Board of Trade,” 28 April 1944. BT 64/1786. National 
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521 Eugene Sotheran, “Full Speed Ahead,” Music Trades Review, February 1945, 115. 
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Piano producers and retailers suggested that if the tax continued, only 10% of the 
projected pianos that could be produced would be sold in the home market. In addition, 
keeping a 100% Purchase Tax on the home trade would negatively affect the export 
trade. According to Hurren: 
No piano manufacturer can run his factory on the basis of only 10% of the 
normal Home Trade even if his output be augmented by the Export Trade 
(which has never exceeded 15% of total production). Unless the Purchase Tax 
is abolished the manufacturer will have to close down. Moreover, without a 
substantial Home Trade the manufacturer cannot produce his goods at a price 
which will enable him to compete in the export market and it is therefore 
useless to talk of boosting exports, unless the Home Trade is encouraged.522 
He went on to say that “It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the present tax of 
100% will kill the industry.”523  
It was impossible for the Board of Trade to respond to the piano industry in regard to 
the Purchase Tax at the time. Firstly, the country was still at war and although the allies 
had just landed in Normandy for D-Day,524 the prognosis of victory was not certain 
and the need for materials for war production was at an all-time high. Secondly, pianos 
were still considered a luxury item and as W. E. Parker put it in an internal 
memorandum “I do not know how important it is that pianos should receive special 
consideration in advance of the products of other industries.”525 In other words, pianos 
were just not that important on the list of Board of Trade priorities. 
The response given to the industry was a diplomatic one. The Board of Trade told the 
industry that they were not able at this time to give a firm answer to when the Purchase 
Tax would be repealed but the Board would bear the industry’s view in mind when 
making decisions. The Board of Trade advised the industry that the Purchase Tax 
would continue for some time after the armistice with Germany and the industry 
should prepare for alternative post-war plans.526  
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Preparing for Reconversion 
S. A. Hurren maintained his constant letter writing campaign to the Board of Trade 
throughout 1944. In his correspondence, he asked about the Purchase Tax, labour 
release, factory release, material release and many other items in hopes of learning 
what the Board of Trade had in mind in regard to restarting the industry. As piano 
manufactures resigned themselves to focus on exporting pianos as a main source of 
revenue in the post-war era, Hurren began writing about export priority.  
Hurren was worried that even though the industry was forced to rely on the export 
trade they would still be hampered by difficulties in obtaining materials and labour in 
order to build their products for export. He wrote to E. A. Fischer in June 1944 
requesting information on the possibility of the piano industry receiving post-war 
priority for the release of materials and labour. In his letter, he complained about how 
the industry was forced into a drastic concentration scheme only to be closed down 
just a few months later and how the piano industry had received no compensation for 
its losses. In addition, the industry had difficulties in obtaining war contracts because 
their labour had been largely moved to other industries. The firms which did receive 
contracts had trouble completing the work because most of their labour was again 
moved before the contracts were completed.527 He thought it only appropriate that the 
Board of Trade should compensate the industry by giving it priority in post-war 
reconstruction.528 The Board of Trade’s response was a firm “no.” Fisher reminded 
Hurren that the Board of Trade had to consider the entire post-war economy and that 
one individual industry, which employed a relatively small number of people, did not 
constitute an important enough position to be given priority. The piano industry would 
have to bide its time and wait for its turn.529 
The end of the Second World War in May and September 1945 marked the beginning 
of the long road to normalising industry within the United Kingdom. Much of the 
reconversion of Britain’s total war economy had been planned by the Ministry of 
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Reconstruction, under Lord Woolton. This cabinet post was created by Winston 
Churchill in November 1943 to oversee the needs of the British people in the post-war 
years.530 The task of this ministry was monumental and it worked alongside the Board 
of Trade and the Ministry of Labour and National Service in designing the post-war 
economy. The Board of Trade was charged with organising industrial reconversion, as 
well as ensuring the needs of the civilian population. Within this large remit, the piano 
industry was a very minor concern.   
The “Brief on Post-War Reconstruction in the Piano Trade” authored by the Board of 
Trade in 1944 shows that the Government was well aware of the obstacles in restarting 
the piano industry. The brief outlines the factors impacting the reconstruction of the 
trade and included concentration, lack of materials, release and retooling of factories, 
ending of government contracts, return of labour and training of new labour, and the 
Purchase Tax. The brief indicates that although the Government was aware of the 
needs of the industry, there was little it could do to help in the transition to post-war 
production as priorities lay elsewhere during a time of rationing and austerity.531  
The brief stated that at the end of the war much of the reconversion of the piano 
industry would be dependent on the speed at which other industries could return to 
normal production.  For example, de-concentrating piano companies would be 
dependent on transferring labour out of factories that were taken over for war work. 
This labour could not be transferred until the men and women leaving war work had 
jobs to which to return and these jobs would need to be in industries which were given 
priority status. The companies which had their factories requisitioned would also need 
to wait to regain control of their premises as the same criteria was applied to the release 
of factory space as with labour. Piano companies whose premises had been turned over 
to other companies or government industries for war production needed to apply for 
the release of their factory space. This was done with The Control of Factory & Storage 
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Premises section of the Board of Trade.532 Without permission from this organisation, 
piano factories could not begin the reconversion process.  
The Board of Trade stated that the resumption of supplies would only occur gradually 
and seasoned wood would be in short supply for years to come. Compounding the lack 
of materials, the Machine Tool Control Division expected a heavy demand for 
replacement of woodworking machinery after the war and it would be difficult for the 
piano industry to obtain the necessary machinery. Because of these circumstances, the 
Board of Trade recommended that the piano industry would have to rely on 
refurbishing used pianos as its main source of domestic revenue in the post-war years. 
When raw materials eventually became available, the production of new instruments 
would be restricted to the export trade. The Board of Trade acknowledged that this 
would be difficult for the piano industry as exports had not been a large portion of the 
British piano market and that the industry faced challenges because they did not have 
representation in other markets and had relied mainly on exporting to Commonwealth 
countries in the past.533  
The reconversion of the piano industry was a slow and at times a painful process. In 
the final year of the war, piano makers continued to advocate for better positioning 
within the Board of Trade’s priority listing, but overall, the industry resigned itself to 
waiting for the reconversion process to begin. During this last phase of the war, 
companies without war production contracts focused their attention on reconditioning 
used pianos for the domestic market. A small victory for the industry was when they 
were able to have pianos recognised as “instruments of art” in the New General 
Furniture Order of August 1944. This designation meant that pianos would not be 
under the same regulations as other types of furniture and that companies would have 
the right to provide hire purchase agreements to customers.534 Another important facet 
of this designation was that reconditioned, restored, or rebuilt pianos would not be 
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liable to the Purchase Tax in the domestic market. This exemption bolstered the piano 
industries’ interest in selling second hand pianos.535 To reduce the possibility of price 
gauging, the maximum price of second hand instruments was set by the Board of Trade 
the following month.536  
It appears that the Board of Trade was attempting to help the piano industry during the 
last year of the war when it informed the trade that it would consider applications for 
early resumption of manufacture for instruments to be sold in the export market.537 In 
January 1944, the Board of Trade’s interest in starting a small export trade in pianos 
continued when it asked S. A. Hurren if any of the piano companies were able to supply 
grand pianos to be sold to Spain by June of that year. Out of the entire industry, only 
three companies were able to send an affirmative reply. Triumph Auto pianos said that 
they could supply three small grands.538 Monington & Weston was able to supply four 
grands, subject to the company obtaining the iron frames for the instruments.539  
Cramer replied that the company could provide 15 instruments.540  
Two piano companies, Chappell Piano Company and Challen & Sons, sent separate 
letters expressing their regret as to not being able to supply the instruments. The 
responses neatly summarised the difficult situation of individual piano firms and that 
even though the Board of Trade was well intentioned in trying to start piano 
manufacturing in a small scale, this was not possible unless material restrictions were 
lifted. Chappell wrote that although the company had nine grand pianos “laid down”541 
they only had five actions, two sets of keys, seven sets of hammers, and more 
importantly they had “no parts, no strings, and no frames.” The company had been 
deprived of all of it working staff and had only seven elderly employees.542 Challen 
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wrote that after contacting the suppliers Herrburger Brooks Ltd. (action and key 
maker) and Crown Foundry Ltd. (iron frame maker) that those industries would not be 
able to obtain permission from the Ministry of Supply to provide parts to the piano 
industry on a reasonably large scale and that orders for small quantities would “not be 
entertained.” The company stated that it was unlikely that the piano industry would be 
able to restart in a small way because their suppliers would not provide parts.543  
 
The Post-War Era 
When the war finally drew to a close, the piano industry was at an impasse as it 
continued to wait to resume full production. At the end of the war the industry had 
been given permission to manufacture a limited number of instruments for export, but 
material rationing was in full force and even if a company was able to secure the 
materials needed to manufacture a piano for export, it was difficult to obtain an export 
licence. Domestically the Purchase Tax continued at the rate of 100% and production 
for the home market remained prohibited. The limitations place on the piano industry 




As previously stated, the Board of Trade encouraged the piano industry to prepare to 
manufacture pianos for export in the post-war era. To help the industry increase their 
export numbers, as of 19 February 1945, pianos were no longer controlled under the 
Export of Goods (Control) Orders and a limited amount of materials were made 
available to the industry to manufacture pianos for export.544  Additionally, the piano 
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industry was able to retain labour made redundant by the completion of war production 
contracts as long as the retained men were manufacturing pianos for export.545  
The provisions granted to the industry for the manufacture of pianos for export were a 
source of frustration. According to Eugene Sotheran, although the industry was 
granted permission to manufacture 10,000 pianos for export, there was no guarantee 
from the Board of Trade that export licences would be granted. Materials continued to 
be difficult to obtain and the timber allotted for the manufacture of pianos was totally 
“unsuited to the purpose as it was unseasoned and of poor quality.”546  
In March 1946 the inability of the piano industry to sell their newly made pianos 
overseas because of the lack of export licences culminated in the publication of an 
open letter to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, printed in the Music Trades Review. 
The letter addressed the lack of export licences provided for the industry and stated 
that although thousands of pianos had been produced, only “less than one hundred had 
left Britain, with the remainder taking up valuable space in factories waiting to be 
shipped.”547  Surprisingly, the open letter yielded results and in 1947 the industry was 
granted an increase in export licences.548 Interestingly, Sotheran’s claims that “less 
than one hundred pianos had left Britain” was a complete hyperbole. According to 
statistics printed in the Music Trades Review, in 1946 the piano industry exported 
6,922 instruments. In 1947 piano exports increased to 11,341 instruments with the total 
value of £910,946.549 This is a dramatic increase in the exports of British pianos 
compare to the start of the war. Overall the export value for 1947 was nine times the 
value of pianos exported in 1939, when the piano industry exported 3,236 pianos 
valued at £100,973.550 The difference in the total value of exports between 1939 and 
1947 also shows how the cost of a piano increased. In 1939 the average cost of a piano 
for export was £31.20 per piano, but in 1947 the average cost was £80.32 per piano. 
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In 1947 the Export Promotion Department of the Board of Trade reopened the British 
Industries Fair. The fair had been cancelled during the previous eight years but in order 
to promote British products, the fair ran from 5 to 16 May at Olympia and Earls Court, 
London.551 According to Sotheran, a large number of piano manufacturers exhibited 
at the fair and their stands showed a variety of instruments including “a piano that 
utilised the bicycle break to the operation of the piano pedals, mini pianos in a variety 
of colours, and instruments that used materials that would ensure durability in tropical 
climates.” He commended piano manufacturers for showcasing their instruments 
“despite the lack of materials or incentive to even show up since production is still 
very limited.”552  
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Sotheran’s mention of instruments that could ensure durability in tropical climates was 
a direct result of advances in materials gained from the war effort. These included heat 
resistant glues which had been developed for aircraft building and plastics which were 




being used for keys and actions.553 Manufacturers who were using these materials 
included Kemble and Company whose listing in the British Industries Fair’s catalogue 
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The efforts of the piano industry in their export sales did not go unnoticed by the Board 
of Trade and on 26 May 1948 the industry received a letter of thanks from Harold 
Wilson, president of the Board of Trade. In the letter Wilson wrote:  
For some time past I have turned eagerly to the “Piano” entry on the export 
side of our monthly Trade Accounts as one of the brightest spots in the story 
of our export effort. Then the other day at the B.I.F. [British Industries Fair] I 
was able to see for myself some of the excellent products of your industry and 
to meet some of the members of your Group who were exhibiting there. I was 
very glad of this opportunity because it brought to life and strengthened the 
happy impression I had already formed from the figures.  
I felt I should like to write and send through my thanks to the industry for all 
they are doing in these difficult days to add to our country’s earnings. The spirit 
of this industry in devoting its entire output to the export market and keeping 
the figures up in face of all difficulties is a fine thing to see and a noble example 
of what can be done.555  
The export trade continued to increase in the post-war years and in 1948 the piano 
industry exported 13,297 pianos valued at £1,191,388.556 In May 1950 William Evans, 
President of the Piano Manufacturers Association, stated that the British piano industry 
could claim that is was responsible for 75% of the world’s export of pianos.557 
 
Imports  
Some of the growth of the export trade was a result of the reduction of restrictions and 
then revocation of the Trading with the Enemy Act in July 1946.558 But, as the British 
piano industry was able to export to expanding markets, the country also began to 
increase imports. As imports increased, piano manufacturers began to worry about 
potential competition from imported pianos from foreign manufacturers.559 These 
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fears would be compounded by the stipulations of the Marshall Plan, which 
encouraged Britain to trade with its former enemies. The biggest cause for concern for 
the piano industry was that German pianos would once again dominate the market in 
the post-war era.  
Even before the end of the war, the piano industry was writing about the potential 
impact of an influx of German pianos, especially as British makers were still banned 
from selling to the home market. Kemble and Co. even penned an anti-German poem 
that began running in its advertisements in 1944 warning the British public about the 
potential influx of German pianos. It read: 
 
There’ll be Kemble’s needed by the score 
When our lads have won the war. 
Kemble plans are well away 
For when we reach that happy day 
When sounds of bombing disappear 
And sirens wail the last “all clear”. 
Should Huns their goods then try to sell 
We hope you’ll answer, 
“Go to H__L”560 
The concern of an influx of German products was justified as there was precedent for 
this occurring after the First World War. In actuality, the damage inflicted on German 
industry during the Second World War far exceeded that of British war damage and it 
would be many years before a German piano was imported to British soil.561  
Czechoslovakia was another country which the British piano industry feared. In 
November 1947 Sotheran wrote in the Music Trades Review: 
Since British luxury good are still marked for export only the trade is scared 
that foreign goods will be imported including pianos.  Housewives cannot buy 
British china but can buy Czech dishes – will the same happen for pianos?562  
In reality, when imports increased, it was done gradually through the Token Import 
Scheme. The scheme, which began in 1946, set a quota for each specified country 
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granted permission to import items into the United Kingdom. The quota was 20% of 
the value of each manufacturer’s average trade with the United Kingdom from 1936 
to 1938. Initially the items imported into the country were mainly raw materials and 
food. In addition, countries which were part of the Token Import Scheme had to offer 
an adequate return of trade with the U.K.563 By March 1948 some of the countries 
participating in the scheme included Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia 
Denmark, Finland, France, Holland, India, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Pakistan, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.S.A.564 
In April 1947 Germany was included in the Token Import Scheme and companies were 
able to apply for import licences from any zone in Germany.565 The addition of 
Germany to the scheme raised alarm for the industry. Although British piano makers 
were told by representatives of the Board of Trade that “piano makers in Germany 
were still not in any state to impose a threat to British piano makers,” the Piano 
Manufacturers Association warned British manufacturers “to keep their eye on 
Germany production.”566   
 
Domestic Production and the Purchase Tax 
The return to piano production for the home trade was the ultimate goal of the piano 
industry and the industry remained confident that the demand for new pianos would 
be “instant and insistent all over the country.”567 But, even if the industry was allowed 
to resume production for the home market, the success of piano sales was reliant upon 
the revocation of the Purchase Tax. The hope for a speedy removal of the Purchase 
Tax was dashed by Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer when he said:  
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I must confess I do not regard this as a temporary tax or as a wartime aberration 
to be swept away. On the contrary, my view is that the Purchase Tax has got to 
stay and yield an increasing revenue over the next few years.568 
 
Even though the piano industry continued to be prohibited from manufacturing new 
instruments for the home market, the industry was preparing for the eventual day when 
this trade would resume. In preparation for resumption of the home trade, 
manufacturers and dealers met at the Music Trades Association conference to discuss 
what pianos should be produced. The general consensus was that manufacturers would 
make miniature pianos (3’ 2”), small uprights (3’ 10”) and baby grand pianos.569   
In 1947 the piano industry was granted a special licence to sell what were called 
“frustrated exports” to the home market. These were pianos that were “unexportable 
because of failure of transport or other causes.” What should have been a reason for 
celebration quickly turned sour as the new pianos were subject to the 100% Purchase 
Tax and were unaffordable as the cost of the new pianos was between £175 and 
£200.570 (As a matter of context, the Ford Anglia, the cheapest four-door car available 
in Britain in October 1948 cost £310, and the average house price in Britain in 1950 
was £1,940.)571 Sotheran expressed his exasperation at the continued taxation of pianos 
and lamented that the industry could not expect the tax to be removed with the 
“almighty dollar pressing so heavily upon us.”572 In total, licences were granted for 
333 pianos to be sold, but as of 31 December 1948, only 271 of these pianos had been 
“disposed of” to dealers. It was noted in the Music Trades Review that no one knew if 
the dealers had actually sold the instruments or still had them in their shops.573  
In September 1948 the Purchase Tax was lowered to 66⅔%.574 Although this was a 
move in the right direction, the tax was still prohibitive to domestic sales and stagnated 
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the industry. At the end of 1948 the piano industry’s entire labour force totalled 1,977 
people with 1,547 males, 267 females (employed mainly in clerical work), and 163 
juveniles.575 The total labour force is less than one-third of the number of employees 
that Stanley Hurren had estimated the industry would require in the post-war years 
when he wrote to the Board of Trade in 1943.576 This illustrates the slow rate of 
recovery of the industry. 
The resumption of the home trade finally occurred in July 1949,577 when, for the period 
of 1 July through 30 September, the industry was allowed to sell 15% of its pre-war 
quota.  The licence was then extended to 31 December 1949 and the quota was 
increased to 20%.578 Although this marked the beginning of the resumption of the 
home trade, the Purchase Tax made the cost of the piano “outside the pockets of all 
but a very small section of the public,”579 and the cost of the cheapest piano available 
to the public was £150.580   
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Piano repair work was also affected by the Purchase Tax. If a piano was being repaired 
and new parts were added to the instrument, the parts were subject to the tax. For 
example, if a new set of hammers were to be placed into a piano, the cost of those 
hammers broke down as follows.  
 
Figure 11. Resumption of Home Trade Announcement, Music Trades Review, July 1949. 
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Cost of Replacement Hammers including Purchase Tax 
 £ s. d. £ s. d. 
Set of hammers    2 9 6 
Postage      9 
    2 10 3 
Invoice 2 10 3    
Uplift tax of 20%  10 0    
Purchase Tax of 66⅔% on  3 0 3 2 0 2 
    £4 10 5 
 
Table 12. Purchase Tax figures on a new set of replacement hammers. Figures found in Music Trades Review, June 
1950, 442.   
 
The tax made not only purchasing a new instrument, but also repairing old instruments 
if new parts were required prohibitive. According to Sotheran because of the lack of 
sales, the Purchase Tax was making it difficult to recruit young people as technicians 
or replace the skilled craftsmen who are needed to recondition existing instruments, 
and that “until this is abolished our industry is formed to fight against impossible 
odds.”581 
The Purchase Tax remained at 66⅔% until October 1952 when it was lowered to 
33⅓%.582 In April 1953 the tax was finally removed. The total abolition of the 
Purchase Tax gave the industry hope and was seen as a turning point and beginning of 
a new era, an era “in which the public and professional can get the new instruments 
that are needed.”583 
The removal of the tax led to an upsurge in sales, with an uplift from 184 piano sold 
in March 1953 to 440 pianos sold in April after the ban was lifted.  But, even with the 
Purchase Tax removed, British-made pianos were still expensive to purchase with the 
cheapest model selling for £120. According to the industry the high cost of pianos was 
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due to the cost of labour and materials, which had risen fantastically during the war, 
and that the skilled labour force had been reduced in number causing the production 
rate to slow down. If the piano industry was to lower the cost of a piano, the rate of 
production would have to increase, but production would only increase if there was 
demand for pianos and the labour to build them.584 After the reopening of sales to the 
home market, the British piano industry agreed that it would have to continue to rely 
on export sales. This would be the main focus of the piano industry until an increase 
in production rates could lower the cost of the piano and once again make them 
affordable to the British people. Unfortunately, before the industry was able to lower 
the cost of pianos for the home market, a new form of competition had emerged which 
would come to dominate the domestic entertainment scene.  
 
The Television and Other Forms of Popular Entertainment Effects on Post-War 
Piano Sales 
As the industry struggled with the difficult post-war situation, a new form of 
competition came on the market. In 1946, the BBC started its television service. 
Although initially the television industry was slow to build as its price made it 
unaffordable to all but the wealthiest of the British public, the popularity of the 
television would expand exponentially in the post-year years.  
The television was not the first device to compete with the piano’s prominent place as 
a means of entertainment and source of music in the British home. Prior to the First 
World War the gramophone had begun to impact the market and soon “people with no 
musical talent preferred the gramophone” to owning a piano. After the First World 
War radios became increasingly popular and by the 1930s a large portion of the public 
preferred this type of entertainment.585 The availability and affordability of radios to 
the public in the years following the Second World War was a point of contention in 
the piano industry. By 1953 the price of a radio had risen 50% above the 1939 price, 
whereas the price of a piano, even after the repeal of the Purchase Tax, had risen 
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200%.586 The popularity of both the gramophone and the radio was noticeable in the 
amount of coverage both items received in the Music Trades Review. Throughout the 
1930s, 40s, and 50s the number of articles discussing gramophones and the radio 
continued to increase in the trade publication while conversely the space dedicated to 
the piano industry shrank.587  
The first television service began in 1946 and was limited to London. The televisions 
themselves were expensive and by the end of 1947 nearly half of television owners 
were from the top 12% of the income distribution of the United Kingdom. But, the 
price of a television set fell dramatically and by 1953 people from all income groups 
were purchasing televisions and eventually television ownership became more 
representative of the whole population.588 The increase in the growth of television 
ownership can be seen in the chart below. 
The Growth of the Television Public in the United Kingdom 1947-1955 
  Estimated 
Numbers of 
Adults with TV 
TV Public as 
Proportion of Total 
Adults 
   % 
At the end of - 1947 80,000 0.2 
 1948 260,000 0.7 
 1949 670,000 1.8 
 1950 1,660,000 4.3 
 1951 3,250,000 8.7 
 1952 5,250,000 14.0 
 1953 8,160,000 21.8 
 1954 11,505,000 30.6 
 1955 14,925,000 39.8 
 
Table 13. The Growth of the Television Public in the United Kingdom 1947-1955. Numbers courtesy of B. P. 
Emmett, "The Television Audience in the United Kingdom" Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 
119:3 (1956): 286. 
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By 1950 the piano industry was beginning to worry about the competition of this new 
entertainment medium. At this time, pianos were available to the domestic market, but 
the instruments were subject to a 66⅔% Purchase Tax, making even a small upright 
piano unaffordable to most buyers. Because new pianos were so expensive, the 
demand for second hand pianos was high and retailers were willing to accept unwanted 
pianos as partial payments for television sets. As piano owners traded in their used 
pianos for televisions, piano makers had to accept that the days of the supremacy of 
the piano in the British home were over.589 Ironically, the Board of Trade’s emphasis 
on expanding export trade actually helped the British piano industry as it competed 
with television as a form of entertainment. By this time companies no longer relied 
mostly on sales to the home market, but had developed strong export markets instead. 
The British piano was no longer made for the British public but instead for buyers in 
Australia, South Africa, and South America.590 
It is interesting that the piano industry was so focused on the development of the 
television in the Music Trades Review. Although the television played a part in 
diminishing the status of the piano in the home, other instruments, forms of 
entertainment, and technologies would prove to be much more damaging to piano 
sales. Technical advancements of audio technologies in the 1940s, many of which were 
a direct result of research undertaken for the war effort, further increased audio 
recording and broadcasting technologies. This included advancement in magnetic tape 
technology, which was “liberated” from Germany during the war, and the unveiling of 
the transistor by U.S.-based Bell Telephone in June 1948. The transistor changed the 
scope of amplification as vacuum tubes, made of glass and prone to overheating 
causing them to break, were no longer needed. This allowed radios and amplifiers 
(important for the development of the electric instruments) to become more robust, 
dependable, and much more portable.591   
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In September 1948, the “long playing” 33-rpm record (the LP) was released and was 
quickly followed by the 45-rpm record in March 1949. These new vinyl records were 
lighter and more durable than their shellac predecessors, had better sound quality, and 
a 33-rpm could play up to 25 minutes per side. The LPs were relatively inexpensive to 
produce and their durability allowed the disks to be distributed with less fear of 
breakage, ultimately allowing them to be shipped across larger distances, such as 
across the Atlantic.592 The LP quickly became the staple of radio programming, but 
also became the preferred medium of the music industry to distribute music to the 
public. With the growing youth culture movement and the emergence of rock and roll 
in the 1950s and expansion to Great Britain in the 1960s, record sales in the U.K. 
steadily increased in the post-war era.593 Although Great Britain still faced austerity 
measures immediately after the war, by 1955 record sales594 equalled a total of $59.9 
million. This increased to $72.7 million in 1960, and by 1970 record sales were valued 
at $114.0 million; a 90% increase in sales in 15 years.595 As record sales continued to 
rise, the LP became the dominant product of the music industry as a whole, eclipsing 
sheet music, which would have previously been played on the family piano.596  
Additionally, instruments like the guitar, both electric and acoustic, and the drums rose 
in prominence in the post-war years. These instruments were more affordable than 
pianos, easy to obtain, portable, relatively easy to learn, and most importantly, were 
played in rock and roll.   
 
Summary 
Government restrictions on piano production brought on by the Second World War 
continued until 1953. Although the Board of Trade began planning the reconversion 
of the industry as early as 1942, the economic reality of post-war Britain resulted in 
the continued limitation of piano production as resources, materials, and labour were 
funnelled to industries which manufactured priority items such as furniture and 
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housing. The piano industry, which produced luxury items, was forced to wait to 
resume domestic manufacturing and instead was encouraged to expand its export trade 
in order to bring in much needed revenue.  
After the end of the war piano manufacturers continued to be effected by material 
restrictions and costs, difficulty in attracting labour, and the Purchase Tax, which made 
the cost of new pianos unaffordable to the British public. During this time the industry 
focused its attention on exporting pianos and the rise in the export trade kept many of 
the companies in business in the post-war years. Even after restrictions and taxes were 
lifted on piano production for the home market, the price of a piano remained high as 
the industry struggled to increase output in order to lower prices. The prohibitive cost 
of new pianos made them less appealing to the domestic buyer and as televisions 
became more popular and affordable, this new form of entertainment began to take the 





Chapter 6: John Broadwood and Sons Case Study 
 
By the outbreak of the Second World War, John Broadwood and Sons, one of the 
oldest names in the British piano industry, had survived numerous crises in its history 
including competition from within London, imports of foreign-made pianos, economic 
downturns, the First World War, international recession, the introduction of the 
gramophone, company restructuring, and even licensing to another piano maker. The 
company had been on the brink of liquidation in the past and had survived, but with 
the threat of another great war on the horizon, there was a distinct possibility that 
Broadwood and Sons might close forever.       
 
Historical Overview 
The history of John Broadwood and Sons can be traced back to the founding of the 
harpsichord making business of Burkat Shudi, who established his business in 1728.597 
John Broadwood, originally from Cockburnspath, Scotland, moved to London and 
began working for Shudi in 1761.598 He married Shudi’s daughter, Barbara, eight years 
later and became a partner in the business in 1770. In 1771 Burkat retired, and the firm 
became known as Shudi & Broadwood.599 After Burkat Shudi’s death in 1773, 
Broadwood became the senior partner with Shudi’s son, also named Burkat, the junior 
partner.  When Shudi the younger died in 1803, Broadwood became the owner of the 
firm and the instruments were signed “Johannes Broadwood.”600 
When Broadwood began working with Shudi, the preference of keyboard instruments 
was transitioning from the harpsichord to the piano. Broadwood steered the company 
toward the production of pianos and began to manufacture square pianos in 1771. He 
                                                 
597Shudi was an immigrant from Switzerland who moved to England in 1718.  His name is also 
spelled Tschudi and Tshudi. Donald Howard Boalch, “Shudi, Burkat,” Grove Music Online (Oxford 
University Press, n.d.), http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/25679. 
598 Broadwood was born on 6 October 1732 in Cockburnspath, a village near Haddington, Scotland, 
although some sources list Haddington as Broadwood’s place of birth.  Derek Adlam and Cyril 
Ehrlich, “Broadwood,” Grove Music Online, n.d. 
599 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 30. 
600 Boalch, “Shudi, Burkat.” 
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Broadwood built his first grand piano in 1781 and these early instruments share many 
similarities with the shape of the firm’s harpsichords. Although the outer form looks 
in many ways like a harpsichord, the inside of the instrument contained the important 
piano action.602  Broadwood continued to be an innovator in the design of pianos and 
in 1783 he introduced a foot pedal that could lift the dampers, as well as adding a 
moderator pedal that softened the sound of the instrument by pressing a cloth pad 
against the strings.603 His improvements to the piano, combined with the growing 
popularity of the instrument, influenced the firm’s halt of harpsichord production in 
1793.   
 
 
                                                 
601 In 1781 Broadwood placed the wrest plank along the back of the case, instead of along the right 
hand side. This increased the volume of the instrument and soon other makers adopted this style of 
manufacturing. Dolge, 49. 
602 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 59. 
603 Ibid., 33. 
Figure 20. Square piano by Broadwood and Son c. 1790, 
MIMEd 4340. This is a typical square piano of the time. Image 













In 1795 the company changed its name to “John Broadwood & Son” after James Shudi 
Broadwood became a partner.  In 1798, James Shudi Broadwood remarked on the 
continued growth of the popularity of the piano: “Would to God we could make them 
like muffins!” 604 Pianos became so popular that by 1802 the firm was making around 
400 instruments a year.605  Broadwood’s third son, Thomas Broadwood, became a 
partner in 1808 and the firm went through its final name change, becoming “John 
Broadwood & Sons.”606    
John Broadwood died in 1812 and the firm remained in the hands of the two brothers.  
They continued to expand the business to meet the demands of the English market and 
by 1820 the company produced more than 1000 square and 400 grand pianos a year.607  
The brothers also continued to improve upon the design of the instrument with the 
introduction of steel tension bars above the strings in 1823 and then a combined iron 
                                                 
604 Isacoff, 52. 
605 This is in comparison to only 20 harpsichords a year produced under Shudi.  Wainwright, The 
Piano Makers, 31. 
606 Derek Adlam and Cyril Ehrlich, “Broadwood,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online (Oxford 




Figure 21. Piano by Johannes Broadwood 
Londini 1793, MIMEd 4490.  This piano 
has similarities with the harpsichord made 
in the same year in decoration and design. 
Image courtesy of the University of 
Edinburgh. 
Figure 22. Harpsichord by Johannes 
Broadwood Londini 1793, MIMEd 4319.  
This harpsichord is thought to be the last 
harpsichord made by Broadwood. Image 
courtesy of the University of Edinburgh. 
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hitch-pin plate with cross bar system in 1827.608 The company continued to expand 
the compass of the instrument, increasing the number of keys. 
The zenith of Broadwood’s production came in the 1840s.  At that time Broadwood 
was one of the twelfth-largest employers in London and the company could produce 
up to 2,500 pianos a year.609  England itself was at the centre of the piano world, with 
an estimated 200 piano makers in and around London.610  But, Broadwood’s time as a 
leader in the British piano trade was about to come to an end.   
The first chink in Broadwood’s armour was at the Great Exhibition of 1851 when 
Broadwood was beaten for the Gold Medal for piano manufacture by the French piano 
manufacturer Pierre Erard.611  Erard had factories in both Paris and London and his 
piano sales quickly rivalled English manufacturers.612 Competition from makers such 
as Erard combined with Broadwood’s stagnation when it came to innovation pushed 
Broadwood from its place as the pre-eminent British piano manufacturer.  While many 
manufacturers were adapting to making upright pianos, Broadwood continued to 
concentrate on the growingly unfashionable square piano.  The company also was slow 
to integrate the use of a full iron plate or over-stringing of the bass strings.613  To top 
it off, the company’s factory on Horseferry Road, Westminster, burned to the ground 
on 12 August 1856.  Nearly 1000 instruments were destroyed; the factory was beyond 
salvaging and the workmen lost their tools – items that were personally owned. Only 
200 instruments survived, along with the stocks of pine and ebony.  Everything else 
was lost.614   
 
 
                                                 
608 Dolge, Pianos and Their Makers, 70. 
609 “John Broadwood and Sons,” accessed April 7, 2014, http://www.broadwood.co.uk/history.html. 
610 Dolge, Pianos and Their Makers, 173. 
611 Adlam and Ehrlich, “Broadwood.” 
612 Amy Griffiths and Richard Macnutt, “Erard,” Grove Music Online, Oxford Music Online, accessed 
April 7, 2014, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/42471. 
613 Broadwood attempted to create its own framed piano with the barless grand of 1888.  The company 
finally began over-stringing the bass strings in 1897. Adlam and Ehrlich, “Broadwood.” 






























Table 14. Sales figures of  Broadwood and Sons 1844-1853. The height of 
production was in 1845 when Broadwood had over $120,000 of total sales.  
Sales then declined from 1846-1850. Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 
163. 
Table 15. Sales figures of Broadwood and Sons 1853-1860.  The worst year of sales 




In the late nineteenth century, Broadwood, along with all of the British piano 
manufacturers, had to compete with an influx of foreign-made pianos, the majority of 
which came from Germany. In 1860, England imported circa 20,000 German-made 
pianos,615 from more than 200 piano factories that had opened in Germany between 
1850 and 1890.616 In addition to German-made instruments, American-made pianos 
were beginning to be imported into England. This includes Steinway & Sons who, in 
1890, received its first Royal Warrant.  After the granting of the warrant members of 
the royalty, including Queen Victoria and the Prince and Princess of Wales, who had 
previously been supplied pianos by Broadwood and Sons, owned Steinways.617 
Another potential threat to Broadwood and Sons was the development of the player 
piano, which was introduced to London by the Aeolian Company in 1899.  The 
Aeolian’s instrument the Pianola was very popular, even though it cost much more 
than a regular piano. In this case, Broadwood responded to the demand for player 
pianos and was one of the few British manufacturers of the instruments. Broadwood 
produced the Artistone player piano, which sold for between £84 and £125618 and first 
appeared in showrooms in January 1907.619 The Artistone was a success and 
Broadwood became one of the leaders in the player-piano industry.620 
During the first decade of the twentieth century the company was financially solvent 
and maintaining a steady stream of manufacturing.  Although German pianos 
continued to be the biggest competitor for the company, growing anti-German 
sentiment was proving positive for the sale of British pianos.  Even though British 
makers were benefitting from the nationalistic and inclusionary sentiments of the early 
twentieth century, the reality was that these same makers imported and used German 
piano parts for their instruments and Broadwood was no exception.  When the First 
World War was declared on 4 August 1914, Broadwood was no longer able to receive 
shipments from its German and French suppliers and it looked as though piano 
                                                 
615 Dolge, Pianos and Their Makers, 173. 
616 Wainwright, The Piano Makers, 122. 
617 Ibid., 123. 
618 Ibid., 128. 
619 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 207. 
620 Ibid., 277. 
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production would come to a complete stop.621 As the war progressed there were major 
disruptions to piano production, a switch to war production, and an influx of female 
workers at the Broadwood factory.622 
The lack of imports and an import duty of 33⅓% on goods caused the company to 
revert to manufacturing its own piano actions, as it was no longer able to receive 
shipments from its Paris supplier.623 The company also turned to other British 
manufacturers for parts that could no longer be imported from Germany.624 Overall, 
material shortages and rationing had the largest impact on the production of 
instruments during the war.  Additionally, the prices of materials, when available, were 
largely inflated, affecting the price of pianos and causing the public to accuse the 
industry of “profiteering in wartime.”625  
The gender of the workforce also changed because of the war.  As factory workers 
joined the military, women began to be hired.  By November 1915, women were hired 
to work on the shop floor and by February 1916 these women were working in upright 
piano finishing, regulating, French polishing, and key manufacturing.  By October 
1916, the women, along with older men who were not fit for military duty, 
manufactured around 20 uprights and 4 grand pianos a week. By 1917 this was reduced 
to 15 uprights a week and the production of grand pianos was stopped.626 In March 
1918, Broadwood stopped manufacturing pianos, not because of lack of demand or 
materials, but because the company had switched completely to war production. 627 
Broadwood received its first war production contract from Vickers & Co. in December 
1914 for the production of tool and ammunition boxes, which it continued to produce 
throughout the war.628 In 1915, the company began making aircraft propellers.  The 
                                                 
621 Many piano companies imported various parts of instruments from Germany.  This included piano 
actions, hammers, wire, keys, wrest planks, and hitch pins.  This tradition continues today with many 
piano makers, including Steinway & Sons, who use German-made Abel hammers for their 
instruments.  Ibid. 
622 For a more detailed account of Broadwood and Sons manufacturing during the First World War, 
see Wainwright’s Broadwood by Appointment which elucidates the various contracts, production 
rates, and difficulties faced by the company during the time.  
623 During this time Broadwood imported piano actions from Herrburger in Paris.  
624 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 278. 
625 Ibid, 279. 
626 Ibid, 284. 
627 Ibid, 283. 
628 Ibid, 279 
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production of aircraft parts expanded to manufacturing nacelles,629 skids, fuselages, 
wings, ailerons,630 undercarriages, cowlings,631 and bomb cells for companies 
including Airco, de Havilland, Rolls Royce, Royal Aircraft Factory, and Hendon 
Aircraft Factory.632  By March 1918, the company had aircraft contracts worth 
£90,000, and the company switched to total war production to meet the demands of 













When the war ended in November 1918, the company was quick to convert back to 
piano production, but a shortage of raw materials, especially metal frames, hampered 
the return to normal domestic manufacturing. As trade and materials trended towards 
pre-war levels, the company predicted that it could produce 3,000 pianos in 1920.634  
Unfortunately, this projection did not become a reality. Firstly, the company was not 
able to produce pianos because of limitations on materials and secondly, in the spring 
                                                 
629 A nacelle is the casing that holds engine, fuel, or equipment on an airplane.  
630 An aileron is the hinged flap on a wing that controls movement on the longitudinal axis. 
631 A cowling is the covering of an engine.  
632 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 280-283.  
633 Ibid, 283. 
634 Ibid, 288. 
Figure 23. Interior of the Old Ford Factory, showing Broadway and 
Sons employees manufacturing aircraft propellers, 1915. Wainwright, 
Broadwood by Appointment, 279. 
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of 1920, factory workers went on strike for 12 weeks. The strike was detrimental to 
the company, and after the strike Broadwood laid off one-third of its workforce. By 
the end of the strike, Broadwood only had 17 piano orders on-hand and the factory 
switched to manufacturing office desks, telephone switchboards, and even photo 
frames in order to stay in business.635 
Over the next six years, the company’s prospects began to improve.  By the summer 
of 1922, the firm was manufacturing close to 300 instruments, but the company was 
in heavy debt and had not yet returned to profitability.636 The first year that the 
company would return a profit was 1927 but sadly this did not last long.  By 1928, the 
company was once again experiencing difficulties as the player piano industry was 
losing its footing to wireless radio and electric gramophones.637 The financial situation 
of the company worsened as the Great Depression took hold, and the company was 
plagued by rumours that it was on the verge of closing down, making it even more 
difficult to sell orders.638 The situation was bleak and in 1931, the company decided to 
reorganise.   
As part of the reorganisation of the company the production of Broadwood pianos was 
taken over by Challen, and according to William Evans of Challen, “our desire would 
be to put the Broadwood piano where we feel it rightly belongs, as the premier British 
instrument.” Unfortunately, this reorganisation caused all but two dozen Broadwood 
craftsmen to be laid off, with the remaining workers were transferred to the Challen 
factory known as “The Hyde” in Hendon. Subsequently, the Broadwood factory, 
known as “The Old Ford,” was rented out as industrial units.639 By joining with 
Challen, Broadwood was able to remain in business and to keep Captain Evelyn 
Broadwood as Chairman of the Board of Directors, but after reorganisation, 
Broadwood pianos were now manufactured by Challen. The agreement with Challen 
stated that Broadwood instruments would be the highest quality pianos produced by 
                                                 
635 Ibid, 289. 
636 Ibid, 291. 
637 Ibid, 296. 
638 Ibid, 300.  
639 Ibid, 301.  
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the company with lesser quality instruments carrying the Challen name or other trade 
names of that company.640 
The agreement with Challen would last from 1931 to 1938. During this time 
Broadwood continued to control the retail side of the business and its successful tuning 
service.  Initially, this agreement proved profitable, but, as the decade continued, the 
threat of war again loomed in the distance and Broadwood would have to face another 
great challenge.  
 
Wartime Preparations 
Prior to the beginning of the Second World War, the trade publications of the piano 
industry, such as the Music Trades Review and The Pianomaker, were full of warnings 
of the consequences a war could bring to the industry and urged the industry to prepare. 
Eugene Sotheran, the editor of Music Trades Review, reminded piano makers in the 
September 1938 issue “Let us not forget the lesson of 1914, when the factories were 
depleted of workmen, supplies were at a minimum and the demand most difficult to 
meet.”641 The Board of Directors of Broadwood and Sons seemed to heed these 
warnings and began to prepare for the impact of war long before hostilities started. 
Throughout 1937 and 1938, Europe moved closer to war. The crisis prior to the signing 
of the Munich Agreement created unstable trade conditions as the populations of 
Europe braced itself for the coming conflict.642  Although Neville Chamberlain 
declared that the agreement would bring “peace for our time,” the British people began 
saving rather than spending and the piano industry suffered.  The bad economic 
position of the industry prompted William Evans to terminate the agreement between 
Challen and Broadwood.  Broadwood was now in need of a new home and the 
company decided to rent a factory in Acton.643  The termination of the manufacturing 
agreement between Challen and Broadwood meant that John Broadwood and Sons 
                                                 
640 Ibid, 305. 
641 Eugene Sotheran, “Facing the Music,” Music Trades Review, September 1938, 323. 
642 Pelling, 27. 
643 The company maintained ownership of The Old Ford factory, but at the time this factory was 
rented out to a number of businesses and was no longer fit for piano manufacturing. 
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was once again independently owned and the company opened its new factory in 
January 1939.644   
The first notion of Broadwood’s war preparations began in the spring of 1939, when 
the Board debated whether the company should get insurance against air raid damage 
at the Old Ford factory in Hackney and the factory in Acton.645  In addition to thinking 
about the possibility of air raids, Broadwood was also planning for the potential of lack 
of supplies.  Capt. Broadwood, Chairman of the Board of Directors, wrote that even 
though piano sales in 1938 were as bad as 1933 (the lowest point of the Depression), 
he had observed that there had been a 20% increase in the manufacturing of iron frames 
in the first three months of 1939 for the piano industry.  This increase was indicative 
of the industry buying parts that would be difficult to obtain once war began, especially 
if rationing was introduced as it had been during the last war.646   
In addition to stocking materials that may be difficult to obtain, the company had to 
decide how and if it should pay employees if they were called for service.  Initially the 
Board decided that the company would pay the full wages of any member of staff 
while he was in annual training.647  But, once war was declared and the demand for 
soldiers dramatically increased, it was decided that the company was not in a position 
to pay the wages of any members of the staff called up for military service or to make 
any part payment.  Instead, the company promised to endeavour to maintain the posts 
for all that wished to return in due course.648   
Four days after the British declaration of war, the company was concerned for the 
safety of its employees and records and decided that it would move all of its accounts, 
tuning records, and clerical staff out of the centre of London (and potential bombing 
zone) to the home of Capt. Broadwood.  The home, Lyne House, was two miles north 
                                                 
644 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 308. 
645 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Friday, 14th April, 1939” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre.  
646 Captain Evelyn Broadwood. “The Crises, the Pianoforte and the Trade,” Music Trades Review, 
June 1939, 173. 
647 This is in response to the Military Training Act of 27 April 1939 which required all men aged 20-
21 to participate in military training. “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Tuesday, 23rd May, 
1939,” Board of Directors Minute Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre.  
648 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Wednesday, 13th September, 1939,” Board of Directors 
Minute Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
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of the village of Rusper in north Sussex; those moving to the premises were informed 
that they would be responsible for their own food and heating costs while staying at 
the estate.  The Board also decided to build a shelter in the basement of the Hanover 
Street showroom, but those working at the factory in Acton would remain, as there 
was enough work for two or three weeks.649  
The Search for War Contracts 
The small amount of secured work at the factory prompted the company to think about 
switching to war production.  During the previous war, Broadwood produced airplane 
parts and ammunition boxes for the military.  These contracts helped the company to 
remain solvent throughout the last war and it was decided that Broadwood should 
approach the Air Ministry in regard to contracts for government work.650 The search 
for war work would prove to be a frustrating process for the company and during the 
next 15 months, the company would repeatedly report at the Board Meetings of the 
possibility of a contract, only then to subsequently announce that the contract had 
fallen through. 
It seemed that Capt. Broadwood foresaw the potential difficulty in obtaining war 
production contracts.  During the board meeting held in October 1939 he reported on 
the negative response he received to his inquiries regarding government contracts.  He 
suggested that although the manufacture of aircraft parts should not be dismissed as 
future policy, the company should continue to concentrate on the manufacture of 
pianos.651  Although the company continued to manufacture instruments, the firm 
persevered in its search for war work as this would be an additional source of income 
and would ensure that they maintained employee numbers.652  Initially, the company 
approached the Government for direct contracts, but as the firm continued to be 
                                                 
649 Ibid. 
650 Ibid.  
651 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Tuesday, 17th October, 1939” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
652 Employees of companies with essential war work could remain at the factory.  Companies with no 
war contracts had to release their employees to either military service or other companies producing 
essential military items.  
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rejected, the company began to look for manufacturing through becoming a sub-
contractor.653       
From December 1939 to July 1940, Broadwood was in negotiations with the Ministry 
of Supply to produce boxes for parachutes.654  Discussions continued throughout the 
first half of 1940, but in order to receive the contract the company would need to install 
new machinery, which was difficult to obtain.  In July 1940, the company remained in 
talks on the possibility of producing these boxes for the war effort655 but by September 
of the same year, it was reported that it was impossible to obtain any contracts or 
subcontracts for Government supplies.656 By December 1940, Broadwood stopped its 
efforts to secure war production contracts.657   
This lack of success in obtaining government contracts must have been frustrating for 
the company, especially as a number of its competitors, such as the Kemble and 
Company, were able to secure contracts for essential government work including the 
manufacture of airplane components, ammunition boxes, and even pianos for the 
military.658 Instead, Broadwood would have to focus on repairing instruments and 
selling second hand instruments in their retail store for the remainder of the war.   
 
Piano Production 
Broadwood was able to continue to produce pianos for the domestic market until 
August 1942 and to the export market until April 1943. Throughout this time, the 
production relied on materials that were purchased prior to the beginning of the war 
and from purchasing other piano companies’ excess stock.  As the war continued and 
more strain was placed upon raw materials and the need for labour, Broadwood would 
                                                 
653 Ashworth, 95. 
654 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday, 14th December, 1939” Board of Directors 
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find it more difficult to continue to produce instruments.  Eventually, piano production 
would come to a complete halt.  
At the beginning of the war, Broadwood and Sons had 40 pianos on order and enough 
work to keep the factory going until December 1939.659  Most of the instruments on 
order were upright pianos that followed the trend of the “mini” piano introduced by 
Eavestaff.660 In December 1939, the company reported that there were outstanding 
orders and supplies to make 20 pianos, which would keep the factory fully employed 
until April or May 1940.  But, although orders were placed during this time, the strain 
of the war had begun to take its toll as the company did not have the funds to purchase 
raw materials (i.e. wood and metal).661  At this point materials were beginning to be 
regulated by the government; and as restrictions became more stringent, prices were 
also rising, for example, timber prices alone had risen 60% and metal furnishings had 
risen 70%.662   
In March 1940, the first of many government intrusions began to affect the production 
of Broadwood pianos with the introduction of the Excess Profits Tax (for more details 
see Chapter 4).  The law applied a 100% tax on the profits a company made on any 
non-war related production sold domestically and was intended to be an incentive to 
companies to switch to war production.  Unfortunately, Broadwood was unable to 
secure any war production contracts and the company had to decide how it would 
proceed.  Luckily, the tax did not apply to instruments sold to foreign markets, second 
hand instruments, or instruments that were in stock prior to 21 October 1940. 
Consequently, Broadwood expanded its export trade of new instruments, while 
simultaneously increasing its advertising of second hand instruments for the domestic 
market.  In March of this year alone, instruments were shipped to South Africa, 
Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia.663   
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The next blow to the company came with the introduction of the Limitation of Supplies 
Orders in July 1940.  These orders controlled raw materials and regulated who received 
the materials in order to release non-essential industry’s employees over to war work 
(for more details see Chapter 4).664  The order made it increasingly difficult for 
Broadwood to obtain materials.  The company understood that maintaining its staff 
would be impossible if piano components could not be purchased, and it was agreed 
that the factory staff should be reduced to a minimum, albeit work would continue 
with the reduced staff.665 The lack of available materials and minimum staff numbers 
directly impacted Broadwood’s ability to meet its expanding export business. By 
February 1941 Broadwood had received export orders totalling £1,300, of which 
£1,100 could not be manufactured because of lack of availability of supplies and 
labour.666   
The third major government scheme to affect Broadwood and Sons was the 
Concentration of Industry Scheme issued in March 1941 (for more details see Chapter 
4). This plan encouraged companies that did not have war contracts to consolidate into 
factories with their competitors in order to release factory space and workers for 
essential war work.667 Broadwood began to approach other companies to see if there 
was a possibility of consolidation.  Tommy Watkin, the manager of the company, 
reported in April that he had contacted Knight Pianos but was rejected.  He also 
contacted Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd (maker of Welmar pianos) to see if the 
company would consider making Broadwoods in their factory.668 By January of the 
following year the company was notified that the government intended to concentrate 
the piano industry and it was agreed that Broadwood would combine with Whelpdale, 
Maxwell & Codd, George Rogers, and Marshall & Rose.  All of the companies would 
move production to the Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd factory in Clapham.  Each 
company would retain five piano makers and the rest of their staff would be released 
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to other factories with war production contracts.  Broadwood also allowed the Ministry 
of Aircraft Production to sublease their factory on Brunel Road, Acton, for the duration 
of the hostilities and eight months thereafter to Newbold & Co., a manufacturer of 
optical lenses.669 
When Broadwood joined the consortium of makers at the Whelpdale, Maxwell & 
Codd factory, it brought with it orders to manufacture up to two years’ worth of 
instruments.  Broadwood had the materials in stock to complete these orders, but was 
unable to obtain an export licence to ship the pianos to the various countries in which 
they were in demand.670  The company’s production stocks were in such good shape 
that Tommy Watkin wrote to Capt. Broadwood: 
…in spite of the fact that the Board of Trade have stopped the supply 
of iron frames we are in a fortunate position, inasmuch as we have a 
fairly large stock, which I calculate will enable us to continue supplying 
the trade with pianos up to the end of the quota which we have 
available, and might, indeed necessitate our purchasing a further 
amount from another firm.  Providing Whelpdale are able to continue 
to manufacture, there is no reason, as far as I can see at the moment, 
why we should not still continue to trade without making a loss.671 
 
Although the company had the orders and the materials to manufacture the 
instruments, the exportation of pianos stopped when the Industrial Supplies 
Department notified piano manufacturers that all requests for export licences received 
after March 31, 1942 would not be granted.672  With the export business cancelled and 
a 100% tax on sale of domestic pianos, the production of pianos all but stopped.  The 
Board of Trade officially ended the production of pianos for the domestic market with 
the Control of Manufacture and Supply Order which went into effect on 1 August 
1942.  The order granted licences for companies to complete the manufacture and sale 
of instruments at a given ratio every month until the end of 1942, when at that point, 
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Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
670 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday, 8th January, 1942” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
671 Letter from Mr. Watkin to Captain Broadwood 11th March, 1942. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History 
Centre. 
672 “Cessation of Export Licences” Music Trades Review, April 1942, 53.  
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domestic piano production would halt.673 Export production was ended in August 1943 
with the cessation of export licences for pianos.  
Broadwood was allowed to sell eight pianos during the month of August 1942.  The 
company had 41 instruments in the factory; 18 of which were intended for export and 
23 partially completed instruments were intended for domestic sales.  All of the 
instruments had buyers, but the company could not release them from the factory 
because of the Control of Manufacture and Supply order.674 With the end of piano 
production, the company had to rely solely on income earned from instrument repair, 
piano tuning and moving, second hand pianos sales, as well as the rent from their 
leased factories. 
The chart below shows the revenue earned from the wholesale of pianos.  Wholesale 
pianos are instruments that were made and sold to dealers – not sold in the showroom 
of Broadwood.  It is evident to see the impact of the various laws that affected the 
industry with the decline of sales from 1940s onward. The revenue earned from 
wholesale pianos ended in 1943, coinciding with the Control of Manufacture and 
Supply Order.     
 
Table 16. Chart showing the revenue earned from the wholesale of pianos 1939-1945.  Figures compiled by the 
author from the “Piano Wholesale Books.” 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre.  
 
                                                 
673 Eugene Sotheran. “The New Order” Music Trades Review, August 1942, 119. 
674 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Wednesday, 12th August, 1942” Board of Directors 











Sales of Second Hand Pianos and Retail Sales 
In addition to making instruments that were sold to dealers, Broadwood ran a 
showroom on Hanover Street, London.  This showroom sold both new Broadwood 
instruments (until 1943) and second hand instruments including pianos, player pianos, 
and organs from other manufacturers.675 The account books include the selling price 
of the instrument, the credit balance to the customer, and the amount of Purchase Tax 
charged in the case of a sale of a new instrument until January 1943 (when the 
production of new instruments ceased). The sales of used pianos became one of the 
main streams of revenue for the company once the construction of new instruments 
was banned.  
The customers listed in the books show a wide range of people and organisations 
purchasing instruments throughout the war.  Churches, schools, and military 
organisations were some of the groups making the largest purchases, but many 
individual citizens continued to buy pianos through the war period.  
 
Figure 12. Retail sales entry for instruments sold to Mr. F. E. Smith for four second hand instruments on 25 March 
1939.  The instruments include three upright pianos and one grand. The makers include Chappell, Erard, Gors & 
Kallmann, and Bechstein. “Broadwood Retail Sales Books” 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. Image by author. 
 
 
                                                 
675 The Broadwood retail books include listings for pianos made by Erard, Chappel, Bechstein, and 
many other makers.  If the instrument was second hand it was marked as “S/H.” “Broadwood Retail 




Figure 13. Retail sales entry for a second hand Boyd organ sold to the Royal Navy War Amenities Fund on 23 May 
1942. “Broadwood Retail Sales Books” 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. Image by author. 
 
 
Figure 14. Retail sales entry for second hand John Broadwood and Sons upright pianos Model 10 and Model 53 
sold to the City of Leicester Education Committee on 23 November 1944. “Broadwood Retail Sales Books” 
2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. Image by author. 
 
The revenue earned from retail sales took a dramatic plunge during 1938, when Europe 
was on the brink of war.  The company suffered its worst sales year in 1941, when 




Table 17. Chart showing the revenue earned from the retail sales of the Broadwood showroom during the wartime 
period. Figures compiled by author from the “Retail Sales Books” 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre.  
 
A better picture of the financial situation of the company can be seen when both the 
retail and wholesale figures are compared.  In 1938 the company earned around 
£20,000 annually from sales, compared to 1944 when the company earned around 
£4,000 in total.  
 
Table 18. Chart showing combined revenue of retail and wholesale for John Broadwood and Sons. Figures compiled 




























The company’s correspondence elucidates the situation in London during the war. 
Many of the letters were from people writing to the company to say that their piano 
was destroyed in a bombing (including a letter from the Controller to the Archbishop 
of Canterbury); other letters were sent asking for the company to send tuners to come 
and tune the pianos.  During the Blitz, Broadwood received a letter from one of its 
tuners, a man named H. Becher, writing in to say he could not be at work because his 
brother and sister had died when their house was bombed.676      
The Broadwood company did not escape the bombings of London. The company’s 
warehouse, where it was storing many instruments for customers, was bombed in 
October 1940.677 The factories of Broadwood were also bombed numerous times.  It 
was reported that the Old Ford factory suffered damage in December 1940, July 1944, 
and August 1944.  The Brunel Road factory suffered damage in February 1944 and 
July 1944.678  Repairing the damage to the buildings would continue to be a financial 
burden to the financially strained company until 1945, when it received insurance 
payments for the damage.679 
 
Post-War Planning and Reconstruction 
Even though Broadwood was reduced to selling second hand pianos from 1943, the 
company planned for the return of piano production throughout the war. The company 
continued to take orders for exporting pianos even though they could not get an export 
licence, but they promised that the orders would be executed the moment the ban was 
lifted.680 The company also planned on how the post-war piano should look and what 
materials could be used. Broadwood was thinking big and decided that the grand 
pianos should be “nothing smaller than a five-foot instrument” and models were 
proposed to be 5’, 5’7” and 6’. These sizes would be larger than the instruments 
produced before the war.681 The company also proposed a new lighter iron frame 
                                                 
676 “Correspondence” 2185/JB/4/3. Surrey History Centre.  
677 “Letter to Miss Blount,” Correspondence. 2185/JB/4/3. Surrey History Centre.  
678 “Minutes of the Board Meetings 1940-1944” Board of Directors Minute Books 1933 – June 1944. 
2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
679 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 308. 
680 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Wednesday 24th March 1943,” Board of Directors Minute 




produced by The Crown Foundry.  The lighter metal would be less expensive to ship, 
especially for foreign trade.682 The company even arranged for a new experimental 
grand to be made at the Whelpdale factory in 1944 using the lighter frame and with 
larger proportions.683   
A very important decision the company made during the last year of the war was that 
Whelpdale promised to undertake all possible manufacture for the post-war period on 
behalf of Broadwood and Sons and that Broadwood instruments would use the Welmar 
string scale.684  This decision meant that there would be very little difference between 
a Whelpdale-made Welmar piano and a Whelpdale-made Broadwood piano.  This 
meant there was no difference in the construction of the pianos except the name plate 
on the key cover.685 
 
Post-War  
In February 1945, the long wait for the return to piano production seemed to be coming 
to an end when the company received the news that it would be granted an export 
licence for approximately 500 instruments in the coming months.686 However, it would 
take almost a year before production was fully resumed.  Throughout this period the 
company was plagued by shortages of materials, machinery, and labour.  In addition, 
it took until May 1946 for the company to return to its Brunel Road factory.  When it 
did regain ownership of the building, the company had to re-install all of its equipment 
and clean the mess and repair damages left behind by Newbold and Co. It would take 
                                                 
682 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday 3rd February 1944,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
683 The instrument would later be rejected because it would not be up to Broadwood standards.  
“Minutes of the Board Meeting held on Thursday 19th October 1944,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books 1933 – June 1944. 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. 
684 Each piano manufacturer has its own “scale” for its instruments.  The scale refers to the graduated 
length and thickness of the strings along the compass of the keyboard. 
685 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday 19th October 1944,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre.  
686 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday 8th February 1945,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
193 
 
until November of that year to resume piano production. Until then, pianos continued 
to be manufactured at the Whelpdale factory.687  
As production resumed the company was only allowed to produce instruments for 
export as the sale of pianos to the domestic market remained banned and the Purchase 
Tax continued to stand at 100%. The company continued to sell second hand 
instruments and after the end of the war, these sales rose dramatically. Even King 
George VI purchased a second hand piano from Broadwood. 
 
 
Figure 15. Image from the retail sales book showing a second hand piano being sold to King George VI. 
"Broadwood Retail Sales Books" 2185/JB/4/4. Surrey History Centre. Image by author.  
 
The company began to export instruments to Holland, Belgium, Portugal, New 
Zealand, Iceland, and Australia.688  The company took in many orders for export 
instruments, but it was continuously unable to fulfil the orders because of ongoing 
labour shortages.  In September 1946 the company was only able to produce 46 of the 
200 pianos promised.689  From February until December 1946, Broadwood and Sons 
manufactured only 54 pianos.690 Once the Brunel Factory was operational, the 
                                                 
687 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Thursday 10th January 1946,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
688 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Wednesday 27th November 1946,” Board of Directors 
Minute Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
689 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Tuesday 24th September 1946,” Board of Directors Minute 
Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
690 “Minutes of the Board Meeting Held on Wednesday 27th November 1946,” Board of Directors 
Minute Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
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company was able to meet demand and by May 1947, Broadwood and Sons had shown 
a profit for the first time in eight years.691 
The years immediately following the war continued to be difficult for Broadwood. The 
Purchase Tax remained prohibitive towards domestic sales until it was repealed in 
1953. During this time Broadwood concentrated on exporting all of its production and 
it expanded its export market to Holland, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, Singapore and 
Thailand.692 
Throughout the 1970s and 80s the firm continued to decline as it could not compete 
with imported Japanese pianos. Despite celebrating its 250th anniversary in 1978, 
Broadwood and Sons was in bad financial shape and it was sold in 1988 to a 
consortium headed by businessman Geoffrey Simon.693 In 2006 Simon died and the 
company was sold to Alastair Laurence, who moved the firm to Goudhurst, Kent. 
Although technically still in business, Broadwood and Sons employed only four 




                                                 
691 “Letter to T. B. Watkin, Esq., General Manager John Broadwood & Sons, Ltd., 9 Hanover Street, 
London, W.1. from P.J. John, G. Jessup, S. C. Treven, 28th May 1947.” Board of Directors Minute 
Books July 1944 – March 1954. 2185/JB/4/5. Surrey History Centre. 
692 Wainwright, Broadwood by Appointment, 310. 
693 Charles Darwent, “Piano Forte,” Management Today (June 1994), accessed 11 February 2017, 
https://www.questia.com/magazine/1G1-16126938/piano-forte.  
694 Paul Kendall, “How we fell out of tune with the piano,” The Telegraph, 20 June 2013.  
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Chapter 7: Kemble and Company Case Study 
 
The story of Kemble and Co. runs opposite to that of Broadwood and Sons during the 
war years. Kemble, a young company which focused on producing affordable pianos, 
was able to secure extensive government contracts during the war years. The contracts, 
to build components parts for aircraft, brought much needed revenue to the company 
and allowed the company to maintain its workforce, ultimately ensuring the company’s 
success in the post-war era.  
Another contrast between Kemble and Broadwood is that although Kemble is only a 
little over 100 years old, there are very few company records surviving or available for 
research (unlike Broadwood which has a remarkably well preserved archive). A 
number of documents are preserved at the Hackney Archives, London, but this archive 
contains very few items from the war years. Possibly the company records were 
transferred to the Yamaha Corporation when it acquired Kemble, but unfortunately 
those archives are not available for research or have not been preserved. The lack of 
archival information is typical of musical instrument manufacturers. The following 
information is gleaned from the records at the Hackney Archives, the papers of the 
Board of Trade, and from a personal interview with Denzil Jacobs, a former director 
of Kemble.    
 
Historical Overview   
Kemble and Co. was founded in 1911 by Michael Kemble.695 When the firm was 
established the company leased a “Warehouse and premises No. 53 Carysfort Road, 
Stoke Newington, in the County of London” for the term of 99 years.696 The area was 
popular with piano manufacturers and it was estimated that there were around 100 
manufacturers in north London at the time Kemble was established. Areas in the 
                                                 
695 Michael Kemble would be joined by Mordechai Jacobs as co-directors of the company known as 
Kemble & Jacobs Limited. The two men would continue as co-directors until Michael Kemble’s son 
Robert and Mordechai Jacob’s adopted son Denzil took their places. Denzil Jacobs was the son of 
Mordechai’s brother Sidney who died when Denzil was 8 years old. He was then adopted by his 
uncle. Julia Chain, “Denzil Jacobs” The Jewish Chronicle (27 December 2013).  
696 Estate Land and Houses Limited, “Lease of Warehouse and Premises,” 7 December 1911. 2009/46. 
Hackney Archives.  
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northern part of London, such as Camden Town, Kentish Town, Chalk Farm, Islington, 
Stoke Newington, and Hackney were popular with piano building because these areas 
had cheaper land and access to railroads.697   
When Kemble began piano manufacture the company specialised in cheaper, 
wholesale and stencil pianos.698 The firm became successful and during the 1920s the 
company expanded. In 1923 Kemble acquired an adjacent factory, adding to its piano 
production capacity and in 1925 the company purchased the firms B. Squire & Son 
and J. Wallis & Son, Ltd. Throughout this time, pianos manufactured by Kemble were 
marked with tradenames or were left blank for retailers to add their own name to the 
fall board. The pianos were “middle of the road pianos made for the ordinary home.”699 
In the 1930s the firm made a name for itself, both literally and figuratively, as it worked 
on the development of smaller, modern piano designed for modern homes.700 During 
this time the company filed seven patents related to the development of what would 
become the “Minx” range,701 a style of piano that followed the trend of the “mini 
piano” popularised by Brasted Brothers. The Minx piano was the first piano to be 
labelled as a Kemble instrument and the range became a big success.  
                                                 
697 Oliver, 277. 
698 Denzil Jacobs, interview. 
699 “Denzil Jacobs,” video, NAMM, accessed 24 November 2016, https://www.namm.org/library/oral-
history/denzil-jacobs.  
700 “Mr. M. V. Jacobs achieves the triple crown” newspaper clipping, undated. 2009/46. Hackney 
Archives.  
701 Patents include GB429809A of September 1934; GB431665A of August 1934; GB452862A of 
January 1936; GB468499A of December 1936; GB481548A of April 1947; GB486265A of July 
1939; and GB499164A of March 1938. Google Patents, accessed 24 November 2016, 




Figure 17. Minx piano. Undated. Kemble and Co. records. 
2009/46. Hackney Archives. Image courtesy of the 
Hackney Archives.  
 
With the success of the Minx, Kemble and Co. continued to expand. It acquired Rogers 
Eungblut, Ltd.702 and Squire & Longson703 in 1936, and Moore & Moore in 1938.704 
According to Denzil Jacobs, by the end of 1938, Kemble was the largest manufacturer 
of pianos in Britain and employed over 150 men, most of whom were woodworkers 
and polishers.705   
 
 
                                                 
702 M. Kemble, Esq. & Anor & Rogers Eungblut, Ltd., “Assignment,” 11 March 1936. 2009/46. 
Hackney Archives.  
703 M. Kemble, Esq. & Squire & Longson, Ltd., “Assignment,” 11 March 1936. 2009/46. Hackney 
Archives.  
704 Moore & Moore Pianos Limited., “Assignment,” 21 July 1938.  2009/46. Hackney Archives. 
705 Denzil Jacobs, interview. 
Figure 16. Minx piano. Undated. Kemble and Co. 
records. 2009/46. Hackney Archives. Image courtesy 
of the Hackney Archives.  
Figure 30. Soundboards, frames, and strings of 
pianos waiting further assembly at the Kemble 
factory, circa 1940. Kemble and Co. records. 
2009/46. Hackney Archives. Image courtesy of the 
Hackney Archives. 
Figure 31. Archival image of the Kemble factory, circa 1940. 
Hackney Archives. Kemble and Co. records. 2009/46. 
Hackney Archives. Image courtesy of the Hackney Archives. 
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Before the start of the Second World War, Kemble offered a variety of sizes of pianos 
– including uprights (both vertical and overstrung), miniatures, and grands. The 
complete range of Kemble pianos for the year 1939 is as follows. 
Piano type Model Description Wholesale  Retail  
Vertical 
upright  
STV  £19 00s 0d 30 guineas 
 E Streamline  £19 15s 0d 32 guineas  
 Marvel  £20 00s 0d 33 guineas 
Overstrung 
upright 
Midget 6 oct. £19 15s 0d 32 guineas 
 S.N. 7 oct. £22 10s 0d 36 guineas 
 C. Streamline 7 oct. £23 15s 0d 38 guineas 
 Jubilee 7 oct. £23 15s 0d 38 guineas 
 FY 7 oct.  £25 00s 0d 40 guineas 
 D 7 oct. £25 10s 0d 41 guineas 
 Cubist Mahogany 7 oct. £26 10s 0d 43 guineas 
 Cubist Walnut and Green 7 oct. £27 10s 0d 45 guineas 
 Cubist Maple and 
Walnut 
7 oct. £29 10s 0d 48 guineas 
 N.S. Ivorette Keys 7 ¼ oct. £28 00s 0d 44 guineas 
Miniature Minx Mahogany  £26 00s 0d 39 guineas 
 Minx Coloured to any 
shade 
 £28 00s 0d 44 guineas 
 Minx Green or Walnut 
Edging 
 £29 00s 0d 44 guineas 
 Minx – Louis XV style  £29 00s 0d 44 guineas 
Grands Miniature (3ft. 6ins.) 6 oct. £33 10s 0d 49 guineas 
 Miniature – Ivorette keys 
(4ft.) 
7 ¼ oct. £39 00s 0d 60 guineas 
 Miniature – Ivory keys 
(4ft.) 
7 ¼ oct. £41 00 0d 63 guineas 
Optional 
additions  
Grands in Walnut  + £3 00s 0d + 5 guineas 
 Streamline or Olympia 
Model 
 + £1 00s 0d + 2 guineas 
 Cabriole legs  + £3 00s 0d +5 guineas706 
 
Table 19. Compiled prices from the “Wholesale Price List for 1939” and the “Retail Price List for 1939.” Kemble 
and Co. records. 2009/46. Hackney Archive.  
                                                 
706 Although the guinea had been replaced by the pound in 1816, the term was used still used, 




It is interesting to note that Kemble’s Minx pianos were sold at comparable prices to 
the more expensive upright models. In addition, the “grand” pianos were miniature or 
baby grand size, each measuring 4 feet or less. The sizes of the instruments matched 
the trend for smaller pianos of the 1930s and also appealed as more affordable options 
for households who wanted a grand piano but who could not afford, or did not have 
the room for, a full-sized instrument.  
 
Wartime Preparations 
Being the largest piano manufacturer in Britain was an advantage to Kemble when the 
Second World War broke out. Kemble had extensive factory space and a large 
workforce, two factors which helped the company receive war production contracts. 
The full extent of the company’s war work is unknown at this time, but according to 
Denzil Jacobs, at the start of the war Kemble approached the aircraft industry for 
contracts and was granted a trial order from de Havilland for wooden parts including 
bomb doors and bodies for the DH-98 Mosquito bomber.  The trial order was deemed 
satisfactory and production increased.  By 1941 the entire factory had been converted 
to airplane production.707    
Jacob’s narrative of Kemble’s war-time story has some difficulties. Firstly, de 
Havilland did not begin to build Mosquito aircraft in any great numbers until 1942 (see 
Chapter 4 for production schedule). Secondly, there is no record of Kemble having 
direct contracts with de Havilland in the company archives,708 and lastly, Kemble had 
contracts to build pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. in 1942709 and it would be difficult to build 
pianos if the “entire factory” had been converted. That said, Kemble did receive 
extensive war production contracts. It is unlikely that the factory had turned 
completely to war production by 1941, but by 1942 the company was heavily involved 
in building items for the war effort. These war-production contracts helped Kemble 
survive and ultimately flourish in the post-war period.  
                                                 
707 Denzil Jacobs, interview. 
708 Ralph Steiner, Operations Director de Havilland Aircraft Museum, email message to author, 10 
August 2016. 




War-time Piano Production  
As piano production became more limited because of material control orders and 
limitation orders, and selling to the home market virtually impossible because of the 
purchase tax, Kemble was in a better situation than most other piano companies 
because of its experience in exporting pianos. At the start of the war, Kemble was the 
largest U.K. exporter of pianos and it had markets in Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa, and the U.S.A.710 The company would rely on these export networks for orders 
in the early years of the war when companies were forced to sell only to the export 
market. In 1939 the company exported £11,836 worth of pianos and by May 1940 the 
firm had exported £5,115 worth of pianos with another £3,296 worth of orders on 
hand.711 The export turnover of £11,836 in 1939 was almost double the amount of any 
other piano manufacturer of the time.712   
Although the piano trade was shrinking during the war, Kemble continued to acquire 
companies and tradenames during the period. For example, in March 1940, Kemble 
bought the rights to use the name Paul Newman & Son on pianos and agreed to pay 
one shilling per piano to the Allied Music Traders for use of the name.713 Other names 
used by Kemble during this time were B. Squire and Son Ltd., Squire and Longson 
Ltd., Rogers Eungblut Ltd, and Moore and Moore.714 
As the largest piano producer, Kemble was issued a nucleus certificate on 6 September 
1941. Two other pianos firms concentrated with Kemble during this time, they were 
Buckland & Co., Ltd. and King Bros. Pianos Ltd., both of which were closed for the 
remainder of the war.715  
                                                 
710 “Factual Survey of the Piano Industry Appendix B,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
711 Ibid. 
712 This is compared to the export report of Monington & Weston who reported an export turnover of 
£6,243 for 1939 and Challen who reported exporting £6,116 for 1939. These companies were the 
closest in competition to Kemble in regard to the export trade. Ibid. 
713 Paul Newman & Sons to Messrs. Kemble and Co., letter, 29 March 1940. 2009/46. Hackney 
Archives.   
714 A trade name is a pseudonym used by companies to sell items under a name other than their 
registered legal name of the business. Many piano manufacturers used a variety of trade names on 
their instruments. Wholesale piano makers used these names to designate quality levels of the 
instruments. These firms would purchase the names of older, established firms whose name signified 
quality or they would create names that were meant to sound expensive or foreign (like a German-
sounding name) that would appeal to a specific customer base.  
715 “Factual Survey of the Piano Industry Appendix B,” March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives. 
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In January 1942 two new rules put a damper on Kemble’s exporting business. During 
this month the Board of Trade made it a requirement for piano firms to obtain an export 
licence for pianos and as part of the Lend Lease Agreement a ban was placed on 
shipping any instrument made partially or wholly of any non-ferrous metals anywhere 
in the western hemisphere. Both of these rules greatly diminished Kemble’s ability to 
sell to the export market, but the cessation of all export licences in April 1942 brought 
it to a halt.  Instead, Kemble, like all other piano manufacturers turned to the 
Government for piano-making contracts.  
One such contract was a licence (D. 3/30) to manufacture 30 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. 
to be completed by 31 October 1942.716 In total the company sold £17,448 49s 5d 
worth of pianos in 1942.717 Because of restrictions and then cessation of piano exports 
by April of that year, the majority of these sales would have been to the Government. 
By the end of 1942 Kemble had £6,039 18s 9d worth of piano stocks stored in its 
factory, but whether any of these stocks were assembled into pianos and sold in 1943 
is unknown.718  In June 1943, Kemble’s nucleus certificate was withdrawn and Kemble 
ceased all piano production.719 
 
War Production Contracts  
Even if the Kemble company had not completely converted to war production by 1941, 
the company was completely converted after the last of its pianos were produced for 
the N.A.A.F.I. at the end of 1942. The contracts Kemble was able to secure were to 
make airplane component parts and were most likely secondary contracts. According 
to the December 1942 Balance Sheet of Kemble and Co., Kemble had £14,538 17s 7d 
amount of stocks on hand of aircraft components in the factory and had sold £127,197 
                                                 
716 E.A. Fisher, “Piano Manufacturers,” memorandum, 18 August 1943. BT 64/1783. National 
Archives. 
717 “Kemble & Co. year-end report and balance sheet, 31 December 1942.” 2009/46. Hackney 
Archives.  
718 Ibid. 
719 E. A. Fischer, Board of Trade, to E.C.P. Lascelles, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
“Piano Manufacture,” letter, June 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
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6s 8d worth of aircraft components that year.720 This is a substantial amount of 
revenue, especially in comparison of the number of pianos that were sold in 1942.  
The balance sheets for the remainder of the war years have not been preserved in the 
documents at the Hackney Archive, but if Kemble solely made parts for the de 
Havilland Mosquito, as stated by Denzil Jacobs, then it can be assumed that the 
contracts for the remaining war years continued to be substantial. For example, in 1942 
de Havilland made 432 Mosquito aircraft in the United Kingdom and Kemble sold 
£127,197 6s 8d worth of aircraft components. The production rate of Mosquitos 
continued to grow in 1943 with 577 aircraft produced, and increased to 2339 in 1944. 
If Kemble continued to produce component parts for these aircraft, then it can be 
surmised that their sales would expand during these years as well. In 1945 the number 
of Mosquitos manufactured fell to 1991 aircraft and by 1946 only 249 aircraft were 
produced in the U.K.721  
 
War-time Advertisements  
Throughout the war period, Kemble maintained advertising in the Music Trades 
Review. Their advertising campaign focused on the war effort, often making fun of 
their enemy, and is worth mentioning for its clever cartoons and humorous poetry. The 
advertisements always extolled the virtue of Kemble pianos and often pointed out that 
the company was producing items for the war effort. The pugnacious attitude of the 
company in the face of a dangerous period brought humour to the often bleak Music 
Trades Review articles.  
 
                                                 
720 “Kemble & Co. year-end report and balance sheet, 31 December 1942.” 2009/46. Hackney 
Archives. 
721 “Production output of de Havilland Mosquito aircraft produced in the United Kingdom from 






Figure 32. Kemble advertisement from 1939. At this time the company was focusing on the piano 
trade and the quality of Kemble instruments. Music Trades Review, October 1939, 316. 
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As the potential for ending the war became more of a reality with the Allied invasion 
of Normandy, Kemble’s advertisements took on a more hopeful note, as can be felt in 
this poem from June 1944.  
Pianos by Kemble were all the rage  
Some time back in the peaceful age  
The war’s been on for many a year 
And a shortage of Kembles you’ve had to bear 
But now the Second Front’s begun 
It won’t be long before we’ve won 
Then we will stop our Work Essential 
And concentrate on Pianos by Kemble.722 
 
In 1945 the tide of war had turned and Kemble advertising was bold in its statement. 
“Booming for Victory” was the sentiment of the company. 
                                                 







Figure 33. Kemble advertisement. Music Trades Review, January 1945, 71. 
206 
 
Post-War Era: Recovery and Expansion  
When the war ended, Kemble faced the same challenges as the rest of the piano 
industry. Raw materials were scarce, the Purchase Tax was high, production for the 
domestic market was forbidden, and companies had to wait for the return of their 
labour and factories. Although these were difficult barriers to overcome, Kemble had 
a number of advantages over its competitors. Because the company had switched to 
war production, Kemble was able to maintain much of its workforce, meaning the firm 
did not have to wait for its labour to be released from priority manufacturing. In 1946 
de Havilland continued to manufacture Mosquito aircraft, although in limited numbers 
compared to the war years, and this brought revenue to the company as it transitioned 
back to piano production and waited for materials to become available. As the post-
war period emphasised export for piano manufacturers, Kemble returned to its 
previous markets for piano sales. The firm even began building new markets in war-
ravaged Europe.  According to Brian Kemble, his father, Robert Kemble, travelled 
across Europe by car at the end of the war, selling pianos while still wearing his army 
uniform.723 
According to Denzil Jacobs, much of Kemble’s post-war prosperity was due to the 
company’s war-time production. In the post-war era Kemble pianos had a reputation 
as well-built, affordable instruments. According to Jacobs, the stability of the 
instruments came from lessons learned during the war years. He said, “we made parts 
for Mosquitos, which were all-wood aircraft and had to learn how to put them together 
so that they stayed that way.”724 Through their war work, the company began using 
new glues, perfected laminating woods, and gained more knowledge of factory 
efficiency in its production line.725 This new knowledge was on display at the British 
Industries Fair of 1947 when the company pushed its pianos that could withstand 
tropical climates. At the fair the company advertised as “Manufacturers of Kemble, B. 
                                                 
723 Neil Buckley, “Europe welcomes mellow sound,” Financial Times (Tuesday April 21, 1992).  
724 “Denzil Jacobs,” video, NAMM, accessed 24 November 2016, https://www.namm.org/library/oral-
history/denzil-jacobs. 
725 Newspaper clipping in the papers of the Kemble and Co. records. No title or date given. 2009/46. 
Hackney Archives.  
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Squire, Moore and Moore, Squire and Longson and Rogers-Eungblut Pianos. The 
"Minx" Miniature Model. Tropical Models a Speciality.”726 
During the post-war era Kemble continued to acquire the naming rights of different 
piano makers. On 8 April 1946 Kemble acquired all the naming rights of the name 
“Squire” for the fee of £400. The agreement, written from a representative of Squire,727 
reads as follows:  
I hereby undertake that I will not at any date hereafter, manufacture or sell any 
piano or cause, permit or allow the same to be sold or manufactured in the 
name of “H. Squire” or any other name including the name “Squire” or in any 
name which may be confused with the name “Squire.” Nor will I use any such 
name or names or allow any firm or Company wholly or partly under my 
control, to use the same for any business or trade or other purpose connected, 
directly or indirectly with the manufacture or sale of pianos.728 
In addition to Squire, in the post-war era Kemble made pianos under many other 
names, including Barnes, Bijou, Boyd, Brinsmead, Chappell, Cramer, D’Almaine, 
Dresdner, Firth, Higgins, Minx, Osbert, Regent, Renn, Rogers, Rogers Eungblut, 
Saville, Sebastian, Shenstone, and Stiles. The company often made identical pianos 
but sold them under different names.729 A visualisation of the many different brands 
that would come under Kemble’s control (and then eventually Yamaha) is shown 
below. 
                                                 
726 “Kemble and Co.” Grace’s Guide to British Industrial History, accessed 25 November 2016, 
http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Kemble_and_Co.  
727 Unfortunately, it is difficult to read the signature on the agreement. The name appears to be 
R[?]NN. 
728 Letter to Messrs. Kemble & Co., 8 April 1946. 2009/46. Hackney Archives.  





Figure 18. Trade names and brands associated with Kemble and Co. Image courtesy of Bill Kirby 
http://www.pianohistory.info/names.html. 
 
In 1948 two important people joined Kemble and Co., Robert Kemble and Denzil 
Jacobs. These men, the son and adopted son of the co-directors of the company, had 
both served in the military and when they returned from the war they both began 
working for the “family business.” 730  The two men would lead Kemble in the post-
war era, leading the transition back to piano production and ultimately creating 
connections that would keep Kemble in business long after other British piano 
manufacturers had shut their doors.   
                                                 




In the 1950s the need to expand production to match growing sales led the company 
to move from its factory in Stoke Newington to a new “state-of-the-art” factory in 
Bletchley, near Milton Keynes.731 The company continued to expand throughout the 
1950s and 1960s.  
Even as Kemble expanded its production and maintained its status as a leading British 
piano manufacture, the industry as a whole had to compete with a new opponent. In 
the 1960s pianos made in Asia by companies such as Pearl River, Kawai, and Yamaha 
began to be imported into the United Kingdom.732 Rather than competing with the new 
influx of pianos, Kemble saw an opportunity and went into partnership with Yamaha 
Corporation of Japan in 1968. This was a bold move at the time and was spearheaded 
by Denzil Jacobs.733 The partnership helped Kemble continue to flourish and in 1969 
the company made more than 6,300 pianos.734  
 
The Last Major Piano Manufacturer to Close its Doors 
The partnership with Yamaha would keep Kemble and Co. in business during turbulent 
times in the British piano industry. An important milestone in the partnership was in 
1985, when Kemble and Co. began to manufacture acoustic pianos for Yamaha to be 
sold in the United Kingdom. By 1991, 75% of the pianos manufactured by Kemble 
were exported under the Yamaha name with the remaining production made under the 
name Kemble or Chappell of Bond Street.735 Over 23 years Kemble & Co. 
manufactured over 120,000 pianos for Yamaha.736 The large export numbers led 
Kemble and Co. to be recognised in 1992 with The Queen’s Award for Export 
                                                 
731 “Kemble History,” Kemble Pianos, accessed 25 November 2016, http://kemble-
pianos.com/en/history/.  
732 “A History of the Piano, 1157-2014” UK Piano Page, accessed 25 November 2016, 
https://www.piano-tuners.org/history/history_1.html.  
733 Julia Chain, “Denzil Jacobs” The Jewish Chronicle (27 December 2013). 
734 Newspaper clipping in the papers of the Kemble and Co. records, no title or date given. 2009/46. 
Hackney Archives.  
735 Neil Buckley, “Europe welcomes mellow sound,” Financial Times (Tuesday April 21, 1992).  




Achievement. Kemble is the only British piano manufacturer to receive this 
distinction.737  
According to Brian Kemble, the partnership with Yamaha saved Kemble from closure 
in 1986. Unfortunately, rising labour costs and declining sales of acoustic pianos in 
the United Kingdom contributed to Yamaha’s decision to close the Bletchley factory 
in 2009. At the time Kemble was the only remaining large-scale piano manufacturer 
in Britain.738 The brand is now made by Yamaha in other parts of the world.739  
  
                                                 
737 “Kemble History,” Kemble Pianos, accessed 25 November 2016, http://kemble-
pianos.com/en/history/. 
738 It could be argued that Kemble was the only remaining British piano manufacturer. By this point 
all other piano manufacturers had closed but Alastair Laurence had purchased Broadwood and Sons 
and had restarted the business. That said, he was not manufacturing pianos to any scale. Susan Tomes, 
“Kemble pianos: out of tune with the times,” The Guardian, 30 October 2009. 
739 Kathryn Hopkins, “Final Notes” The Guardian, 2 May 2009. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions   
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the Second World War had an irrevocable impact on 
the British piano industry. For fourteen years, the industry faced varying degrees of 
restrictions, limitations, and taxation, ultimately forcing many piano companies to 
close their factories and seek alternative sources of revenue, either by selling second 
hand instruments or converting their factories to war production. When the war finally 
ended, restrictions placed on piano manufacturing continued to negatively impact the 
industry. Although British piano manufacturers were able to grow their export market, 
domestic piano production was banned until 1949 and remained cost prohibitive to 
British consumers until 1953. By this time the television had become the preferred 
alternative form of entertainment and the British piano industry was never able to fully 
recover from the war.  
The aim of this study was to document for the first time how the policies enacted by 
the British Government because of the needs of the war effort affected the piano 
industry. This was done in order to form a more complete history of the British piano 
industry, particularly during the twentieth century, which has not been subject to 
scholarly research. The finding suggests that the British war effort during the Second 
World War impacted the British piano industry not only during the war years, but also 
for the rest of the twentieth century.  
This study has shown that the British piano industry, although much diminished from 
its nineteenth century position of prominence, was still a profitable industry at the 
beginning of the Second World War. The industry had suffered during the First World 
War and the inter-war years but had emerged from the Depression and was benefitting 
from an upsurge in sales in the mid-1930s, largely due to the popularity of the 
minipiano. When the war began, the renaissance of the British piano industry was 
halted as the mobilisation of the British economy required every industry to work 
towards the war effort. This thesis has demonstrated that the mobilisation effort was 
extensive and every aspect of manufacturing came under the control of the British 
Government and that the piano industry was most directly affected by the Board of 
Trade, the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Labour and National Service. The 
materials used in the production of pianos, especially timber, iron, steel, and wool were 
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of particular importance to the British war effort and this thesis has shown that the 
control of these materials were some of the first restrictions placed on piano 
manufacturing during the war years.   
In addition to material restrictions, this thesis presented how the Board of Trade, 
Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Labour and National Service used the Excess 
Profit Tax, Purchase Tax, Limitation of Supply Orders, and the Consolidation of 
Industry Scheme to force the complete cessation of piano manufacturing by August 
1943. This was done to reduce consumer purchasing of non-essential items, divert 
materials to war production, and to release labour and factory space of the piano 
industry for the war effort.  
As piano manufacturing became increasingly restricted and ultimately banned, the 
industry sought alternative sources of income with a much reduced labour force. This 
study explored the primary and secondary war production contracts obtained by the 
piano industry during the war years. It was discovered that the piano industry 
manufactured a variety of items including but not limited to pianos for the 
Government, furniture, coffins, and airplane components. Overall, it was presented 
that piano companies relied on the woodworking skill of their employees in order to 
secure war production contracts but not every piano company was successful in 
obtaining war work. It was shown that piano companies which produced cheaper, mass 
produced pianos were often more successful in obtaining war production contracts as 
they had a bigger workforce and larger factory, while smaller and more high-end piano 
producers had more difficulty in securing contracts. Additionally, it was shown that if 
a firm was able to secure war work then that firm could maintain its workforce, which 
was beneficial in the post-war years. Conversely, piano companies unable to secure 
war production work had to release labour, close their factory, consolidate with another 
firm, and rely on second hand piano sales until the reconversion process began.  
It is interesting to note that this study showed that piano companies with war 
production contracts hired in additional labourers, some of which were women. At the 
end of the war these women were not kept on in the factory and the industry reported 
that they had difficulty in finding skilled workmen to build pianos. The study also 
explored how the movement of labour during the war years opened the door for unions 
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to re-unionise piano workers and that the unions had a keen interest in the reconversion 
of the industry.  
In addition to establishing a timeline of the restrictions placed on the piano industry 
and its closure during the war years, this thesis documented the return to piano 
production in the post-war years. This study demonstrated that the restrictions and 
limitations placed on the piano industry lasted far longer than the years of conflict and 
that these post-war restrictions were just as damaging to the industry as the limitations 
place on the industry during the war. One positive outcome of the war years was the 
Governments push for the piano industry to export instruments. Although the piano 
export trade was stopped from April 1942 until February 1945, during the reconversion 
process the Government encouraged the piano industry to expand its export market in 
the post-war era. To push piano makers to manufacture for export, pianos to be sent 
overseas were exempt from the Purchase Tax and material restrictions. Ultimately the 
piano industry was successful in expanding its export market and the profits made from 
these overseas sales maintained the industry in the post-war years. 
This study showed that the most damaging aspect of the Government’s intervention of 
the piano industry during the post-war years was the Purchase Tax. This tax made the 
cost of a new British piano prohibitive to the majority of the British public after pianos 
could once again be sold to the domestic market in July 1949. The tax, which was in 
place until 1953, prevented the piano industry from re-establishing itself in the home 
trade which then prohibited the industry from increasing production, hiring more 
workers, and thus lowering prices. The tax also continued the country’s reliance on 
second hand pianos, which maintained their value in the post-war years.  
Two case studies were presented which gave a more in-depth look at the effects of the 
war on individual companies. The findings in these case studies reiterated the issues 
presented in the proceeding chapters and showed both the negative and positive aspects 
of the war period. The first case study explained how John Broadwood and Sons was 
adversely affected by the war. As a high-end piano firm, the company was unable to 
secure war production contracts and was forced to consolidate under Whelpdale, 
Maxwell and Codd because of the Consolidation of Industries Scheme. During the war 
years the firm maintained only a few of its staff and had to lease its factory to an 
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industry with war production contracts. The case study illustrated how it was difficult 
for Broadwood to return to piano production as the company needed to retool its 
factory and rehire workers and it took until May 1947 for the company to meet 
production demands. Ultimately Broadwood was never very successful in the post-war 
era. In contrast, this thesis showed how Kemble and Company profited from the war 
years. The firm, which mass produced affordable pianos, had a large factory and 
workforce and was able to secure numerous war production contracts including 
manufacturing airplane components for the de Havilland Mosquito. These contracts 
enabled Kemble to maintain its workforce and factory and in the post-war years the 
company was able to more quickly return to piano production. Unlike other British 
piano companies, Kemble expanded in the post-war years and according to Denzil 
Jacobs, former director of Kemble, the success of the company was largely due to its 
wartime work. Unfortunately, just like the rest of the British piano industry Kemble 
would ultimately struggle to compete with cheaper imported pianos and eventually 
closed in 2009.  
This thesis has shown that the policies of the British Government towards the piano 
industry during and after the Second World War weakened the industry so much that 
in the decades after the war the industry never fully recovered and would ultimately 
fail. Many of these policies were essential to the war effort, and they were necessary 
in the post-war years in order to raise money to help pay the country’s enormous war 
debt, but was the continued limitation of the British piano industry absolutely 
necessary in the post-war years? Could the British Government have helped the piano 
industry recover faster?  In particular, the negative impact of the Purchase Tax on the 
piano industry prevented the industry from capitalising on the British public’s desire 
to own new pianos. The prohibitive tax rate also prevented the industry from re-
establishing itself within the hearts and minds of the British consumer during a time in 
which competition from German imports was non-existent as German products 
remained restricted in the immediate post-war years. Although it is unlikely that if the 
British Government had helped the piano industry quickly reconvert to domestic trade 
then the industry would have been able to compete with the television, the radio, and 
the availability of recorded music in the post-war years, but perhaps the British piano 
industry would have been stronger if they had been able to lower their prices through 
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increased production. This in turn may have made the British piano more marketable 
and affordable to foreign buyers. When Asian piano companies such as Yamaha, 
Kawai, and Pearl River began coming onto the market in the late 1960s and 1970s 
perhaps a stronger British piano industry could have remained competitive. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case and as cheaper Asian-made instruments flooded the 
market in the 1970s, British piano companies such as Brasted Brothers, Chappell, 
Cramer, and Monington & Weston closed down. This continued in the 1980s with the 
sale of Danemann, Stroud, and Broadwood and Sons. By 2003, the British Piano 
Manufacturing Company, which made pianos under brand names such as Bentley, 
Knight, Welmar, and Woodchester, went into liquidation; and in 2009, Kemble and 
Company, the last large-scale piano maker, closed. The failure of the British piano 
industry was complete, but perhaps it could have been prevented if piano makers had 
opportunities rather than restrictions in the post-war years. 
The findings in this study were restricted by the limited availability of piano company 
records and this study would have been made more complete if additional company 
records were preserved and made accessible. It is possible that these documents have 
been kept in private hands, but until these materials are made available, the complete 
picture of the impact of the Second World War on individual piano firms cannot be 
fully documented. Additionally, it has been frustrating not to be able to find the 
Scottish Music Merchants Associations Journal of 1945, which according to an 
announcement in the Music Trades Review, listed the record of war work of the piano 
industry. This journal is not listed on WorldCat.org and has not been catalogued at the 
National Library of Scotland or the British Library. A search of council libraries in 
Scotland has also been fruitless. Research into secondary contracts has also yielded 
few results. As many of the piano companies were hired on secondary contracts for 
war production work, it has been difficult to trace the companies’ work as it would be 
necessary to find the primary contract holders name and research their company 
records. For example, Kemble and Company stated that they made components for the 
Mosquito bomber, but the de Havilland Museum has no records of Kemble working 
for the firm. Most likely the piano company was hired by a contractor of de Havilland. 
Tracking down these contracts would be incredibly time consuming and it was decided 
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that investing time into this potentially unproductive search was not a priority for this 
thesis.    
The time period of this study places focus on the years in which the British government 
had policies in place which affected piano production, mainly 1939-1953. But, in 
reality, this study could be expanded to 2009, as many of the restrictions of the war 
period continued to impact the industry until it closed its last factory in that year. 
However, this study is not intended to be a history of the demise of the British piano 
industry and instead sought to focus on the immediate impact of the Second World 
War on the industry. The fact that the effects of the war stretched far beyond the scope 
of this study was discovered during the course of research and would be an interesting 
topic for future research.  
Additional areas for future research include looking into the histories of a number of 
piano firms which were referenced in the papers of the Board of Trade, but which have 
little documentation. This includes Triumph Auto Pianos (which I am curious to find 
out if it is related in any way to the Triumph Motor Company), Vaudeville Pianos, and 
Supertone. It is interesting that these three companies received contracts to make 
pianos for N.A.A.F.I., which implies that they were a large-scale piano producer, but 
the firms have no production information listed in the Pierce Piano Atlas. A 
comparison study of how the British and American governments restricted piano 
production would also be a worthwhile study, especially as the American industry was 
able to flourish after the war while the British industry floundered. Finally, a more 
comprehensive study of the changes in the labour of the piano industry in the post-war 
years could be undertaken, especially in regard to the influence of the unions in the 
reconversion of the industry and to see if women were integrated into the industry after 
the war. 
As this study focused on the dialogue between the U.K. Government and piano 
manufacturers, it is limited in scope compared to the larger picture of how the Second 
World War affected music overall. For example, this thesis does not investigate how 
composers, musicians, and the general public dealt with the difficulty in obtaining 
instruments, and how this may have changed the type of music created or performed 
during the time and their voices would have added a human dimension to this study. It 
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is acknowledged that there is a larger discussion to be had around how the war affected 
music, but that was not the focus of this particular investigation, but is worthy of future 
scholarship.   
Finally, this study has presented a historical record of the British piano industry during 
the war years and has documented how government policies affected the industry. It 
has established a clear timeline of production for the period and has laid the foundation 
for future studies of the decline of the British piano industry in the twentieth century. 
This study adds to the scholarship of research on the history of the British piano 
industry, of which would be incomplete without investigations into the impact of the 








Appendix 1: Piano Firms Referenced in the Board of Trade Papers 
 
The lack of company records of individual piano firms makes it difficult to fully 
understand the Second World War’s impact on each firm. The scarcity of preserved 
records kept by the companies themselves means that in order to create a picture of the 
time, one must rely on other sources of information. Luckily, information on a number 
of piano firms was noted in the piano industry and reconstruction files of the Board of 
Trade. The information primarily focuses on the production of pianos for the war 
effort, but ancillary information regarding war production contracts also survives. The 
following is an exploration of the firms referenced in the papers with particular 
attention paid to the number of pianos produced during the war years, the concentration 
of the various piano firms, and how the companies rebuilt their business in the post-
war era. The information found in the Board of Trade files is supplemented with 
research from the Music Trades Review and Alastair Laurence’s two books.  
 
Brasted Bros., Ltd. 
Pre-war production. This piano company was founded circa 1870 by Harry Brasted. 
The firm primarily manufactured wholesale pianos and stencil instruments and the 
company used the names Wigmore, Welbeck, Bannerman, Cumberland, Dorchester, 
Paul Gerard, and Reger on their instruments.740 In 1920 the firm purchased Eavestaff, 
with origins dating back to 1823, and Brasted produced many instruments under this 
name.741 In 1934 the company introduced the “Minipiano,” an instrument design the 
firm purchased from C.A.V. Lundholm of Stockholm.742 The instrument was 
incredibly popular, cost half the price of a regular upright pianos, and was produced in 
a variety of finishes and colours. The design of the minipiano became the dominant 
design of British pianos and helped to revitalise the industry in the 1930s.743 By the 
                                                 
740 Laurence, More London Makers, 23. 
741 Ibid, 19. 
742 Lundholm was not the inventor of the minipiano, That title belongs to the German manufacturer 
Erbe. In addition, Brasted was not the first company in Britain to manufacturer Erbe’s designs. Henry 
Hicks & Sons produced a number of the small instruments in 1929 but they were not successful and 
the firm stopped production shortly thereafter. Ibid, 29. 




1930s Brasted had the largest piano factory in Britain and at the time was regarded as 
the largest piano factory in Europe. At the end of 1934 the company had sold over 
7,000 minipianos and by June 1938 this number reached 10,396.744  
 
Piano production in the war years: The company continued to produce pianos until 
limitation orders and control orders prohibited their production for domestic and 
export markets. 
  
                                                 















Figure 35. Advertisement for the Eavestaff Pianette Minipiano. Music Trades Review, November 1939, 342-343. 
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Brasted was licensed to make minipianos for N.A.A.F.I. In February 1934, the firm 
employed 74 people in the production of pianos.745 In April 1943 the firm was licensed 
to make 24 minipianos for the N.A.A.F.I. and another six instruments to be supplied 
to other government agencies.746 The company was also under licence to produce 
pianos for the Admiralty.747 The firm’s nucleus certificate was withdrawn by the Board 
of Trade in June 1943.748 In August 1943 Brasted sold its 13 remaining pianos to the 
N.A.A.F.I., after which the firm was shut down.749   
Concentration: Brasted was granted a nucleus certificate and concentrated with 
Danemann, who closed its factory.750 
War production: It is unknown if the firm had any alternative war production 
contracts at this time.  
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: yes. 
Post-war: In the post-war years Brasted no longer controlled the market on minipianos 
and faced competition from Kemble, Zender, Barratt & Robinson, and Monington & 
Weston. As time went on, the company fell behind other firms, eventually losing their 
competitive edge. The company’s production fell from 220 pianos a week in 1955 to 
100 pianos a week in 1956 and then dropped to fewer than 70 pianos a week in 1957. 
By 1963 the rate of production was no more than 30 pianos in a week and by 1968 this 
number was down to an average of 10.   
Brasted purchased the Challen company in 1960 and produced an equal if not greater 
number of Challen instruments each week during the 1960s. As the trend for larger 
upright models returned in the 1960s, Brasted continued to produce small-scale 
                                                 
745 Ministry of Labour and National Service to Mr. Postgate, letter, 24 February 1943. BT 64/1783. 
National Archives.  
746 J.E. Meldrum, “Note on the position with reference to supplies of pianos to N.A.A.F.I.,” 
memorandum, 16 April 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
747 J.E. Meldrum, “Letter to Mr. Clayton Ministry of Labour and National Service,” letter, 14 April 
1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
748 E. A. Fischer, Board of Trade, to E.C.P. Lascelles, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 
“Piano Manufacture” memorandum, June 1943. BT 64/1783, National Archives.  
749 E.A. Fisher, “Piano Manufacturers,” memorandum, 18 August 1943. BT 64/1783, National 
Archives.  
750 Ministry of Labour and National Service to Mr. Postgate, Board of Trade, letter, 24 February 1943. 
BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
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instruments and was not competitive with the influx of instruments made in Asia.751 
The company suffered significant financial loss after a failed attempt to produce an 
electro-acoustic piano around 1970. In the spring of 1970 the factory was closed and 
Brasted was sold to Barratt and Robinson.752  
 
Chas. H. Challen & Sons, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Founded by William Challen in 1835. By the turn of the 
twentieth century Challen was known as a maker of medium-priced pianos.753 During 
the First World War the company began making good quality, but affordable, small 
grand pianos, most notably the Model 16 – a 5’ baby grand. 754 The company suffered 
after the war due to competition from imported pianos from Germany and the United 
States and almost closed. Production fell to just over 100 pianos in 1922. The business 
began to turn around after William Evans took over and in 1937 the firm produced 
over 3,000 instruments in that year.755  
Piano production in the war years: In 1939 Challen reported an export turnover of 
£6,116 worth of instruments. From January to October 1940, Challen sold £3,245 
worth of pianos with another £1,109 orders on hand. At this time the firm exported 
pianos to Australia, India, South Africa, Malaya, and Iceland.756 
 
 
                                                 
751 Laurence, More London Piano Makers, 35. 
752 Ibid, 37. 
753Laurence, Five London Piano Makers, 31. 
754 Ibid, 36. 
755 Ibid. 39. 






Figure 19. Challen advertisement. Music Trades Review, March 1940, 48. 
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The firm had stopped manufacturing pianos by 14 April 1943 because it was working 
full-time for the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Admiralty, and the Ministry of 
Supply.757 
Challen was persistent in writing to the Board of Trade during the war years to ask for 
the release of supplies. For example, the firm applied to purchase “Rumanian Pine” in 
October 1943 in order to season the wood for post war production,758 but the 
application was denied.759 The company tried again in January 1944 when it applied 
for the release of 2,597 standards of softwood for seasoning purposes. Although E. A. 
Fisher from the Board of Trade was sympathetic to the company’s request especially 
since the timber was “lying idle,”760 the application was denied by P. Forbs of the 
Ministry of Supply. Forbs wrote that the Wood Division would find it hard to give 
facilities to one firm without having lots of firms and industries coming for the same 
privilege.761 
Experimental piano research: Challen applied to the Board of Trade for the release 
of materials to make three grand pianos and three upright pianos on 4 November 1943. 
Materials needed included: 
o 12 cwt iron 
o 37 lbs. copper 
o 18 lbs steel 
o 38 cu. ft. hardwood 
o 25.5 cu. ft. softwood 
o 56 sq. ft. plywood (3/16”) 
o 66 sq. ft. plywood (1/4”) 
o 113 sq. ft. Plywood (5/8”)762 
 
                                                 
757 J.E. Meldrum, Board of Trade, to Mr. Clayton, Ministry of Labour and National Service, 14 April 
1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
758 S. A. Hurren, Secretary of the Pianoforte Industries and Export Group to E. A. Fisher, Board of 
Trade. “Messrs. Chas. H. Challen and Sons,” 16 October 1943. BT 64/1783. National Archives. 
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1944. BT 64/1783. National Archives.  
761 P. Ford, Ministry of Supply, to E. A. Fisher, Board of Trade, “Challens,” memorandum, 26 January 
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Concentration: Challen did not concentrate with any other firms during the war years 
because it had received sufficient war production contracts and was considered 
“running full” (see Chapter 4 for stipulations of the Concentration of Industry 
Scheme).  
War production: After April 1943 Challen was wholly engaged on Government 
Contracts763 which included working for the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the 
Admiralty, and the Ministry of Supply.764 Challen also had a staff member who did 
maintenance and repairs for pianos at the B.B.C. 765 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. The firm advertised as 
“Manufacturers of Upright and Grand Pianos, specialising in the Production of the 
latter for Domestic, concert, and Broadcasting use.”766 
Post-war: Although Challen was able to secure numerous war production contracts, 
the firm never recovered from the effects of the war. After the war the company never 
reopened its factory located in Hendon, but instead moved to the smaller Omega Works 
in Hermitage Road, Harringay by the early 1950s.767 The company was sold to Brasted 
Brothers in 1960. In 1970 Brasted was sold to Barratt and Robinson. This firm closed 
down by 1984.768  
 
Carlton Pianos 
Pre-war production: Maker of wholesale pianos. 
Piano production in the war years: Carlton Pianos had a licence (D.3/51) for the 
production of ten pianos for N.A.A.F.I., which was valid until 31 October 1942. The 
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Board of Trade had no further correspondence from the firm and it was reported that 
the Government was not sure if the instruments were ever supplied.769 
Concentration: The company may either have been previously purchased by Ferry & 
Foster Ltd. or concentrated under the firm with the following makers: C. & J. Eungblut, 
Burling & Mansfield, F.W. Emmerson Ltd., and C. Burlman & Co.770  
War production: none. 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No 
Post-war: At some point, Carlton pianos was purchased by Temple Pianos, which 
manufactured Carlton pianos in the post-war years. Temple Pianos became Renn 
Pianos in 1958. The company closed in 1960.771 
 
Chappell Piano Company, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Chappell was founded in 1811772 by Samuel Chappell, Francis 
Tatton Latour, and John Baptist Cramer as a music publishing company and instrument 
retailer. Initially the firm did not make its own instruments but sold instruments 
selected by Cramer and Latour and marketed to the nobility and gentry. In 1840 
Chappell started producing their own pianos and opened a factory on Phoenix Street, 
Soho. The pianos became popular and profitable and the firm moved to a new factory 
at Chalk Farm.773 The company made high-end grand pianos and along with 
Broadwood provided instruments for concert stages.774 In 1901 Chappell Piano Co. 
Ltd. was incorporated as a separate company from the music publishing business and 
in 1922 production for grands and uprights reached 100 instruments per week. In 1929 
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Chappell acquired Allison Pianos and Collard & Collard; in 1938 they acquired John 
Strohmenger & Sons. During this time half of Chappell's production was for export.775 
Piano production in the war years: Chappell was granted a provisional nucleus 
certificate on 21 August 1941. By 16 September 1941, the company reported that it 
was fully engaged in export trade.776  
As of February 1942 the company had 30 people engaged in making pianos. The firm 
had been given permission to manufacture 40 pianos a month until the end of 
November 1942, after which time an application for an extension to complete partially 
finished pianos was due to be made.777 The licence for piano production was extended 
until 30 June 1943, but only to complete unfinished pianos.778 The company’s nucleus 
contract and nucleus certificate were withdrawn on 30 June 1943.779 Chappell used up 
most of its reserve stocks while completing its contracts in 1943.780   
Concentration: Chappell was granted a provisional nucleus certificate on 21 August 
1941. It concentrated with J. B. Cramer & Co. Ltd., and John Spencer & Co., both of 
which closed their factories as a stipulation of concentration.781 
War production: After 30 June 1943 the company was working for the Admiralty, 
the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Aircraft Productions, and the Ministry of 
Works and Planning.782 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “The Range of 
Chappell Pianos shown includes the "Mignon" 6ft (1.8m) Grand and the "Chaplette". 
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There will also be models of Our Associated Companies Collard and Collard, Allison 
and Strohmenger.”783 
Post-war: Like most piano companies, Chappell was slow to recover from the war. 
The post-war production estimates based on serial numbers show that Chappell made 
around 200 pianos a year in 1948, 1949, and 1950. 784 According to Laurence, the firm 
produced about eight instruments a week in 1948, but this declined to around six 
instruments per week throughout the 1950s.785 From 1951 to 1977 production numbers 
ranged from four instruments a week to 15 instruments a week. By 1963 the company 
was running on a skeleton workforce; a large portion of its factory sat idle and many 
of its employees were over the age of 60 years. In 1970 Chappell was purchased by 
Phillips Electrical, which closed the ailing piano factory.786 The company was 
purchased by Kemble Piano Company in 1978, who continued to make pianos with 
the Chappell name until April 2000.787  
 
J. B. Cramer and Company  
Pre-war production: J. B. Cramer and Company was established 1824 and was 
incorporated as a limited company in 1897. The company manufactured pianos and 
was a music publisher. By 1914 the company employed 300 people.788 
Piano production in the war years: In 1939 the company reported an approximate 
total turnover of £17,512. This amount declined in 1940 and was reported as £9,461; 
in 1941 the company reported its turnover as £5,230. The firm was exporting 
instruments to Australia, South Africa, British West Indies, and South America.789 
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In February 1942, Cramer had 21 people employed in piano making.790 The company’s 
licence (D.3/77) to produce pianos was valid until 30 June 1943 and it was then 
extended until 31 August 1943. This licence covered 52 pianos, all of which were 
supplied to the N.A.A.F.I. 791 The pianos were all manufactured at the Chappell factory 
after the Concentration of Industries Scheme went into effect.792  
Concentration: The factory closed down under the Concentration of Industries 
scheme. A nucleus certificate was issued to Chappell Piano Co. Ltd. on 21 May 
1941.793 
War Production: Cramer completed war work for the Admiralty.794 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No. 
Post-war: During the post-war years, Cramer averaged a production of fewer than 200 
pianos a year and production stopped in the early 1960s.795 In 1964, the company was 
taken over by Kemble & Co., who used the name J. B. Cramer and Co. for a limited 
time. 
 
W. Danemann & Co.  
Pre-war production: Founded by William Danemann in 1893 as a manufacture of 
“trade” (stencil) pianos.796 The firm began manufacturing Pohlmann and Son pianos 
in 1934.797 Prior to the war the company produced mainly upright and miniature pianos 
and only small grand pianos measuring 4’ 3”.798 
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Piano production in the war years: Danemann closed down the manufacture of 
pianos on 27 February 1943.799 The company employed a separate labour force of five 
men for maintenance and repair work after it closed manufacture.800 Most likely the 
firm maintained a healthy amount of its stock, because when it applied to the Board of 
Trade in November 1943 for the release of materials to make experimental 
instruments, including three grand pianos and three upright overstrung pianos, it only 
requested 6 cwt iron and 18 sq. ft. of celluloid.801 
Concentration: Concentrated with Brasted Brothers.802 
War production: By April 1943 the firm was wholly engaged in Government 
contracts and completed work for the Admiralty and the Ministry of Supply.803 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed exhibitor: “Manufacturers 
of Pianos, Grand and Upright, in various woods and modern designs.”804 
Post-war: After the Second World War the company began making instruments under 
its own name805 and changed from producing stencil pianos to more upscale 
instruments, including grand pianos.806 The company was best known for its upright 
school models, made of solid oak to withstand abuse in a school environment.807 In 
the 1970s the company was having difficulty competing with Asian imports and was 
eventually sold to Broadwood and Sons in 1982. The Danemann factory was closed in 
July 1984.808 
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Herrburger & Brooks Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Established by Henry Brooks in 1810. Maker of piano actions, 
hammer heads, and keyboards.  
Piano production in the war years: The company employed just two people (aged 
50-60) in piano work as of February 1943.809 The firm’s nucleus certificate was 
withdrawn by August 1943 and its labour (not involved in war production) was 
transferred to the Directorate of Woodworking. 810  
Concentration: This firm was not concentrated. 
War production: The company had contracts for the Admiralty and the Ministry of 
Aircraft Production.811 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “Manufacturers of 
Pianoforte Actions, Keys and Hammers for Grand and Upright Pianos and Player 
Pianos. Organ Keys. "Schwander" and "Herrburger" Actions. "Shenstone" and 
"Ivorette" Keys. Ivory Cutters. Plastic Moulders.”812 
Post-war: By 1953 Herrburger Brooks became the largest action maker company in 
Europe. The company was taken over by Kimball International Inc. of the U.S.A. in 
1965 and was sold to Harmony Pianos of Hong Kong in 1996. In 1998 the company 
went into administrative receivership.813  
 
Alfred Knight, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Founded by Alfred E. Knight in 1936. Knight had previously 
worked at the piano firm Cremona Ltd. before founding Booker & Knight in 1936.  
Knight’s prior experience and financial backing from the Barnes Piano Group, which 
owned a number of retail stores in England, aided the new company as it established 
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itself in less-than-ideal financial times. The new piano company produced around 150 
pianos in 1936, which then increased to almost 600 pianos in 1937.814 In 1939 the firm 
was producing 1,000 instruments per year.815 The company produced upright pianos 
which were known for their even sound quality throughout their compass. 
Piano production in the war years: In 1939 Knight reported a turnover of £26,000 
worth of pianos for the period running June through December. Of this, £2,000 worth 
of pianos were for export and sent mainly to South America. In 1940 the company 
reported a turnover of £17,100 worth of pianos. Exports accounted for £2,100 of this 
amount.  
Knight was contracted to make pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. and the British and American 
Red Cross.816 In June 1943 the firm had a contract to make 54 pianos for the 
NA.A.F.I.817 The company was also given special permission to build an experimental 
piano which would be exported to tropical climates.818 It was reported that nine pianos 
made by Alfred Knight were sent to Normandy after the D-Day invasion in 1944.819 
The Knight N.A.A.F.I. piano was designed to be a sturdy instrument that could 
withstand extended use by soldiers. To increase its strength, the piano was made with 
an iron frame that extended across the entire back of the piano and the casework was 
made from solid heavy oak. To prevent damage from overeager, or potentially 
inebriated players, the piano had some interesting features. The top of the piano was 
at an angle so that glasses could not be set on it, a metal plate was placed behind the 
pedals to prevent players from kicking in the bottom, ashtrays were built into the piano 
beside the keys, and the key covers were made of flame-resistant material to prevent 
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cigarette burns (and to prevent the whole instrument from going up in flames because 
of a misplaced cigarette820).821   
 
Figure 20. Still from a promotional video of the Knight N.A.A.F.I. piano showing Alfred night placing a glass on 
the angled top of the piano. 1951. Accessed 28 January 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYnnSPNKYlA. 
 
                                                 
820 At the time, synthetic materials used in key covers were made of celluloid, which was highly 
flammable. They were marketed under the names ivoroid or ivorette. 




Figure 21. Still from a promotional video of the Knight N.A.A.F.I. piano showing Alfred Knight with cigarette on 
the ashtray of the piano. 1951. Accessed 28 January 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kYnnSPNKYlA. 
 
Concentration: Knight was issued a nucleus certificate on 16 September 1941. This 
firm combined with Alfred Taylor & Son, Ltd. and Leswein Piano, Ltd, which was 
closed down. 822 The company’s nucleus certificate was withdrawn by the Board of 
Trade on 30 June 1943.823  
War production: Knight’s war-time contracts were for pianos. It is unknown if the 
company had any other war production contracts.  
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “Manufacturers of 
Modern Small Pianos.”824 
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Post-war: In 1950 Knight produced around 800 pianos with 90% of the pianos 
exported.825 The company was able to create an extensive export market by offering 
piano “kits” containing finished and semi-finished parts, including the iron frame, 
soundboard, unassembled case, action, piano wires, etc., which were shipped to 
factories in other countries to be assembled and finished. These pianos were stencil 
instruments and were labelled with the foreign factory’s name on the outside, but the 
iron frame was cast containing the Knight logo.826  
An additional market Knight developed in the post-war era was that of the classroom. 
Knight modified the sturdy N.A.A.F.I. piano to be suitable for the schoolroom and the 
resulting piano came to be known as the “school” model. The N.A.A.F.I. pianos were 
known for their ability to withstand the rigors of soldiers’ playing, and the modified 
“school” piano was also able to take the stress of classroom use.827    
In the 1950s, Knight moved to a new factory at Loughton in Essex. The move to a 
more modern and larger factory enabled the company to expand its production and 
between 1956 and 1959 the company produced over 2,000 pianos a year. From 1961 
to 1979 the company averaged an annual production of 1,780 instruments. Throughout 
this time Knight exported 80% of their production.828  
Like other piano firms, Knight had difficulty facing competition from cheaper, Asian-
made pianos. From 1980 onwards, production numbers declined and on 31 October 
1990 the factory closed.829 The company was sold to Bentley Piano Company Ltd. in 
1990 and Knight pianos were made in the Bentley factory until 1993 when Bentley, 
Broadwood and Knight were acquired by Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd Ltd. In 2000 
this firm merged with Woodchester Pianos, Stroud to form The British Piano 
Manufacturing Company, Ltd., which was liquidated in 2003.830 Today instruments 
bearing the Knight name are imported from China.831 
                                                 
825 The remaining 10% were sold to schools and churches which were exempt from the ban on 
purchasing pianos as well as from having to pay the Purchase Tax. 
826 Laurence, More London Piano Makers, 95. 
827 Ibid, 93. 
828 Ibid, 97. 
829 Ibid, 101. 
830 “A History of the Piano, 1157-2015” UK Piano Page, accessed 20 November 2016, 
http://www.piano-tuners.org/history/history_1.html.  




Lambert of London  
Pre-war production: Established in 1881. Manufacturers of upright pianos. 
Piano production in the war years: Lambert was issued a licence (D. 3/83) for the 
production of 200 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I to be completed by 31 August 1943. 832 In 
April 1943 the company reported that it was uncertain if it would be able to fulfil the 
contract as their allocation of iron was about to run out.833 
Concentration: Unknown. This company is not included in any of the reports of piano 
company concentration in the Board of Trade Papers.  
War production: Unknown. 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No.  
Post-war: According to the Pierce Piano Atlas Lambert Pianos produced 400 pianos 
in 1954, 1080 pianos in 1955, and 370 pianos in 1956. There are no more production 
numbers recorded after 1956 and most likely the firm was closed down.834 
 
Leswein Pianos, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Established in 1920. 
Piano production in the war years: On 3 February 1940 a fire totally destroyed the 
Leswein factory. The company stated that they would restart production at a new 
factory.835 In 1941 the company obtained full manufacturing and selling rights of 
Kessel Pianos.836  
The firm was granted a licence (D. 3/85) for the production of 25 pianos for the 
N.A.A.F.I to be supplied by 31 July 1943. Only ten instruments were supplied and the 
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company requested an extension to finish the contract.837 In September 1943 Leswein 
was granted an extension on their licence to complete 14 pianos but it was required 
that the pianos must be completed by any labour that would be left to them after the 
Ministry of Labour and National Service investigated their workforce and transferred 
workers to war production factories.838  
Concentration: Concentrated with Alfred Taylor & Son and Alfred Knight, which 
became the nucleus firm. Leswein was closed down for the rest of the war.839  
War production: Unknown. As this firm was concentrated it is highly unlikely that it 
was granted any war production contracts.  
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as: “Manufacturers of 
Pianofortes, Pianoforte Stools.” 
Post-war: The company produced around 100 instruments per year in 1958 and 1959 
and closed in 1960.840  
 
Sir Herbert Marshall & Sons, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Established in 1907. Maker of Marshall & Rose pianos. This 
firm was known for building high quality, elaborate pianos.  
Piano production in the war years: The company’s last licence for piano production 
was for nine pianos to be sold to the N.A.A.F.I., which expired on 27 February 1943.841 
Concentration: Marshall concentrated under Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd, which 
was issued with a nucleus certificate on 19 June 1941. Marshall & Sons, along with 
John Broadwood & Sons, Ltd., and Vincent Manufacturing Co., Ltd, were closed 
down.842 
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War production: Ernest Marshall (son of Herbert Marshall) recounted that 24 hours 
after he filled out forms and submitted his details of his factory space and machinery 
for war work the local Borough Council called round and requisitioned his factory for 
storing furniture from war-damaged houses. All of his machinery was “just pushed 
aside.”843  
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes: Listed as “Manufacturers of the 
‘Marshall and Rose’ Upright and Grand Pianofortes of Various modern designs in any 
available Woods and, if desired, of special construction throughout for use in Tropical 
Climates.”844 Although exhibited as its own company, these pianos were made by 
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd.  
Post-war: The company decided not to restart its business after the war and instead 
sold to Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd. Marshall and Rose pianos had a good reputation 
and soon this formed 20% of Whelpdale’s annual output.845  
 
Monington & Weston, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Established in 1858. This firm was predominantly makers of 
baby grand pianos and small uprights. 
Piano production in the war years: The company reported an export turnover of 
£6,243 in 1939, £5,171 in 1940, and £5,603 in 1941 with an additional £2,076 worth 
of orders on hand for that year. It had agents in South Africa and Australia and also 
exported to New Zealand, Ceylon, and British West Indies. Monington & Weston 
made a type of piano that had a double metal frame which they reported as being 
“particularly suited for the Tropics.”846 
The company was issued a licence (D. 3/76) for the production of 29 pianos to be 
supplied by 30 June 1943. The firm received an extension on the licence until 31 
August 1943 because they were only able to supply 16 pianos by July. The extension 
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covered the remaining 13 pianos. E. A. Fisher from the Board of Trade thought it was 
unlikely the company would be able to finish the 13 pianos by August847 and the firm’s 
nucleus certificate was withdrawn on 31 August 1943.848 
Monington & Weston applied to the Board of Trade on 4 November 1943 for the 
release of materials in order to manufacture six experimental pianos using the firm’s 
patent double iron frames. The materials requested were: 15 cwt iron, 37 lbs. copper, 
30 cu. ft. softwood for soundboards.849 
Monington & Weston agreed to complete four 4’6” grand pianofortes by the end of 
June 1944 for export to Spain if they could obtain the iron frames.850 
Concentration: A nucleus certificate was issued to the company on 19 November 
1941. The company concentrated with Werwick Piano Company, which was shut 
down.851 
War production: Unknown. 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “Manufacturers of 
Pianos, Uprights, Baby Grands, Boudoir Grands, Miniature Pianos, Music Stools. 
Pianos can be specially made for Tropical Climates. School Pianos.”852 
Post-war: The company ceased piano production in 1976 and instead built piano 
keyboards after taking over the J. Pine company. The company closed in 1986. The 
name was sold to John Morley of Robert Morley & Co. in 1996. Morley re-established 
the name and made Monington & Weston pianos for U.K. sales. The pianos are now 
made in China and finished in the U.K.853  
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John Spencer & Co. 
Pre-war production: Established in 1883. Produced mainly upright pianos and a few 
baby grand pianos. 
Piano production in the war years: The company was issued a licence (D.3/62) to 
manufacture 32 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. which was valid until 27 February 1943.854  
Concentration: John Spencer & Co. concentrated under Chappell along with John S. 
Murdock & Co. Ltd. and J. B. Cramer & Co. Establishments closing down were J. B. 
Cramer & Co. Ltd. and John Spencer & Co.855 
War production: None 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No.  
Post-war: This company did not reopen after the war. The last pianos made were for 
the N.A.A.F.I in 1943.  
 
Stroud Piano Co.  
Pre-war production: Originally founded as the Bentley Piano Company in 1906, the 
firm moved to the Cotswolds, Woodchester Mills near Stroud in 1911 and became the 
Stroud Piano Co., Ltd., continuing to sell pianos using the Bentley name. In 1930 
Stroud was a major producer of baby grand pianos and had an annual output of 3,000 
pianos.856 Along with the Bentley trade name, this firm manufactured Hampton Pianos, 
Stroud Pianos, and Kingscourt Pianos.857 
Piano production in the war years: Stroud received extensive orders from the 
Government for pianos. In August and September 1941, the Government ordered 
£1,046 worth of pianos for export and £6,547 of pianos to be supplied to military bases 
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on U.K. soil. During this time 18 men were engaged in piano production of the 43 total 
employees.858  
From March to May 1942, Stroud produced £9,743 worth of pianos for the 
Government. Most likely these pianos were ordered for the N.A.A.F.I. or another 
Government agency. At this time 29 out of the 35 employees of the company were 
engaged in “normal” production, i.e. piano production.859  
Stroud’s last licence for piano production (D. 3/66) was for 250 pianos to be completed 
by 27 February 1943. After this time the firm was engaged completely in war 
production.860 
Concentration: Stroud did not concentrate during the war. 
War production: In April 1941, the company had a Government order for £1,313 
worth of products other than pianos. In May 1941 the order amounted to £443 and in 
June of that year it totalled £2,659 worth of products other than pianos.861 By February 
1943 the company was fully engaged in Government work for the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production.862 The company made aircraft components, notably for the Gloster 
Meteor.863 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “Manufacturers of 
"Bentley" Pianofortes of Modern Design small in size and of attractive appearance. 
Bentley "Studio-Minor" and "Bungalow" Models in Walnut, Mahogany, Oak. Bentley 
4ft. 6in. (1.37m) Horizontal Grands in Walnut and Mahogany.”864 
Post-war: Stroud was a successful piano company in the post-war era. During the 
years of austerity, Stroud exported many pianos and created a world-wide distribution 
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market. The firm started to decline in the 1980s with mounting competition from Asia, 
as well as suffering a significant fire at its factory. In 1993 the firm was acquired by 
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd. In 2001 it became part of the British Piano 
Manufacturing Company Ltd., which went into liquidation in 2003.865  
 
Supertone Pianos 
Pre-war production: Manufacturers of wholesale pianos. 
War-years piano production: Unknown at this time. 
Concentration: This company did not concentrate. 
War production: Supertone received extensive war production contracts, many of 
which were most likely for furniture production. The reported value of government 
orders for products other than pianos included the following:  
 
April 1941:    £3,192  
May 1941:    £5,300 
June 1941:    £13,966  
August & September 1941: £13,967 
March to May 1942  £28,472.  
 
The company received an additional £3,405 worth of orders for products other than 
pianos from non-government related contractors in March to May 1942. 866 
In April 1941 the company had 187 male employees and eight female employees. In 
June 1941 the company had 182 male employees and six female employees working 
on all products. Of these employees only five male employees were working full-time 
on normal piano-related work, the rest of the work force was working over-time on 
                                                 
865 Ibid.  
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Government contract production.867 By October 1941 the number of employees 
totalled 165 males and 31 females, of these three men were engaged in piano work. In 
May 1942 Supertone employed 270 people (179 men and 91 women) with only three 
of these employees working on piano related work.868  
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No. 
Post-war: Unknown at this time. 
 
Alfred Taylor & Son, Ltd. 
Pre-war production: Established in 1890.  
Piano production in the war years: Taylor reported having an export turnover of 
£610 in the year 1939-1940 and only £62 worth of orders on hand in September 
1940.869 The company was issued a licence (D. 3/82) for the production of six pianos 
to be completed by 30 June 1943. This licence was extended until 13 August when the 
pianos were sold to the N.A.A.F.I.870 The company’s nucleus certificate was 
withdrawn by the Board of Trade in June 1943.871 Alfred Taylor & Son closed its 
factory in November 1943.872  
Concentration: A nucleus certificate was issued to this firm in conjunction with 
Alfred Knight Ltd on 16 September 1941. The two firms concentrated with Leswein 
Piano Ltd., which closed its factory.873  
War production: None 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No.  
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Post-war: The company closed in November 1943. 
 
Triumph Auto Pianos 
Pre-war production: Maker of player pianos and upright pianos. 
Piano production in the war years: The company was issued a licence (D. 3/88) to 
produce 50 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. to be completed by 31 July 1943. By August the 
firm had only supplied seven instruments and asked for an extension.874 Although the 
firm’s nucleus certificate was withdrawn by the Board of Trade in June 1943, the 
company had their licence extended to 31 October because they had a special order 
from the N.A.A.F.I. for 200 pianos. The War Office agreed to release the necessary 
raw materials for the company to complete the pianos and the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service ceased transfer of labour from this company until 31 October 1943 
so that the firm could finish their contract.875 Piano production ceased after 31 October 
1943.876  
The company applied to the Board of Trade for the release of materials for 
experimental production of six pianos in November 1943. Materials needed included 
8 cwt iron, 36 lbs. copper for bass strings, 33 cu. ft. hardwood, 82.5 cu. ft. imported 
softwood, and 18 sq. ft. celluloid for key-coverings.877 
Concentration: Triumph Auto was issued a nucleus certificate on 19 July 1941 and 
concentrated with A. W. Lee and the Fleet Piano Company, both of which closed their 
factories during the war years.878 
War production: unknown 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No.  
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Post-war: Unknown.  
 
Vaudeville Piano Company Limited 
Pre-war production: Unknown 
Piano production during the war years: By February 1943 the company employed 
eight men (six of whom were over 50) working full-time on piano repairs for 
N.A.A.F.I. and had an order to manufacture 40 pianos for this institution.879 The 
company was licensed (D. 10/383) to produce ten pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. by 30 June 
1943.880 In September 1943, Vaudeville was granted an extension on their licence to 
complete two pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. Although the company was granted the 
extension, the pianos had to be completed by any labour that may be left to them after 
the Ministry of Labour and National Service investigated their workforce and 
transferred labour to war production factories.881  
Concentration: Unknown.  
War production: Unknown. 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No.  
Post-war: Unknown.  
 
T. M. Vincent Limited 
Pre-war production: Maker of upright pianos.  
Piano production during the war years: Vincent was granted a licence (D.3/54) to 
produce 20 pianos for the N.A.A.F.I. by 31 December 1942. The firm was given an 
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additional licence (D.3/86) for the production of three pianos to be supplied by 31 July 
1943, after which the company stopped production.882  
Concentration: Concentrated under Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd (who were issued 
a nuclear status) along with John Broadwood & Sons Ltd., and Sir Herbert Marshall 
& Sons, Ltd. Broadwood, Marshall, and Vincent closed their factories during the 
war.883 
War production: None. 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: No. 
Post-war: Unknown. 
 
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd 
Pre-war production: Originally founded in 1876 to sell imported Blüthner pianos. 
The company began manufacturing their own pianos in 1938 after the Squire and 
Longson factory was destroyed in a fire and Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd bought 
the company and hired the staff to produce pianos under the brand of Welmar.884 Along 
with Broadwood and Chappell, Welmar pianos were among the most expensive British 
pianos on the market.885  
Piano production during the war years: In 1942 the company reported these sales 
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Period of Report Total Turnover Export Turnover Orders on hand 
1939 (June/Dec) £26,254 £6,018  
1940 (June/Dec) £18,223 £3,378  
1941 (Jan/May) £11,519 £4,964  
June 1941   £5,690 
 
Table 20. Sales figures reported to the Board of Trade from the "Factual Survey of the Piano Industry, 
Appendix B, March 1942. BT 64/1786. National Archives, Kew. 
 
The company had an agent in Argentina and exported to Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa.  
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd was issued a licence (D.3/63) to build six pianos for the 
N.A.A.F.I to be supplied by 27 February 1943.886 The company’s nucleus certificate 
was withdrawn by the Board of Trade in June 1943.887 
The company applied to the Board of Trade for release of materials in November 1943 
to manufacture experimental post-war pianos. This included one large grand piano and 
one overstrung model upright. The materials requested were 10 cwt iron, 18.15 cu. ft. 
imported hardwood, 21.10 cu. ft. imported softwood, 5.00 cu. ft. softwood for 
soundboards (imported).888 
Concentration: The firm was issued a nucleus certificate on 19 June 1941 and 
concentrated with John Broadwood & Sons Ltd., Sir Herbert Marshall & Sons, Ltd., 
and Vincent Manufacturing Co. Ltd – all three of which were closed down.889 
War production: According to Alastair Laurence, Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd 
were allowed to continue to manufacture a limited number of instruments for the 
Government throughout the war years.890 By 1947 the company reported that the 
factory had completed 72 Broadwood upright instruments and one Broadwood baby 
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grand over the course of seven years. The factory had a further 11 grands and 38 
uprights in the course of construction.891 
Exhibitor at the 1947 British Industries Fair: Yes. Listed as “Manufacturers of the 
‘Welmar’ Upright and Grand Pianofortes of various modern designs, in any available 
woods and if desired, of special construction throughout, for use in Tropical 
Climates.”892 
Post-war: Immediately after the war Whepdale continued to manufacture Broadwood 
pianos until that company was able to return to its factory in November 1946.893 
Marshall and Sons Ltd. decided not to re-start production and sold the business to 
Whelpdale, after which Marshall and Rose pianos formed 20% of Whelpdale’s annual 
output.894 After 1945 the company offered for the export market two sizes of grand 
pianos: a baby grand of 4’ 9” and a full-sized grand of 9’ (of which very few were 
produced). These pianos were branded both as Welmar pianos and Marshall and Rose 
pianos. Three main sizes of upright instruments were produced from 1945: models A, 
B, and C.895  
Whelpdale, Maxwell and Codd was successful in the post-war years. The company 
was able to recover from the war and maintain strong production numbers. The 
company acquired the Bentley Piano Company in 1993. At this point Whelpdale 
owned the names of Welmar, Bentley, Grover and Grover, Knight, Rogers Steinberg, 
Hopkinson, and Zender.896 In 2000 this firm merged with Woodchester Pianos, Stroud 
to form The British Piano Manufacturing Company, Ltd. This firm was liquidated in 
2003.897 
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Appendix 2: Timeline of Government Restrictions on the Piano 
Industry 
 
January 1939 New Zealand announces restrictions on imports to the country. 
 
June 1939 Piano imports banned in New Zealand. 
 
1939 Excess Profit Tax set at 60%. 
 
September 1939 Trading with the Enemy Act enacted. 
 
 Control of Timber (No. 1) Order goes into effect. 
 
January 1940 Board of Trade and Ministry of Supply take control over raw 
materials. 
 
April 1940 Steel and iron restricted by licensing restrictions by the 
Ministry of Supply. 
 
March 1940 Excess Profit Tax set at 100%. Firms making more than £2,000 
in profit had to register with the Board of Trade. 
 
May 1940 Purchase Tax proposed by the Conservative Government – met 
resistance. 
 
June 1940 Limitation of Supply Order reduced piano production by 1/3 of 
the amount manufactured in June to November 1939. 
 
October 1940 Purchase Tax enacted: a flat rate of 33⅓% of the retail value 
was placed on less essential and luxury goods. 
 
November 1940 Limitation of Supply Order reduced piano production to 25% 
of the amount produced in June-November 1939. 
 
March 1941 Concentration of Industries Scheme enacted. 
 
April 1941 Piano industry invited to apply for Protection Status. 
 
July 1941 Seven protection certificates were granted. All other piano 
firms had to concentrate or shut down. 
 
 The Location of Industry (Restriction) Order, 1941. Firms not 
engaged in war work could not carry on in a factory or 
warehouse having an area larger than 3,000 feet or use the 




August 1941 No timber would be released for the manufacture of pianos for 
the home trade. 
 
September 1941 Excess Profit Tax registration requirement lowered from 
£2,000 profit to £500 profit. 
 
November 1941 Purchase Tax sales threshold lowered from those with 
chargeable goods exceeding £2,000 a year to just £500 a year. 
 
January 1942 Export of Goods (Control) Order No. 4 (S.R. & O., 1942, No. 
68). Piano manufacturers and action makers are required to 
obtain a licence before exporting goods abroad. 
 
 Lend Lease Agreement: British makers are banned from 
shipping any instrument made partially or wholly of any non-
ferrous metals anywhere in the western hemisphere. 
 
April 1942 Cessation of all export licences. 
 
 Purchase Tax increased to 66⅔% on luxury goods. 
 
May 1942 Piano industry granted a small amount of raw materials to 
enable repairs of second hand instruments. 
 
 Second hand instruments now price controlled. 
 
August 1942 Control of Manufacture and Supply Order: the production of 
all pianos for the civilian market is now banned.  
Manufacturers were able to sell their stocks, when completed, 
to certain priority users (N.A.A.F.I. and other Government 
buyers) under a monthly quota system. 
 
April 1943 Purchase Tax raised to 100%. 
 
August 1943 Complete shutdown of piano making as of 31 August 1943. 
This also applied to the output allowed for the Forces and 
N.A.A.F.I. In regard to other instruments: a very limited 
amount of manufacture is permitted for official purposes, but it 
does not enable the makers to retain any skilled staff or 
machinery.   
 
January 1944 Export of Goods (Control) (No. 10) Order 1943. (S.R.&O. 
1943, No. 1717). Holders of special censor permits may export 
certain good to British and Allied prisoners of war and interned 
civilians. This has been extended to include musical 




August 1944 Board of Trade Order fixing the maximum prices for second 
hand goods comes into effect. Since 1942 pianoforte prices 
have been controlled under the General Furniture Order and the 
amount of profit that could be made is clearly defined in this 
order.   
 
February 1945 Piano industry set up a research committee to help with the 
transition back to civilian production. Materials were released 
for production of half a dozen experimental models by each of 
the firms which applied. 
 
 Pianos were no longer controlled under the Export of Goods 
(Control) Orders and no licence was required from the Export 
Licensing Department. 
 
June 1945 New Order for Price Control of Second Hand Pianos. Second 
hand goods order (S.R.&O. 1943, No. 393).  
 
October 1945 Timber Control Orders lessened and the piano industry was 
given first choice of timber.  
 
July 1946 Trading with the Enemy Act is revoked. Order (S.R. & O. 1946, 
No. 1041) 
 
July 1947 Piano makers were granted a licence to sell 333 pianos to the 
home market which had not been able to be exported. By April 
1948 only 271 of these pianos had been transferred to dealers. 
 
September 1948 Purchase Tax lowered to 66⅔%. 
 
July 1949 Resumption of Home Trade for the piano industry. 
 
October 1952 Purchase Tax lowered to 33⅓%. 
 















Appendix 3: Members of the Pianoforte Manufacturers Association, 
Ltd. 
 
Compiled from the June 1941 & June 1944 list of members found in the Board of 
Trade Papers, BT 64/1786. National Archives. Addresses are in London unless 
otherwise stated. 
 
Company name Address 
Bamberger, Louis & Sons 27, Finsbury Square, S.C.2 
Bansell & Sons, Ltd. 5, Urswick Road, Homerton, N.9 
Barratt & Robinson, Ltd. 255, York Way, N.7 
Berry, Nathaniel 14 City Road, E.C.1 
Brasted Bros. Ltd. 155 Hermitage Road, N.4. 
Broadwood, John & Sons Ltd. 9 Hanover Street, W.1 
Buckland, G. A. & Co. Paxton Road, Tottenham, N.17  
Burling & Mansfield Leads Place, Tollington Park, N.4 
Carlton Pianos 121, Daubeney Road, E.5 
Challen, Chas. H. & Son, Ltd. Omega Works, Hermitage Road, N.4  
Chappell Piano Co. Ltd 50 New Bond Street, W.1 
Cramer, J. B. & Co. 139, New Bond Street, W.1 
Cremona Ltd.  97, Carysfort Rd., Stoke Newington, N.16 
Danemann, W. & Son Northampton Works, Northampton St. N.1 
Dunkley, Chas. 18 Hazelville Road, N.19 
Eavestaff, W. G. & Sons, Ltd. Ashfield Road, N.4 
Fleet Piano Co.  43, Commerce Road N.22 
Harper, Thomas (Pianos) Ltd. 498, Hornsey Road, N.19 
Harrison, T. Grayling Rd., Stoke Newington, N.16 
Hertman Pianos  White Hart Works, Douglas Road, N.17 
Hicks, N. & Son Ltd. 53-57, New Kent Road, S.E.1 
Holder, P. E. & Sons  5, Woodberry Place, N.15 
Hulbert & Jones  168, Stockwell Road, S.W.9 
Humphrey, J. & Co. Ltd.  Leads Place, Tollington Park, N.4 
Kemble & Co.  97, Carysfort Road, Stoke Newington, N.16 
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Knight, Alfred  Granville Park Works, Brettenham Road, N.18 
King Bros. (Pianos) Ltd.  Tresham Avenue, E.9 
Leswein Pianos Ltd.  54, Islington Park Street, N.1. 
Marshall, Sir H. & Son, Ltd. (1941) Reading Lane, Hackney, E.6 
(1944) Bridge Road, Weybridge, Surrey 
Monington & Weston, Ltd. 23, Piercefield Street, N.W.5 
Montague Bros. & Co. 505, Liverpool Road, N.7 
Morley, Robt. & Co. Ltd.  123, High Street, Lewisham, S.E.13 
Payne, T. G. Ltd.  141-145, Kentish Town Road, N.W.1 
Pyrke, C. H. 132, Sussex Way, N.19 
Renn, H. J. Standard Works, Newington Green, N.16 
Skerratt Bros. 66, Brewery Road, N.1  
Souhami & Co.  109a, Regents Park Road, Chalk Farm, N.W.1 
Spencer, John & Co. 7, Chalcot Road, N.W.1  
Steinberg Pianos Ltd. 16, Brewery Road, N.7  
Stroud Piano Co. Ltd. The Woodchester Mills, Stroud, Glos. 
Supertone Long Eaton, Nottingham 
Taplin & Hoare  89a, Braemar Rd., S. Tottenham, N.15 
Taylor, Alfred & Son, Ltd. Alsen Road, Holloway, N.7 
Temple Pianos Ltd. 107, Matthias Road, N.16 
Vaudeville Piano Co. Dorset Works, Dorset Road, N.15 
Vincent, T. M. 7 Greenland Place, N.W.1 
Vincent Manufacturing Co. 44, Fitzroy Road, N.W.1  
Whelpdale, Maxwell & Codd Ltd. 17/23, Wigmore Street, W.1 
Wyatt, H.A. 53a, Turnpike Lane, Hornsey, N.8 






Appendix 4: Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous) Order, 1940  
 
Transcribed from the June 1940 issue of Music Trades Review. 
Overview 
Under the new Limitation of Supplies (Miscellaneous Order, 1940), supplies to the 
home market of a large number of articles in general use but not considered essential 
are to be restricted. 
The articles controlled are outlined in a schedule to the Order issued by the Board of 
Trade and those affecting the music and radio dealers are specially outlined at the end 
of this article.  
In the Explanatory Memorandum it is pointed out that the consumer can use fewer and 
make last longer a large number of articles commonly used, but not essential. 
Particularly, it says, the labour engaged in non-essential production can be diverted to 
war work elsewhere. Under the Order every person carrying on the business of 
supplying: 
a) any class of controlled goods in the manufacture of which he has carried out a 
process, or 
b) any class of controlled goods to persons who buy for the purpose of selling them 
again, 
is required to make an application to the Board of Trade to be registered. These persons 
will be referred to in this article as “Controlled Suppliers.” 
Retailers or other dealers who sell controlled good exclusively to persons (e.g., 
members of the public, hospitals, railway companies, etc.) who do not buy for re-sale, 
are not required to apply for registration and are not entitled to be registered.   
Controlled Home Supplies 
During the period beginning June 6, 1940, and ending November 30, 1940, the 
aggregate of his controlled home supplies (i.e., of supplies other than those exempted 
for specific purposes) of each class of controlled goods is to be restricted by each 
registered person to a maximum of two-thirds of his aggregate controlled home 
supplies of that class of goods in the six months ended November 30, 1939 (referred 
to hereafter as the standard period). The restriction is to be calculated by value and not 
quantity.  
The Order does not necessarily require the registered person to restrict his home 
supplies to any particular customer to any fixed proportion of the value of the orders 
placed by that customer in the standard period. Nor does it prevent him from accepting 
the orders of new customers or persons who did no trade with him during the standard 
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period, so long as his controlled home supplies of each class of goods are in the 
aggregate restricted as prescribed.  
Every controlled supplier, as defined in paragraph 3 above, is required to apply on 
forms issued by the Board of Trade for registration by the Board before June 20, 1940. 
Forms are obtainable from Chambers of Commerce, Trade Associations and by 
personal application at the offices of H.M. Inspectors of Factories or from the 
Industrial Supplies (Registers) Department of the Board of Trade, Fanum House, 66, 
Whitcomb Street, London, W.1. Every supplier is required to specify each class of 
controlled goods in respect of which he is a controlled supplier.  
Applicants will be informed as soon as possible whether or not their names have been 
entered on the Register. A copy of the Register will be published and placed on sale at 
the earliest possible date. When it is issued forms will be sent to all registered persons 
on which to make the return required under the Order. This return must be certified by 
auditors and the relevant trading accounts, invoices and other documents must be kept 
for inspection, as may be necessary, by accountants appointed by the Board of Trade. 
Provision is made under which, for example, a retailer who carries on a relatively 
trifling wholesale business may be exempted from the requirement to register as a 
wholesaler, provided that he raises the question when applying for registration. The 
fact that he may be allowed such exemption does not relieve any person required to be 
registered from his obligation to apply for registration.  
Unrestricted Supplies 
All registered persons may supply without restrictions: 
(a) any class of controlled goods to any other person whose name is included on 
the Register for that class of controlled goods,  
(b) goods required for the execution of contracts with Government Departments, 
(c) direct to overseas markets. 
It should be noted that goods supplied to local authorities are not to be regarded as 
supplied to Government Departments. Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man are not, 
but the Channel Islands and Eire [Ireland] are to be so regarded. 
The restriction to be made must be computed in respect of each class of controlled 
goods. It may happen that suppliers registered in respect of one class are not registered 
in respect of another class or classes.  When making his computation, therefore, the 
supplier will have to be careful to examine the Register to ascertain in respect of which 
class or classes in which he deals each of his customers is (or is not) registered. 
The words “supply” and “supplied” are to be understood as referring to the physical 
act of supplying and not to the making of a contract under which goods will 
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subsequently be supplied. Articles should be regarded as “supplied” on the date on 
which they are despatched to the customer by the supplier.  
Definition of Value 
The Order defines the value at which supplies are to be taken into account. Normally, 
this value will represent the net sale price on which the invoices to customers are based.  
Registered persons will probably find it convenient to compute the value of the 
permitted home supplies of controlled goods somewhat as follows. 
In respect of each class of controlled goods: 
(e) ascertain the total value thereof as invoiced to customers in the period from 
June 1 to November 30, 1939; 
(f) subtract therefrom the value of those supplies which are unrestricted; 
(g) subtract the amount of any discounts (including cash discounts), commissions 
or allowances to buyers and of any delivery charges applicable to the remaining 
supplies; 
(h) from the net total subtract one-third. 
The resultant figure for each class of controlled goods will represent the home supplies 
of that class permitted for the period from June 6 to November 30, 1940. 
Dealers on Commission 
The fact that a person receives a commission in respect of a particular transaction does 
not in itself mean that for the purposes of the Order the goods in question have been 
“supplied” to him or that he has “supplied” them. Manufacturers’ agents, shipping 
houses or similar firms operating solely on commission will not be registered as 
suppliers. Firms which deal in controlled goods on their own account in addition to 
acting as agents for others must apply for registration.  
A manufacturer whose business in controlled goods consists solely of manufacturing 
on commission or performing a process on goods which do not become his property is 
not a controlled supplier and is not required to register. The person on whose behalf 
such work is done is required to register.  
Imported Goods 
The restriction upon the home sales of persons covered by the Order applies not only 
to goods of United Kingdom manufacture but also to goods imported from abroad – 
the latter class are also subject on importation to the restrictions imposed by Orders 
under the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. The importer who 
imports controlled goods and supplies them to other persons who buy for the purpose 





The retailer who is not engaged in manufacturing or wholesaling is not required to 
register or to make returns. His supplies are liable to restriction by the registered 
suppliers.  
Contracts 
Difficulties may arise where contracts for the supply of controlled goods have been 
entered into before the date of the Order, and provision is made in the Order under 
which in certain circumstances such contracts may be determined. 
Persons required to apply to register and who fail to do so before the date prescribed 
in the Order (namely, June 20, 1940) will be prohibited from carrying on business in 
respect of which they were required to make application for registration. 
Contravention of, or failure to comply with, the Order is an office against the Defence 
Regulations. 
Trade Associations and Chambers of Commerce 
Persons desiring further information with regard to the operation of the Order should 
in the first instance approach their trade organisations, Chambers of Commerce or 
Export Groups.  
Steps will be taken to supply these organisations with explanations of the various 
questions arising from the operation of the Order. 
The Small Manufacturer 
Under Article 1 (3) of the Order a manufacturer who is not also a wholesaler is neither 
required to apply for registration under the Order nor required to observe any of the 
other provisions of the Order provided that his total sales of any class of controlled 
goods did not amount to more the £250 in value in any month in the year which ended 
on May 31, 1940, and does not amount to more than £167 in any month henceforth. 
The exemption applies equally whether or not the small manufacturer retails his own 
product himself. But any retailer and any other person who carries on or has carried 
on the business of manufacturing any class of controlled goods in excess of the above 
figures is subject to the operation of the Order. He has to apply for registration and he 
has to limit his total sales within the class in question, including the goods which he 




Appendix 5: Purchase Tax 
 
Transcribed from the August 1940 issue of the Music Trades Review. 
General Scheme 
In order that this report may be fully informative we reiterate once more that liability 
to tax arises when the goods pass from the wholesaler to the retailer. Manufacturers 
and wholesale merchants dealing in chargeable goods will be registered and this will 
enable them (except in certain cases) to deal with one another freely in the goods, or 
to export them, without incurring liability to tax. Tax becomes chargeable when the 
goods are sold by an unregistered person, generally the retailer, or where there is no 
retail stage, to the public.  
Sales by Registered Persons 
The right of a registered firm to buy tax free is limited to cases where the goods are 
bought (a) as materials for making other goods, or (b) as stock for wholesale trade. If 
the registered firm is buying as a consumer (e.g., if the goods are required for office 
equipment in his office), tax is payable as if they were being purchased by an 
unregistered person. 
Where a registered manufacturer or wholesaler maintains separate retail shops or 
departments, tax will be chargeable when goods are transferred to them from the 
factory or warehouse.  
Imports and Exports 
Imported goods are included in the scope of the tax in the same manner as home-
produced goods. The tax will not apply while the goods remain in bonded warehouses, 
or to goods in transit or transhipment. 
Goods exported by a registered person will be free of tax, whether he is exporting on 
his own account or on behalf of a retailer. Where the retailer exports from his own 
stock, on which tax has been paid, the Treasury is empowered to approve schemes for 
refunding the tax.  
Date of Operation 
The date from which the tax becomes operative will be fixed by Treasury Order. It will 
apply to all taxable transactions as described above if the goods are delivered on or 
after the operative date of the tax, irrespective of the date when the contract of sale 
was made. In general, therefore, existing stocks in the hands of retailers will not be 
chargeable with tax; but there is special provision whereby firms who since July 2, 
1940, have delivered goods to retailers or to separate retail branches of their own 
business “on a scale or in a manner not in accordance with the ordinary practice of the 
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business” may be charged with tax in respect thereof, notwithstanding that the goods 
were delivered prior to the date of operation of the tax.  
Collection of Tax 
The person accountable for the tax in the ordinary case is the manufacturer or 
wholesaler selling the goods, but he will not be required to pay it to the Crown until 
the end of the period (normally three months) in which the goods are delivered. 
Registered persons will be required to keep such accounts as will enable them to render 
periodical returns of their deliveries of goods and to compute and pay the tax 
accordingly. Provision will be made enabling the tax on goods which are not paid for 
during the period in which they were delivered to be carried forward to the next period, 
and due adjustment will be allowed in respect of bad debts.  
Provision is also made to enable the seller, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, 
to increase the price at which he may have contracted to supply the goods before the 
operation of the tax, by the amount of tax chargeable. Any consequential increase in 
retail prices will be subject to the provisions of the Prices of Goods Act, 1939.  
Registration 
Firms required to register include every manufacturer who makes and sells chargeable 
goods and every wholesale merchant dealing in chargeable goods. Such firms must 
register with the Customs and Excise unless the gross takings from sales of chargeable 
goods do not on the average exceed £2,000 a year. The limit of £2,000 is subject to 
alteration by Treasury Order at any time. In the case of a manufacturing retailer, any 
retail sales of goods not made by him must be disregarded in determining whether the 
limit is exceeded.  
Definitions 
The term “manufacturer” means any person carrying on in the United Kingdom a 
business of making and selling goods, or applying any process in the making of goods 
which are his property (including the assembly of parts). 
Firms engaged in processing or repairing goods, the property of another firm, and not 
themselves selling chargeable goods, are not required to register. 
Retailers engaged in making chargeable goods for sale are manufacturers, and, subject 
to the provisions set out above, are required to register. This does not, however, apply 
to retailers who merely alter ready-made goods or make up carpet or curtains to prior 
order. 
The term “wholesale merchant” means any person carrying on in the United Kingdom 
a business of selling goods not of his own manufacture (a) to persons buying such 
goods for the purpose of resale, or (b) to persons using such goods as materials in the 
manufacture of other goods. 
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Wholesale merchants engaged in import or export trade should apply for registration 
if they deal in chargeable goods. 
Firms engaged only in making goods which are not chargeable are not required to 
register, but provision exists for registering such firms where they use chargeable 
goods in substantial quantities as materials in manufacture. This will enable them to 
obtain their materials free of tax from other registered firms. 
The Commissioners are also empowered to register businesses such as multiple shops 
which for their retail trade make purchases of chargeable goods which in value and 
character are such as in the ordinary course of trade are made by wholesale merchants. 
The Commissioners propose to register such businesses, and tax will become 
chargeable as the goods are transferred to the firms’ retail ranches.  
Repairs and Second Hand 
Firms engaged in repair work as distinct from manufacture are not required to register. 
Second hand goods as such are not exempt from tax, though in many cases no tax may 
be chargeable owning to the nature of the transaction, e.g., sales by retailers of second 
hand goods bought or taken back from members of the public. Firms who make a 
business of buying chargeable goods second hand and repairing or reconditioning them 
for sale to retailers are carrying on wholesale trade and must apply for registration.  
Application for Registration 
All persons required to be registered must apply for registration. Registration will not 
be compulsory until the Finance (No. 2) Bill, 1940, has become law, but the 
Commissioners are prepared to receive applications forthwith from all persons who 
will be registrable. Application should be made on Form PTI, which may be obtained 
from the local Officer of Customs and Excise, or from the Secretaries’ Office, Custom 
House, Lower Thames Street, London, E.C.3. The form, after being completed, should 
be sent to the local officer, whose address is usually obtainable from the telephone 
directory or from the Post Office. Firms in doubt as to whether they are required to 
register should also consult the local officer. 
On being registered, firms will be given an official certificate of registration, which 
will enable them to obtain tax-free from other registered firms any chargeable goods 
required as materials for use in manufacture or as stock for wholesale trading. A 
registered firm selling chargeable goods to an unregistered firm will be accountable 








Hire and hire-purchase transactions will be treated as purchases for tax purposes. In 
the ordinary case where the transaction is between the retailer and the public, the tax 
will have been charged when the retailer bought the goods. Where the goods are let 
out on hire by a manufacturer or wholesale merchant to an unregistered person, tax 
will be due on their full wholesale value when the goods are delivered. Houses 
financing hire-purchase transactions will not be registerable as wholesalers merely 
because from time to time they resell goods on which the purchaser has defaulted. 
The Commissioners strongly recommend all firms required to be registered to make 
application as early as possible: it is understood that the prescribed date will be fixed 
shortly. Arrangements have been made for copies of the official notice, and of the form 
of application, to be posted to a number of manufacturers and wholesale merchants 
who may be concerned, but any trader required to register who has not received a form 




Appendix 6: Brief on Post-War Reconstruction in the Piano Trade 
 
Transcribed from documents in Board of Trade Papers, BT 64/1786. National 
Archives.  
Organisation 
The original Piano Trade Export Group held discussions with the Department of 
Overseas Trade at the Board of Trade Offices in 1942 and submitted very valuable 
data particularly with regard to export prospects. This Committee was enlarged on 
February 3rd 1943 to include manufacturers of parts and supplies as well as the original 
members who were piano manufacturers, and thereafter appears to have become 
thoroughly representative of the whole trade. At the request of the Board of Trade it 
enlarged and brought up to date information given by the original group.   
The Trade Unions concerned with the Piano Industry have met together and have 
appointed a Piano Workers’ Joint Committee which held its first sitting on November 
11th 1942. Both the above bodies are to be invited to the proposed meetings. 
There have been no relations between the two sides of the Industry since 1927 when 
there was a dispute and a strike. We have reason to believe that more peaceful relations 
may be hoped for in the future and it is anticipated by the Union side that this meeting 
may mark the commencement of a better state of affairs.  
Concentration 
Originally the Piano Trade was subjected to a process of concentration similar to that 
of many other industries, but after this had been completed under the direction of Lord 
Forres it was decided (owing apparently to reasons connected with lease-lend and 
similar international complexes) to close down the Piano Trade altogether and the 
present position is that no new production is taking place except a small number of 
pianos which are being made for N.A.A.F.I. and E.N.S.A. Small allocations of raw 
materials are made to the industry for repairs, including the re-conditioning of 
secondhand pianos for re-sale largely to N.A.A.F.I. This work is permitted to be 
carried out only by non-transferable labour.  
The transferable labour still remaining in the industry is engaged on war work such as 
making ammunition boxes, and certain aeroplane parts. 
Requisitioned firms will need to inform Regional Factory Controllers what parts of 
their premises are most urgently needed for a start in a small way, should it not be 
possible to clear all the premises. 
Disposals 
During the period of great shortage which may be experienced immediately after the 
armistice some relief may be anticipated from release of pianos from N.A.A.F.I. and 
E.N.S.A., or from the Admiralty. This relief cannot be very great in quantity. Some of 
the instruments will undoubtedly be in poor condition; all will need some 
reconditioning, and there will be very few fine concert pianos included. The Board is 
anxious to secure that this reconditioning should take place under proper supervision 
and that these machines should be put on the market at controlled prices and in a 
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regulated manner.  Approaches have already been made to N.A.A.F.I. to secure that 
they co-operate in this. It is also clear that the allocation of contracts for reconditioning 
may ease some of the difficulties caused by a sudden withdrawal of contracts to the 
piano firms who are at present engaged in munitions. 
The piano manufacturers appear to be interested in these proposals so far as they 
concern the London area (all manufacturers save two are in London) provided the 
reconditioning is to be of a good standard. They would not be interested in “odd jobs”. 
It is understood that (except for big jobs such as split sound boards) most 
reconditioning work could be done satisfactorily by local retailers. As regards London 
the manufacturers may desire to share this work with the retail firms. It is desirable 
that only pianos released for purchase by the public be properly reconditioned. We 
cannot say at the present time whether or not sales will be entrusted to manufacturers. 
Profit margins certainly will be subjected to control. The manufacturers are 
recommended to discuss further with Mr. Abrahamson and representatives of other 
Departments concerned.   
Time Required for Changeover 
This is estimated by the employers as between 6 and 12 months according to the stocks 
held by individual firms now.  
Export 
In the original interview in 1942 it was alleged that exports were made “at a loss”, 
being regarded as a contribution to the overheads during the slack season of 5 months. 
Preferential tariffs were endorsed and a hope of their extension expressed.  
The annual value of exports of pianos and parts was only about £115,000 (out of a 
total production of £1.3/4 million) of which about 80% was to Empire countries. The 
makers of parts claim to be as large exporters as those of the complete instruments 
though statistics do not support this view. The industry expects an increased export 
trade after the War especially to S. America. The prospects from an accumulated 
demand are said to be good. The trade say they have no fear of U.S. competition even 
in S. America, but before the War Germany was a serious competitor. Some firms have 
already large export orders. 
The Export Group includes both sections of the industry, i.e. piano manufacturers and 
the manufacturers of parts. These are complementary in as much as if a country is 
making pianos, e.g. Australia, parts may be imported though in addition some 
purchasers will demand complete U.K. instruments. At the same time the two sections 
of the trade are, obviously, to some degree competitors.    
Comparatively few firms had direct representatives abroad. Sales were through 
merchants. Such methods cannot be very effective in securing new markets or 
extending existing markets at the expense of, say, Germany. Could the trade combine 
with similar industries, i.e. other musical industries, to make an export drive through 
their own representatives? 




“The Break” in Government Contracts 
The Directorate of Woodworking has asked to be represented at these meetings. Such 
presentation is desirable because after the Armistice Government contracts would 
disappear progressively. Re-allocation of those remaining would probably be 
necessary and this would be a responsibility of the Directorate in consultation with the 
Board.  
Future Production 
The employers have estimated for a production of 50,000 pianos plus 10,000 for 
export. Pre-war export was about 3,000. They ask for the following raw materials: 
3154 Petersburg standards of softwoods 
137500 ft. cu. of hardwoods 
10000000 ft. super veneers 
6500 tons of various metals, mostly iron; and more modest amounts of textiles 
and general merchandise. 
It will be necessary to point out that these materials will only gradually become 
available and in any case properly seasoned wood will be found to be short for some 
long time. This is an important point. It would be desirable to consider and perhaps 
discuss with the Trade and Timber Control the possibility of releasing at intervals to 
firms timber for seasoning (under seasoning licences), as such timber becomes 
available.  
Labour 
It is not likely, at any rate before the Japanese armistice that anything like the suggested 
amount of labour (5,000 skilled, 1,000 unskilled) will be available. The skilled workers 
are all craftsmen but are not all equally important. The trade should be asked to classify 
further into groups indicating order of priority of desired release. We should need to 
know from the Industry in particular whether there are any key workers for whose 
early release a strong case can be made and if so, how many; whether they have any 
proposals for the allocation of this labour between the various firms as it is 
demobilised, and a similar question arises in the matter of raw materials. 
Purchase Tax 
The employers strongly urge the abolition of the present 100% purchase tax. This is a 
matter for the Treasury and the Board can only note with interest their view.  
Machinery 
The observations made by the industry to date on this are indefinite. But they appear 
to indicate that replacement needs should not be heavy, and machinery may not present 
a serious problem. New electric motors should not present much difficulty but we 
should like to know what machines would need replacement, their number and their 
value, and whether there will be a heavy demand for spare parts. The Machine Tools 
Control has been consulted but cannot be very helpful until specific requirements of 
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the industry are stated, but warns us that it expects a heavy demand for replacement of 
woodworking machinery after the war. 
Training of Labour 
As has been stated there are no organised relations between the employers and 
employed nor any Joint Industrial Council. We are given to understand that there is 
some hope of a better state of affairs; and we should like to know for our information 
whether there is a prospect of a national agreement on wages and hours, and 
particularly upon the training of apprentices on which the future of the industry must 
largely depend. At present there are two training institutions. 1. The Music Trades 
School at the Northern Polytechnic, Holloway, consists of a junior and senior school. 
The former takes juvenile students at 14 for a three years’ course, the better students 
then pass to the senior school for a further two years’ course. The skilled junior labour 
in the musical instruments trade is largely drawn from these lads and the courses are 
largely substitutes for the old apprentice system. Not all the students however enter 
the music trade. 2. The Institute of Musical Instrument Technology founded in 1938 
provides some instruction for craftsmen. We should like to know the extent of support 
which the Industry is prepared to grant to these two bodies. They are limited in their 
sphere and are in no sense research organisations. The school will certainly need re-
equipping to a considerable degree at the end of the war.  
Research 
Scientific research may be expected to assist in bringing the British product up to a 
level sufficiently high to compete with others outside these Islands. Before the war the 
trade was suffering very seriously from American and German competition. German 
competition declined in the years preceding 1939, but solely because the Germans 
were deliberately turning their piano factories to war production. At the present 
moment the trade employs directly few or no professional scientists on research. But 
scientists are obviously needed for such problems as the seasoning of special timbers, 
the response of special timbers and other materials to various climatic conditions (most 
important for the export trade), the problems of sound productions and quality, the 
properties and use of substitute materials, electric amplification and the further 
development of electronic instruments, design in general, and many other problem. It 
is improbable that any such useful research could be done on such questions for a less 
sum then £5,000 per annum; and even if the whole piano trade were to co-operate to 
set up a co-operative research bureau for this purpose it is probable such expenditure 
would be rather heavy for it. The conference should be asked to discuss whether it 
would not prefer to co-operate with other musical instrument makers since there are 
many important problems common to all musical instrument industries. If all the 
musical trades, including organ building, combine to form a research association 
substantial funds might be made available. £10,000 a year from the combined trades 
would be indeed a good start. Failing this, a fund of a thousand pounds spent yearly 
on a special library and information bureau would be far from useless and might lead 
to further developments later. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
will not be represented at the meeting but would be very glad to meet and advise any 
sub-committee that may be appointed and to consider the proposals in relation to the 
work of existing research organisations. 
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It seems relevant to point out that a musical instrument is a finished product made by 
craftsmen and has reached its present degree of “perfection” through centuries of 
development. Problems of cost of production and processes of manufacture play a less 
important part than in most industries. In so far as fundamental problems are 
concerned, these may be less numerous and relevant than in other industries and may 
be such as could be dealt with by University Departments. The real problems of 
immediate interest to the trade are practical problems of development. Much work of 
this type has already been done by the staff of the Trade School through the Institute 
of Musical Instrument Technology and a useful body of the experience already exists. 
A Research Association should be independent of the School but should keep in close 
touch with it and with University Departments interested in the fundamental physical 
problems.  
On the question of design, the trade might make useful contacts with the National 
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